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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the general question of what role can courts play in
counteracting the potential capture by professional self-regulating bodies, with a
specific focus on competency-based, entry-to-practice standards. This thesis will
make the argument that the current competency-based, entry-to-practice standards
for Canadian patent agents suffer from several issues which call into question the
legitimacy of this occupational licensing intervention. Using the Canadian patent
agent profession as a case study, the thesis will consider whether Canadian
administrative law can provide a viable mechanism for challenging the illegitimacy
of the Canadian patent agent regulatory framework. Accordingly, this thesis project
asks the following question- in light of important considerations of both legitimacy
and legality in Canadian patent agent governance, can Canadian courts act as an
effective counterbalance to potential competency-based, entry-to-practice based
capture in Canadian patent agent regulation? The answer to this question extends
beyond the context of administrative law. The concept of patent agent ‘competency’
in many ways acts as a foundation for a dominant patent discourse, and challenging
patent agent competency may be an important mechanism for challenging this
overarching discourse.
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PART 1: PATENT AGENCY – THE PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The state of occupational regulation, and particularly, professional self-regulation,
has undergone profound transformations in commonwealth jurisdictions including the
U.K. and Australia. However, for many reasons, this same political movement has yet to
take hold with the same force in North America. According to Alice Wooley, Canada
remains one of the ‘last bastions of unfettered self-regulation in the common wealth
world’, with the self-regulatory mechanism maintaining its predominance in fields such
as law, medicine and pharmacy.1
This is not to say that a North American counter movement has not started to take
shape. In the U.S. context, an abundance of recent scholarship pertaining to the legality
of occupational licensing regulations signals a growing interest in challenging the
unfettered discretion of self-regulatory licensing bodies. Several recent high-profile
cases, including United States Supreme Court decisions, have invigorated a debate
regarding the legality of allegedly protectionist professional licensing regulations.
These cases and commentaries highlight a growing dissatisfaction with the
perceived illegitimacy of professional licensing and self-regulation, which are
increasingly viewed as being convenient covers for professional protectionism. Yet they
also demonstrate that the North American self-regulatory counter movement, unlike the
political movements of Australia and the U.K., has to date been largely legal, rather than
political, in nature.
The emphasis on legal avenues for redress against protectionist self-regulatory
licensing regimes is a recognition of the challenging situation surrounding regulatory
agencies generally. Often people speak of different forms of ‘regulatory capture’,
wherein a regulatory body serves the interests of the regulated rather than the public’s
interest. In the context of self-regulation, regulatory capture may be a consequence of
1

Alice Woolley, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics in Canada 4 (Markham: LexisNexis, 2011) at 4-9.

1

‘public choice theory’. According to public choice theory, regulatory agencies and
enactments which predominantly serve the interests of the regulated as opposed to the
public are relatively easy to establish and remarkably resistant to political reform. This is
because benefits flowing to the regulated group, which typically consist of a small
community of highly organized individuals, are intensified within a tight-knit group that
can effectively lobby to secure their political interests at the expense of the public
interest. Thus, according to public choice theory, self-regulatory bodies are particularly
resistant to political reform given the disparity in interests and political organization.
While one could say that this recent litigation trend has sparked an interesting
discussion regarding the legality surrounding occupation licensing regulation, this is far
from saying that these cases have been very successful in invalidating allegedly
illegitimate licensing regulations. From an administrative law perspective, courts have
historically afforded tremendous legal deference to the discretion of self-regulatory
bodies because “despite public choice insights, courts have historically assumed that such
laws can be ‘rectified by the democratic processes’.” 2 Many U.S. cases have attempted
to reanimate outdated constitutional principles as a counter-balance to protectionist
tendencies of self-regulatory bodies. John Blevins succinctly summarizes the issues by
stating:
Why select such contentious and seemingly discredited [constitutional]
doctrines? One reason is simply that there are no other better options.
Modern law lacks viable doctrinal tools to invalidate irrational
protectionist licensing. A second is that occupational licensing litigation
has become about more than the individual cases themselves. Instead,
they are part of a larger attempt to revive dormant economic liberty
doctrines. In this respect, occupational licensing battles are a new form of
public interest litigation, not unlike same-sex marriage or desegregation
litigation.3 (emphasis added)

John Blevins, "License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational Licensing” (2017) 64 UCLA L Rev
844 at 878.
2

Ibid at 871. See also Joseph Sanderson, “Don't Bury the Competition: The Growth of Occupational Licensing and a
Toolbox for Reform” (2014) 31 Yale J on Reg 455 at 456-457: “So far, the law has not found a satisfactory way to deal
with state-level protectionist economic regulation… is there anything that can be done to counter the special interest
laws that restrict entry to occupations?”
3
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This thesis is a modest attempt at contributing to the discussion surrounding the
appropriate balance between courts and professional self-regulation. Using the example
of Canadian patent agent regulation, this thesis explores the general question of what role
can courts play in counteracting the potential capture by professional self-regulating
bodies, with a specific focus on competency-based, entry-to-practice standards. This
thesis will make the argument that the current competency-based, entry-to-practice
standards for Canadian patent agents suffer from several issues which call into question
the legitimacy of this occupational licensing intervention. Using the Canadian patent
agent profession as a case study, the thesis will consider whether Canadian administrative
law can provide a viable mechanism for challenging the illegitimacy of the Canadian
patent agent regulatory framework. Accordingly, this thesis project asks the following
question: in light of important considerations of both legitimacy and legality in Canadian
patent agent governance, can Canadian courts act as an effective counterbalance to
potential competency-based, entry-to-practice based capture in Canadian patent agent
regulation?
This thesis begins by discussing general theories of professional regulation with
an emphasis on regulation of professional legal services. As self-regulation, at least from
a North American perspective, remains the preferred professional regulatory framework,
the review undertakes a historical analysis of Canadian self-regulation. This historical
analysis examines several unique factors leading to Canada’s steadfast commitment to a
broad form of professional self-regulation, highlighting some of the concerns regarding
the regulation of professional ‘competency’ and how the mechanisms of competencybased regulation have become disconnected from their historical origins and purposes
and have become servants of professional interests.
This historical analysis provides several key insights. There has been a historic
shift in professional self-regulation, which developed over the course of the midtwentieth century, from a balancing of public and professional interests, including
flexibility with respect to strict ‘competency’ based entry qualifications, to a commitment
to the principle that the best interests of the profession somehow automatically align with
and further the public’s interests. Stemming from this principle, Canadian self-regulated
3

professions have focused considerable efforts on entry qualifications, placing tremendous
emphasis on competency based standards as the predominant ‘public interest’ priority,
often at the expense of other important public interest considerations. However, this
phenomenon begs the question whether protectionist forces may have taken hold in
various professional fields under the guise of professional competence. With respect to
Canadian self-regulating professions, new political movements skeptical of the public
interest motives of professions may be returning Canada to a position where reliance on
professional judgements of expertise may no longer occupy a central role in professional
self-regulation.
The thesis will then discuss public choice theory as well as several contemporary
theories of regulatory capture, with a focus on regulatory capture in self-regulated
professions. The discussion of regulatory capture covers various analytic frameworks for
identifying indicia of capture. This includes a discussion of Daniel Carpenter’s analytic
framework, which distinguishes between between ‘regulatory’ and ‘agency’ capture
(which relate to legislative action and agency action respectively) and his emphasis on
‘capture mechanisms’. Other contemporary ‘non-materialist’ theories of capture include
Cass Sunstein’s theory of ‘epistemic capture’ and James Kwak’s theory of ‘cultural
capture’. To translate these economic theories into applicable legal frameworks, and
specifically, administrative law doctrine, this thesis proposes a clear distinction between
public choice theory, which operates at the political level, and regulatory capture, which
operates within the administration of a regulatory framework. The law of judicial review
emphasizes the significance of political will as evidenced by legislative intent, and in the
context of self-regulation, circumstances which might typically be viewed as ‘capture’
are frequently authorized by statute. As such, this thesis clearly distinguishes between
public choice consequences, for which judicial review remediation is limited, and
regulatory capture, which is properly within the domain of judicial review.
The thesis then proceeds to examine the history of the patent agent profession.
This historical examination will demonstrate that the patent agent profession is in many
ways unique from other professions. The origin of the profession at the time of the
Industrial Revolution is in many ways tied to the historical development of a socio4

economic discourse of technology, a discourse for which patent law is central. Patent
agents have been, since the time of the Industrial Revolution, central players in authoring
this discourse along with their professional role within it. Thus, the patent agent
profession is in many ways unique amongst professions, in that they have, and in many
ways continue to be, authors of their own professional discourse.
An analysis of patent agent competency will demonstrate that patent agent
competency is in many ways disconnected from any demonstrable evidence of public
harm caused by incompetence. Furthermore, patent agent competency serves as a
lynchpin for the predominant patent practice narrative; the boundary between who is and
is not competent defines the boundary of this narrative. The patent system is founded on
a public interest theory- a ‘patent social contract’- which states that the patent system
promotes innovation and dissemination of knowledge by rewarding inventors with
proprietary rights over their inventions in exchange for public disclosure of invention
information. Yet evidence demonstrates that the current predominant practice narrative
may undermine many aspects of the patent social contract, by limiting independent
inventors’ access to the patent system as well as failing to accommodate for public
interest in access to inventive knowledge. As this international patent narrative is largely
supported by a hyper-proximity between patent offices and patent agents, through what
Peter Drahos calls ‘invisible harmonization’, challenging the predominant patent practice
narrative may require challenging the concept of ‘competency’ that reinforces this
narrative. As discussed herein, an analysis of the history of patent agent regulation tells
us as much about the development of the patent system itself as it does about the patent
agent profession, as the two are in many ways inexorably intertwined. 4
The historical analysis continues by reviewing the history of the Canadian patent
agent profession. This analysis demonstrates that the Canadian patent agent profession
exhibits many of the same phenomenon common to the development of self-regulated
professions in Canada generally, including the possibility that professional ‘competency’
Anna Guagnini, “Patent Agents in Britain at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Themes and Perspectives” in Ian
Inkster (ed.), History of Technology, Volume 31, 2012 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2012) at 146: “the
analysis of the internal dynamics of this small but diverse group [patent agents] can tell us much not only about the
profession itself and how the characteristics of the practitioners evolved but also about the changes that took place
within the network of the other players involved in the patent business.”
4
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has become disconnected from its historical origins and has become a capture mechanism
for the profession. Historically, regulation of the Canadian patent agent profession
emerged from factors that, at least at first appearance, were at best tangentially related to
the issue of professional competence. However, similar to other Canadian professions,
the Canadian patent agent governance framework has over time become almost entirely
focused on ‘competency’, with practically the entire governance framework centering
around a stringent licensing examination process. The Canadian patent agent regulatory
framework is remarkably out-of-step from comparable jurisdictions, with the
qualification examination pass rate being the lowest in the world. The insularity of the
profession, the lack of accountability and the dismal exam pass rates all potentially form
part of what may be a valid capture narrative, centering around ‘competency’ based entry
qualifications as an effective capture mechanism.
The thesis will proceed to discuss Canadian administrative law, with analysis of
recent case law and the challenges associated with relying on judicial review as an
effective filter against professional self-regulatory protectionism. The analysis will
consider both substantive and procedural review. Regarding substantive review, recent
jurisprudence demonstrates courts have interpreted enabling legislation as granting selfregulated bodies broad discretion in setting competency-based regulations. The
combination of ‘competency’ and ‘public interest’ mandates common to most selfregulatory legislation entitles self-regulating professions to tremendous deference in
setting competency-based standards, even in circumstances where any evidence of
‘public harm’ rationale for such decisions is limited.
Furthermore, courts have applied a strict evidentiary standard with respect to
substantive review of the decisions of self-regulating professions, limiting the evidentiary
record to the material that was before the decision maker in making its ‘decision’. This
limits applicants’ ability to construct a ‘capture narrative’, by limiting the scope of
evidentiary review when challenging regulatory bodies’ ‘policy’ decisions. As this
question of evidentiary standards is still very much an open issue, Supreme Court
guidance, and hopefully reform, with respect to expanding the evidentiary record would
be beneficial.
6

Procedural fairness, as opposed to substantive review, may provide viable options
for challenging competency-based, entry-to-practice standards. Recent jurisprudence
applying the Supreme Court’s Baker factors have suggested that contextually, in
circumstances involving entitlement to practice a profession, individuals should be
afforded a substantially high level of procedural fairness. In this regard, courts have
demonstrated a willingness to scrutinize all aspects of professional licensing
administration, including examination development, setting, marking and the provision of
reasons. Furthermore, as matters of procedural fairness are reviewed on a standard of
correctness, courts have demonstrated a willingness to expand the evidentiary record
beyond what would be permitted in substantive review, thereby affording opportunities to
construct an evidentiary ‘capture narrative’.
Most importantly, this thesis will argue that institutional bias, as an element of
procedural fairness, may be the most significant legal mechanism for challenging
regulatory capture in the context of self-regulating professions. As set out above, when
translating political/economic theories of public choice theory and regulatory capture into
‘legal doctrine’, the concern surrounding regulatory capture is in many respects a concern
with biased decision making. Accordingly, combatting regulatory capture is essentially
an attempt to combat biased decision-making within the regulatory framework. Specific
to patent agent regulation, as discussed above, if the objective in challenging the current
patent agent regulatory framework and its over-emphasis on ‘competency’ is to challenge
the current dominant patent practice narrative, then this essentially translates into
challenging the over-proximity between the patent office and patent agents in regulatory
decision-making along with the biases that flow therefrom.
The unique challenge in self-regulatory professions, as opposed to other
regulatory frameworks, is that many biases are statutorily authorized. This is the same in
the context of the Canadian patent agent profession. This thesis proposes the adoption of
Laverne Jacobs’ grounded impartiality approach to institutional bias analysis, which
advocates for courts conducting a comprehensive analysis into the detailed working of a
regulatory body in order to locate potential biases that may not be explicitly mandated by
statute. Currently, Canadian jurisprudence remains unclear with respect to the nature and
7

extent of institutional bias analysis. As this discussion will demonstrate, the depth of
institutional bias analysis that a court would hypothetically be willing to undertake when
reviewing the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework will largely determine
whether the current regulatory framework is invalid due to institutional bias.
1.2 CANADIAN PATENT AGENCY AND PATENT AGENT GOVERNANCE
To set the stage for the significance of the discussion set out herein, this Chapter
1.2 provides background on the nature of Canadian patent agency and the regulation
thereof. To acquire patent protection for an invention in Canada, one must file a patent
application in the Patent Office of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO).
This application is then examined to ensure that that the patent application meets the
requisite formalities and that the invention claimed therein meets the requirements for
patentability. If a patent application meets all legal requirements, a patent is granted for
the claimed invention, and the owner may, subject to some limitations, exclude all others
within Canada from practicing the invention.
Individuals may prepare and prosecute their own patent application before CIPO,
but given the technical nature of patent office practice, the assistance of an experienced
professional is often recommended. Only registered Canadian patent agents may
represent others before the Canadian Patent Office, and in many instances, individuals
wishing to conduct business before the Canadian Patent Office, such as institutions and
corporations, must appoint a registered Canadian patent agent to act on their behalf. 5
Canadian patent agents are granted the exclusive right to “represent applicants in the
presentation and prosecution of applications for patents or in other business before the
[Canadian]Patent Office.”6
Many jurisdictions regulate the practice of patent agency, but, regulatory
frameworks vary. To become registered as a Canadian patent agent, an individual must
complete two years of practical experience followed by successfully passing the

5

Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, R. 20(1) [Rules].

6

Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, s. 15 [Patent Act].

8

Canadian Patent Agent Examination.7 The current patent agent licensing regime is
authorized by the Patent Act and Patent Rules. Section 15 of the Patent Act states that:
A register of patent agents shall be kept in the Patent Office on which
shall be entered the names of all persons and firms entitled to represent
applicants in the presentation and prosecution of applications for
patents or in other business before the Patent Office. (emphasis added)
Section 12(1)(j) of the Patent Act grants the Governor in Council authority to
make rules and regulations:
respecting the entry on, the maintenance of and the removal from the
register of patent agents of the names of persons and firms, including
the qualifications that must be met and the conditions that must be
fulfilled by a person or firm before the name of the person or firm is
entered thereon and to maintain the name of the person or firm on the
register.
Rule 13(1) establishes an Examining Board for the purpose of preparing,
administering and marking the qualifying examination for patent agents. Rule 13(2)
states that:
The members of the Examining Board shall be appointed by the
Commissioner, and the chairperson and at least three other members
shall be employees of the Patent Office and at least five members shall
be patent agents nominated by the Intellectual Property Institute of
Canada. (emphasis added)
The Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) is a voluntary organization
that represents the interests of patent agents and other intellectual property professionals
in Canada.8 The IPIC has a long history in Canada’s intellectual property landscape,
promoting intellectual property protection and the expertise of its members, as well as
lobbying to protect its members’ interests. Since the earliest days of modern patent
systems, similar voluntary organizations have been active in various jurisdictions around
the world, and in that respect, IPIC is not unlike its counterparts from other countries.
However, as elaborated below, several circumstances unique to Canada make IPIC’s

7

Rules, R. 12.

8See

generally, The Intellectual Property Institute of Canada, (Ottawa: The Intellectual Property Institute of Canada,
2018) <http://www.ipic.ca> accessed on July 2, 2018 [IPIC Website]

9

involvement in the patent agent licensing process an outlier amongst comparable
jurisdictions.
As there are no education requirements, no required competencies for the twoyear practical experience period and no ethics guidelines, for practical purposes, the
entire Canadian patent agent regulatory framework revolves around the Patent Agent
Examination process. The current Canadian patent agent examination is a set of four
papers, offered over four consecutive days, once per year. The four papers are: Paper A
covering patent drafting; Paper B covering patent validity analysis; Paper C covering
patent office practice; and Paper D covering patent infringement analysis. A total of 100
marks are available for each paper and to pass the examination, a candidate must obtain a
total of at least 240 marks (60%) and not less than 50 marks (50%) on each individual
paper. A candidate who scores at least 60 marks (60%) on a given paper will retain those
marks towards future attempts to pass the examination.9
CIPO has only maintained archived examinations and exam statistics since 2005.
While anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that the Canadian patent agent examination
pass rate has always been substantially low, the available statistics and context from the
last two decades paint a harrowing picture. For example, as seen in Table 1, the overall
pass rate in 2004 was approximately 32%, with a first time pass rate of 7%. These
numbers are no doubt daunting. However, since 2009, pass rates have decreased
drastically towards their current abysmal numbers. Overall pass rates have fallen to less
than 7% in 2012, with first time pass rates hovering around 1% since 2005. In 2016, only
3 out of the 119 candidates sitting for the Paper D examination scored over the 60/100
pass-mark on Paper D with the highest mark being one individual who scored just over
the pass score of 60. 10 In every year since 2005, with only very few exceptions, the
average marks for each Paper of the Exam has been a failing grade.11 It takes the average
Canada, Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Candidate Guide To Writing — The Canadian Patent Agent
Examination
(Ottawa:
Ministry
of
Innovation,
Science
and
Economic
Development,
2018)
<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00113.html> accessed on July 2, 2018.
9

Canada, Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Patent Agent Qualifying Examination — 2017 Report (Ottawa:
Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, 2017) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04382.html> at Table 1 (accessed on July 2, 2018) [CIPO].
10

11

Ibid at Figure 1 and Table 2. The only exceptions are 2010 Paper C (average mark- 61%), 2015 Paper C (average
mark- 61%) and 2016 Paper C (average mark- 64%).

10

Figure 1 and Table 2—Average marks for each paper since 2005
Average marks for each paper since 2005

candidate between five to eight years to pass these examinations. 12 It now appears that
the pass rate for the Canadian patent agent licensing exam is by far the lowest amongst
comparable jurisdictions. 13
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Figure 3 and Table 4—Number of candidates achieving overall pass in 2017
by number of attempts (total number of candidates: 26)
Number of attempts to achieve overall pass in 2017
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United States of America, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Registration exam results and statistics
(Alexandria, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2017) < https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners/registration-exam-results-and-statistics> accessed on July 2, 2018. In
2017 (which appears to be the most recent data available) the overall percentage pass rate was 43.9%. Some have
commented that U.S. pass rates are unfortunately low; see Zachary Kinnaird, 2015 U.S. Patent Practitioner Trends
(2015) Patently-O <http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/current-patent-practitioner.html> accessed on July 2, 2018.
For European statistics, see Europe, European Patent Office, Statistics on the results of the European qualifying
examination 2018, pre-examination and main examination (Munich: European Patent Office, 2018) <
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/0B8D505A36857ACEC12582BE00435344/$File/StatisticsEQ
E2018.pdf> accessed on July 2, 2018. The 2018 overall pass rates per paper were 52% for Paper A, 73% for Paper B,
47%
for Paper
C and 33% for Paper D. However, in Japan, where the patent agent profession (referred to as ‘benrishi’)
Number
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notoriously accused of protectionism, the pass exam pass rate has also historically been very low- see Lee
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Candidates who fail the exam in any given year are entitled to file an appeal
request. The grounds for appeal are limited to either an administrative error, such as
missing pages lost during physical handling of the examination, or that the marks
awarded do not align with the marks set out in the marking guide. Appeals questioning
the accuracy of the provided responses set out in the marking guide are not permitted. In
response to the appeal, the appealing candidate receives a one-page response which
simply states that the mark was changed or that the appeal was denied, without any
further elaboration. Statistically, a very small percentage (less than 10%) of appeals are
successful in achieving a mark change, and fewer still result in a change from a failing to
a passing mark.14
These requirements are quite possibly the most stringent in the world, and out of
step with comparable jurisdictions such as the U.S., the European Patent Office (EPO),
Australia (while it still utilized a qualifying exam) and the U.K.15 The Canadian patent
agent profession valorizes the low pass rates for the Canadian Patent Agent Examination,
apparently based on the assumption that the lower the pass rate, the higher the quality of
services provided to the Canadian public. 16 The current system has existed for many
years, and accordingly, it has become engrained within the accepted culture of Canadian
patent agent practice. Not only is the profession boastful of the low pass rate for the

CIPO, supra note 10; CIPO’s data indicates that in 2017, “The Examining Board considered requests for review from
12 candidates for Paper A, 2 candidates for Paper B, 3 candidates for Paper C and 11 candidates for Paper D. None of
these reviews resulted in an overall pass. One partial pass for Paper C resulted from these reviews.”
14

Wissam Aoun, “Canadian Patent Agent Regulation Reform (Part 1)- (In)Validity Issues Surrounding the Canadian
Patent Agent Exam” (2017) 99:2 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc’y 1 at 35. Pass scores for patent agent qualifying
examinations in the majority of comparable jurisdictions around the world are set at a hard 50/100, with no carry-over
limits and opportunities for individuals scoring over 50/100 on certain exams to shift marks to other lower scoring
exams (known as a compensable pass). With respect to the EQE, the pass score is 50/100, although the marking
criteria allows for ‘compensable pass’ in some circumstances where candidates score between 40-50/100 on one or
more of the EQEs.
15

Wissam Aoun, “Canadian Patent Agent Regulation Reform (Part 2)- Governance, Self-Regulation and Canada’s
Patent Professional Identity Crisis” (2017) 99:3 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc’y 388 at fn 156 [Aoun]. See also,
Intellectual Property Institute of Canada, Consultation: A Governance Framework for IP Agents Part 2: Governance
Model; Submission to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada By the Intellectual Property Institute of
Canada, available online: < https://www.ipic.ca/english/submissions/view/183/governance-framework-for-intellectualproperty-agents.html> at 6 [IPIC]. See also, Adam Kingsley, “Importance of IP agents to innovation ecosystem”, (The
Hill Times, June 12, 2017) at 17. “Presently, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, with assistance from the
profession’s association, the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC), administers one of Canada’s most
rigorous qualification exams, in order to ensure a profession that continuously exceeds expectations.”
16
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examination, many from within the profession are openly hostile towards those who
speak out in favour of reform. 17
The foregoing information and statistics would likely create one or more
impressions upon an objective reviewer with no previous experience in patent practice or
knowledge of the patent agency regulatory framework. Given the extremely low pass
rates, one would likely assume that patent agency is an extremely challenging field of
practice, involving tremendous skill and serious repercussions for malpractice, and as
such, few individuals are able to successfully master the necessary competencies. One
might also consider whether certain validation issues have crept into the licensing
process, thereby contributing to the poor pass rates. Or, some may simply believe that
this is a matter of gatekeeping, and that incumbent practitioners are using this licensing
process to limit supply of practitioners and maintain a healthy market for their services.
As the following will demonstrate, all the above-referenced factors are at least
partially involved. However, none of these issues, either in isolation or combination,
paints a complete picture. The circumstances at play in Canadian patent agent regulation
touch on far more profound issues, cutting to the heart of the patent system itself and the
role it plays in our society.

17

Ibid at 419, fn 151.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF REGULATION
2.1 THEORIES OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
Any discussion of Canadian patent agent licensing must begin with a background
discussion on licensing generally. Why do we restrict individual liberty to practice
certain occupations? What is the purpose, or purposes, of licensing? What is the purpose
of licensing examinations?
Michael Kane provides one of the most succinct and accurate descriptions of the
rationale for professional licensing. According to Kane, professional licensing serves:
to protect the public by ensuring that candidates who are admitted to
practice in a profession have met certain basic qualifications...
Licensure is not intended to provide a guarantee of excellent
performance, nor does it claim to predict how well candidates will
perform if admitted to practice. Rather, it certifies that new practitioners
have met the basic requirements that are designed to provide the public
with some assurance that they are qualified to practice. 18
Several important points can be derived from Kane’s definition of the purpose of
professional licensing. Primarily, licensing is not and should not attempt to serve as a
guarantor of successful practice, rather, the emphasis is minimal competence within a
field of practice. Licensing fundamentally impinges on individual liberty and as such,
should be approached with some apprehension. Furthermore, restricting entry-to-practice
within a given field invariably imposes costs on the public, including increased fees due
to supply-restriction and potential reduction in access to services. Accordingly, the
purpose of licensing should be as minimal regulatory intrusion as necessary to protect the
public from the risk of loss associated with incompetent practice.
From a market regulation perspective, licensing serves to reduce market failures
associated with asymmetry of information. In various fields of service, consumers lack
the knowledge to assess practitioner quality in the marketplace, and as such, could easily
fall victim to incompetent practitioners offer their service for gain. Thus, licensing
Michael T. Kane, “Reflections on Bar Examining”, (2009) The Bar Examiner November at 6, available online: <
http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Bar-Examiner/articles/2009/780409_Kane.pdf>.
18
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ensures that all practitioners possess a minimum threshold of competence to practice
within a given field, in order to reduce problems associated with asymmetry of
information between providers and consumers.
It is important to reiterate that the focus of licensing must be minimal, entry-level
competence- the level of competence sufficient to prevent harm to the public. Licensing
is not employment testing, where an employer may individually decide what skills and
competencies are required for successful performance of a job, and, subject to certain
legal restrictions, go about testing as the employer sees fit. It is highly-debatable whether
licensing examinations could develop an objective definition for ‘successful practice’
within a given field and then develop fair, standardized criteria for measuring it. 19
The challenge with any debate surrounding the necessity of licensing intervention
is that it is extremely challenging to measure costs and benefits associated with licensing.
As such, these debates often remain abstract, without any data to support one side or the
other on a specific licensing debate. 20 However, given the social costs of licensing and
the impact on individual liberty, economists and psychometricians generally take an
apprehensive approach to mitigate against the potentially harmful social consequences of
licensing regulation. Many experts believe that occupational licensing schemes should be
disfavored when the presence of market failures is unclear, given that licensing almost
always produces social costs but only occasionally produces social benefits. 21
Licensing can come in many different forms, and while licensing in the public
interest may not be controversial, the question of form of licensing may be subject to
debate.22 For example, licensing may require completion of an accredited educational
component, licensing examinations, continuing education or any combination thereof.
Furthermore, the subject matter of exclusion is also variable. Licensing may legislatively

19

American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, National Council on
Measurement in Education, Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, [AERA] (Washington: American
Educational Research Association, 2014) at 178.
20

William Hubbard, “Razing the Patent Bar” (2017) 59 Ariz L Rev 383 at 396.

21

Ibid at 397.

Nuno Garoupa, “Regulation of Professions”, in David Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation
(Northampton: Edgar Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2011) at 454-5.
22
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define a scope of practice and grant a regulatory body authority to police against
unauthorized practice by unlicensed individuals. In contrast, certification models allow
anyone, licensed or otherwise, to practice within a given field, but restrict use of a
specific professional title to those who have met specific qualifications.
Based on the foregoing, licensing can be strongly justified in circumstances where
the risk of loss due to incompetence is catastrophic, such as loss of life. Fields such as
medicine involving significant risk to individual health and/or safety are stringently
regulated. Furthermore, strict licensing requirements are justifiable in activities involving
significant potential external damages to the public, such as public health crises or public
harm caused by poorly engineered structures. However, matters involving personal
property or matters of contract, involving asymmetries of information without significant
externalities, may be best addressed through certification schemes. This provides quality
cues to consumers in the market, while still respecting individual liberty, consumer
choice and minimizing unnecessary social costs associated with reduced supply of
service providers.
Where possible, any different mix of licensing options can be balanced in order to
best achieve the desired outcome and reduce unnecessary social costs. For example, the
accounting, has moved to a mixed certification/licensing model, wherein services having
no substantial externalities, such as bookkeeping and personal tax accounting, have been
completely deregulated, and activities involving significant externalities, such as auditing
of publicly traded companies, are reserved for individuals with certain designations. 23
Furthermore, the accounting profession utilizes a mixed certification model, with
competing designations (such as CA, CPA and CGA) to further maximize consumer
choice while minimizing information asymmetries.
Examination and testing are key elements of many licensing frameworks.
According to psychometricians, experts in the field of testing sciences, the key to exam
setting in the licensing context is validation. For a licensing examination to be valid, the
23

United States of America, Federal Trade Commission, The Costs and Benefits of Occupational Regulation (report
prepared by Carolyn Cox, Susan Foster ) (Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 1990) <
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster__occupational_licensing.pdf> at 43-6 (accessed on July 2, 2018).
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examination setter(s) must first set the content domain, namely, the knowledge and skills
indicative of entry-level competence within a given field. Psychometric approaches to
content validation have changed considerably over the years, 24 but at least several
identifiable best practices exist. To avoid perceptions of arbitrariness, the entire process
should be sound, well-documented, and based on unbiased evidence.25 While subject
matter expertise is certainly important, care should be taken to ensure that standard
setting processes are not biased due to over-representation of professional opinions.
Content validation may be jeopardized if the content of a licensing examination places
too much emphasis on irrelevant content, including peculiar testing formats and
inappropriate distribution of mark weighting across tested content. 26
Validation of an examination is a question of interpretation. A valid examination
is one that supports the interpretation that one who scores over the pass score is
minimally competent and one who fails lacks minimal competence. To support
validation, demonstrable evidence linking the inferences and assumptions underlying this
interpretive argument is required, including evidence refuting any counter-arguments
potentially undermining the accuracy of the proposed interpretation. 27
The interpretive argument supporting licensing examination validation depends
both on content and construct validation. With respect to construct validity, “Issues such
as poorly constructed questions (allowing guessing or permitting ambiguity),
testwiseness, test duration, unreasonable or indefensible pass score and other
irregularities not directly tied to entry-level practice introduce serious validity issues into
the examination process, making it more likely that examinees who have mastered the
content domain might fail the examination due to these factors which are irrelevant to
questions of competence.”28

Benjamin Michael Superfine, “At the Intersection of Law And Psychometrics: Explaining the Validity Clause of No
Child Left Behind” (2004) 33 J L & Educ 475 at 476-7.
24

Michael Kane, “Validating the Performance Standards Associated With Passing Scores”, (1994) 64:3 Review of
Educational Research at 437.
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Supra note 15 at 7.
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Supra note 25 at 432.
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Supra note 15 at 7.
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2.2 CANADIAN HISTORY OF SELF-REGULATION AND THE PITFALLS OF ‘PUBLIC
INTEREST’
The professions have always held a unique place in civil society. Some view
professions as forming one of four essential pillars to social order- the other three being
community, state and the market. 29 Much like public regulatory mechanisms, selfregulation is based on the premise that the regulated professional activity suffers from
some form of market failure, and in the case of professions, externalities and/or
information asymmetries.30 Furthermore, typical private law mechanisms (such as the
freedom to contract, tort, etc.) are inadequate to correct the market failure. 31
However, the justification for self-regulation over typical public regulation is that
“self-regulation is a better (cheaper) method of solving the problem than conventional
public regulation.”32 The foregoing are the two leading, and occasionally, competing,
theories of self-regulation- the ‘bottom-up’, ‘self-regulation bargain’ theory, where
professionals are granted privileges in return for acting in the public interest (which is
entirely served by quality assurance) and the ‘top-down’ theory that professions are a
way for government to extend governance to certain social areas (i.e. health, justice,
finance) without using state resources (because self-regulation is self-funded).33
Since at least the mid-Twentieth century, Canada has adopted a strict adherence to
the top-down theory of self-regulation. As stated in the Royal Commission Inquiry into
Civil Rights:
The granting of self-government is a delegation of legislative and
judicial functions and can only be justified as a safeguard to the public
interest. The power is not conferred to give or reinforce a professional
or occupational status. The relevant question is not, "do the
practitioners of this occupation desire the power of self-government?",
but "is self-government necessary for the protection of the public?" No
Tracy L. Adams, “Professional Self-Regulation and the Public Interest in Canada” (2016) 6(3) Professions and
Professionalism, available online: < https://doi.org/10.7577/pp.1587> at 3.
29

30

Anthony Ogus, “Rethinking Self-Regulation” (1995) 15:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97 at 97.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

Tracy L. Adams, “Self-regulating Professions: Past, Present, Future” (2017) 4:1 Journal of Professions and
Organization 70 at 72.
33
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right of self-government should be claimed merely because the term
"profession" has been attached to the occupation. The power of selfgovernment should not be extended beyond the present limitations,
unless it is clearly established that the public interest demands it. 34
(emphasis added)
The discussion of professional licensing and self-regulation raises several
important, and possibly conflicting, concepts which underlie professional self-regulation,
namely, professional expertise, professional self-interest and the ‘public interest’. From
the initial days of self-regulation in Canada, the earliest statutory enactments defined
public interest statements primarily in terms of practitioner qualifications. 35 Yet this
alone tells us little about “how, when and why the [Canadian] government legislated
professionals”, as well as “state-profession relations and professional expertise
historically.”36
Examining the earliest Canadian ‘professional regulation’ legislation in Ontario,
including a plethora of Private Bills for entry into various professions, Tracy Adams
states that “it is not entirely clear that, in regulating professions, the Ontario legislature
sought to regulate expertise.”37 (emphasis added) Adams states:
For instance, occupations such as dentistry and medicine were regulated
long before their expertise was widely accepted. As noted, the 1869
medical legislation regulated not only regular practitioners, but
homeopathic and eclectic medical doctors as well. Hence, the Ontario
legislature regulated medicine, even without any clear consensus over
what precisely constituted medical expertise… The provincial
government’s willingness to legislate for petitioners… who could not
meet professional education standards, further casts doubt on Ontario
politicians’ faith in professional expertise – at least, as it was defined by
professionals themselves.38 (emphasis added)
Adams arrives at this conclusion through a detailed examination of Private Bills
during the 1868-1914 era. During this period, it was not uncommon for individuals to
Ontario, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report Number One, vol 3 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for
Ontario, 1968) at 1162.
34

35

Supra note 29 at 5.

Tracy L. Adams, “Legislating Professionals: Private Member Bills for Entry to Practice Professions in Ontario,
1868-1914” (2005) 18:3 Journal of Historical Sociology 172 at 174.
36

37

Ibid at 177.

38

Ibid.
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petition legislature for exemption from certain professional licensing requirements and
entry into a profession. Legislative debates regarding such Private Bills demonstrates
that members of the legislative assembly were apprehensive about the authority of selfregulated professional bodies to govern entry to professions- “the feeling of the country
was against a close corporation like the Law Society having such powers as they had
enjoyed, instead of leaving the power in the House.” 39 While there certainly was debate
and disagreement regarding the role of professional bodies in governing entry, members
of the legislative assembly felt that they had a right to legislate professionals directly,
“having a responsibility to get involved” despite the authority granted to professional
bodies.40
This is not to say that members of the legislature were not concerned with
maintaining levels of competence; in fact, when granting individual requests for entry to
a profession by way of Private Bill, the number one factor considered by the legislature
was professional competence. 41 However, the legislature was willing to exercise
flexibility in recognition of competence, waiving formal professional requirements (such
as apprenticeship period, formal education or professional licensing examinations) for
individuals who could demonstrate that they were competent. 42
Another factor of key importance in deciding whether to grant an exemption was
on the grounds of public interest. The legislature was often prepared to waive entry
requirements in circumstances where practitioners intended to provide service to underserviced areas.43 The Ontario legislature, much like legislatures of other provinces,
viewed its role, and the role of regulating professional practice, as a political balancing
act. With respect to competence, legislatures viewed competence-based entry
requirements largely as an attempt to protect the public from ‘quacks’. 44 But legislatures
39

Ibid at 188.

Ibid. Furthermore, Adams states at 193 that “In passing individual professional legislation during this era, the
legislature ultimately showed little interest in undermining professional authority. Nevertheless, its actions did
implicitly challenge professional organizations’ claims to be the sole judge of competence.”
40
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Ibid at 190.
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Ibid at 189.
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Ibid at 190-1.
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Supra note 29 at 6.
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were also aware that this threshold could quickly transform into an unnecessary barrier
that would curtail public access to service, the individual citizen’s freedom to practice
and consumer choice.45
In carrying out its political balancing act, the Ontario legislature, when
considering Private Bills for waiving professional entrance requirements, was largely
influenced by opposition and/or support for such Bills. Where there was no opposition,
such Bills would often pass smoothly through the legislature. 46 Professional opposition,
on the part of professional licensing bodies, was often effective at curtailing such Private
Bills.47 In some circumstances, the legislature considered both professional opposition
by professional bodies as well as community support from members of under-serviced
communities, and in such circumstances, the legislature was willing to pass legislation
despite professional opposition. 48
The Ontario legislature’s perception of professional bodies’ authority over
professional competence was ambivalent at best. 49 There was undoubtedly concern for
maintaining professional competence, but such concerns were easily tempered by public
interest concerns such as access to services and respect for personal autonomy.
Furthermore, the legislature bended quite easily in favour of, or against, Private Bills
requesting waivers of entry-requirements based on public support or professional
opposition respectively.
However, beginning in the early 20th century, division regarding the benefits and
intentions of self-regulation began to manifest itself. According to Adams, “in the
opening decades of the twentieth century, MPPs became more accepting of professional
autonomy and professional bodies’ rights to regulate professional practice and
expertise.”50 Although it is not entirely clear how or why this shift began to take place,
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Supra note 36 at 190-1.
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several factors could have been relevant. Primarily, the legislature did begin to recognize
that a principled approach, rather than an ad hoc approach, to professional competence
was required, a position vociferously advocated by professional bodies. 51 Furthermore,
the legislature was at best ambivalent regarding professional licensing, and as such, could
be persuaded in one direction of the other. Accordingly, with time and increased pressure
from professional bodies, “politicians increasingly came to accept professional leaders’
claims that formal education and established requirements were essential to professional
competence, expertise, and safe professional practice.”52
Throughout the early-to-mid 20th century, Canadian regulators were regularly
convinced that “gains for professionals and their clientele were sufficient for the
legislature to regulate the field.” 53 In some instances, despite vocal opposition, selfregulatory legislation passed referencing only entry qualifications with no mention of
public interest.54 In this era, it seems that protection of the professional market was
sufficient to justify regulation:
By and large, from the 1860s through the 1950s, most legislation
establishing self-regulating professions was viewed as being in the
public interest, because it raised the quality of services provided. Here,
the public interest was defined primarily in terms of practitioner
qualifications, so the public’s interest and professionals’ interests were
seen to go hand-in-hand.55
For much of the above-referenced period, enabling legislation for self-regulated
professions defined ‘public interest’ primarily in terms of practitioner qualifications. 56
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Ibid at 189.

Ibid. Adams states at 177-178: “When passing private bills granting Ontario claimants the right to circumvent
professional bodies’ requirements for practice, members of provincial parliament appear to have considered themselves
valid judges of competence and expertise – despite professional bodies’ assertion that only they could adequately judge
ability. The decline in such legislation in the early twentieth century appears to reflect greater acceptance of
professional authority and expertise.”
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Ibid at 6. Adams cites the example of 1920’s legislation for the regulation of engineers. Mining companies, as well
as the British Columbia Premier, were vocal in their opposition to such legislation, stating that it could prevent the
“non-professional man… from gaining a living. According to Adams, “In the end, the bill passed, with a preamble
stating simply that the engineers had requested that “qualifications be established” and the legislature found it
“expedient to grant that prayer”.
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Yet once again, beginning in the 1960’s, the Canadian discourse shifted, with legislators
and policy advisors becoming apprehensive about professionals’ ability to put the
public’s interest above their own, as well as the definition of public interest expanding
past the all-encompassing obsession with practitioner competence to include
considerations such as efficiency, competition and costs. 57 Public distrust of selfregulation led to views that professionals could only be trusted to serve the public interest
“as long as there were “effective mechanisms” in place for accountability and
supervision”.58
Based on a thorough review of commission reports, policy papers, legislative
debates and legislation, Adams states that between the 1960’s and 1990’s, the definition
of public interest shifted significantly. 59 According to Adams:
In this new usage of the term public interest, there is a blending of old
and new meanings. The term appears to retain its meaning respecting
public safety. Consumer choice and access are still mentioned as
concerns especially in health professional regulation. However, these
goals are balanced with a concern for efficiency, flexibility, and
business growth. Service quality is not entirely forgotten, but it is not
central to discussions and debates either. Practitioner qualifications are
portrayed as barriers, more than as standards that protect the public. 60
Adams draws several conclusions regarding the role of self-regulation in
Canadian society. Professions were, at least originally, viewed as part of the state
apparatus, enjoying some level of autonomy yet still being linked to the legislature. 61
Ibid at 7. For example, in 1970, the Ontario Committee on the Healing Arts conducts a study of the province’s
health professions. In characterizing a ‘sound and socially acceptable health system’ as including “quality services
(protecting the public against the incompetent), accessibility, co-ordination of services, flexibility, economy,
complementarity of services, and “a maximum degree of freedom of choice consistent with public safety””, the
Committee highlighted that while the public’s interest in health care was served by self-regulation’s ensuring of
practitioner competence, “it was not economical or efficient, and there were problems with accessibility, co- ordination,
flexibility, and complementarity.”
57
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Ibid at 8. Also, at 9, more policy reports and commissions were providing harsh criticisms of the overlapping role of
professional associations, which promoted professional interests, and professional regulators bodies, which promoted
the public’s interest, demanding a clearer separation between the two.
Ibid at 9. Also, at 10: “Overall, we can see that from the 1960s to the 1990s, policy advisers and provincial leaders
supported professional self-regulation, but they argued that professions needed greater oversight to ensure that they
acted in the public interest. Although not every commission formally defined the public interest, there was continued
the emphasis on service quality and consumer choice, and new emphasis on fairness, efficiency, accountability, and
cost.”
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This is evident in the fact that legislatures were willing to grant professional bodies
authority to establish entry-to-practice qualifications, while maintaining the right to
intervene when the legislature felt that doing so best served the public interest. However,
beginning in the early 20th century, professional bodies acquired greater autonomy and
separation from the state, including greater authority over regulation of practice and
professional expertise. 62
Adams further states that “while reliance on professional expertise may have been
a factor early in the twentieth century, it was not likely the central factor in the nineteenth
century, and similarly may be less central to professional regulation today.” 63 Adams
concludes by suggesting that in Canada, the predominant theory that self-regulated
professions’ inability to serve the public has historically led to regulatory change may not
be entirely precise. Rather, Adams suggests that the converse may be more accurate“that regulatory change is actually linked to changing conceptualizations of the public
interest. When professions’ interests and the public interest were viewed as compatible,
granting professions self-regulation and considerable autonomy made sense.” 64
With respect to professional competency and entry-to-practice requirements, a
disjuncture has been created by changing perceptions of what ‘public interest’ entails.
According to Adams, professional associations have paraded around claims to expertise
and moral authority, along with passing references to ‘public interest’ tucked into
legislative preambles, in attempts to win over the public and the state in the goal of
justifying self-regulation. But this is not necessarily the same as fulfilling social
obligations.65 This leads to a situation where professionals do not necessarily respond to
client needs or self-govern based on accurate reflections of what public interest demands,
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rather, they define and use their professional knowledge guided by a transcendent value
system as to when and how that knowledge should be employed. 66
Yet despite the foregoing, Canada remains “the last bastion of unfettered selfregulation” in the world. 67 Rising professional fees, professional scandals and
misconduct have provoked large scale restructuring of professional self-regulation in the
U.K.68 Soon after the U.K. self-regulation reformation began, Australia followed suit.69
Professions in the U.K. and Australia are now best described as being co-regulated, rather
than self-regulated, and professional licensing bodies are now dominated by ‘nonprofessional’ members, largely made up of consumers.70 Although similar cracks in the
self-regulatory political structure have emerged in the North American context, North
America has not only managed to weather the self-regulatory storm, in fact, it appears
that the number of self-regulating professions in the U.S. and Canada has been
increasing.71
There are number of reasons why the same movements that led to self-regulatory
reform in the U.K. and Australia have not taken hold in North America. One key
difference is that professional self-regulation is typically governed at a regional level (i.e.
State/Province) in North America as opposed to predominantly Federal self-regulation in
the U.K and Australia. 72 The difficulty in policing large numbers of practitioners, spread
out over an entire country, and attempting to do so with very limited resources, proved to
be unmanageable for many federally self-regulated professions in the U.K and Australia.
The U.K.’s system of individual, rather than firm level, regulation, created
significant governance challenges in addressing the rise of transnational law firms. 73 In
addition to the jurisdictional challenges associated with regulating practice conduct, these
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transnational law firms exhibit signs of ‘client capture’, a phenomenon where
transnational law firms predominantly service large, multi-national corporations rather
than smaller, local clients. Professionals working under the yoke of client capture are
“pressured to put the needs of their clients and/or the interests of those individuals in a
client organization with whom they work closely, ahead of the public interest or
professional ethics”.74 According to Adams, “even when professionals attempt to resist
these pressures, and exercise discretionary judgement, their ability to do so without
encountering resistance and potentially damaging their careers may be limited.”75
Another distinguishing factor between the UK and Canada is the perception of
institutional bias in UK regulatory bodies. As Adams states:
Traditionally in the UK, some professions’ regulatory bodies were also
their advocacy bodies. In contrast, advocacy and regulatory duties were
typically separated in the USA. In Canada, regulatory traditions have
varied across province, but a separation of advocacy and regulatory
bodies was historically present, and has been the trend over time. Selfregulatory professional bodies in the USA and Canada still face charges
that they subordinate the public interest to professional interests, but
they may be better able to resist these criticisms. In some UK
professions, such as law, professional bodies carried on both advocacy
and regulatory duties; when challenged, they could not convincingly
deny their self-interest since that was long a core part of their
organizational mission. 76
Professional unity has also been a key contributor to the ability of Canadian
professions to maintain their self-regulatory monopoly. In contrast, in the U.K., the
professional landscape has historically been characterized by a multiplicity of
overlapping, and competing, professional bodies (for example, barristers and solicitors).
As professional unity is an important political element in maintaining self-regulatory
privileges, the lack of such unity in the U.K. political landscape has contributed to selfregulatory decline.77
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This is not to say that these same factors have not started to appear in Canada.
Self-regulatory bodies continue to be dominated by professionals, and when there is
‘public representation’ on such boards, it is typically far less than a majority. Both U.S.
and Canadian self-regulatory bodies have struggled with lack of resources, which has
caused an inability to effectively regulate practitioner conduct. 78 Recent studies
demonstrate that client capture is also a problem for the Canadian legal profession. 79
Furthermore, Canada has had to tackle the issue of institutional bias due to self-regulation
and representational advocacy, a problem now affecting the patent agent profession. 80
2.3 PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY, REGULATORY CAPTURE AND SELF-REGULATION
Regulatory capture is quite possibly one of the most used concepts in social,
economic, political and legal scholarship, despite being one of the most imprecisely
defined. A plethora of different activities are often associated with the term ‘regulatory
capture’, including: special interest groups using their influence to shape regulation;
diluting of regulation through amendments; repeal of existing regulation to suit special
interest groups; manipulation of regulators; and weakened enforcement of existing
regulatory standards. 81 To put it simply, regulatory capture refers to a situation where a
regulatory body is, over time, influenced to prefer the interests of the regulated over its
broader public interest mandate, and exercises decision making which benefits the
interests of the regulated as opposed to the public’s interest.
There are several reasons to believe that self-regulation is largely the result of
professionals’ self-interest as opposed to serving the public’s interest, and as such, a form
of regulatory capture. It is almost always professionals themselves, rather than the
Ibid at 76. (Adams provides the example of medical self-regulation in the U.S.: “Studies of the US medical
profession in the 1970s similarly criticized regulatory bodies for not responding to consumer concerns (Grad and Marti,
1979). State medical boards tended to be small and ‘honorific’—senior, professionally active members were nominated
to fulfil these roles for which they were not paid. Although these boards appeared fairly successful in regulating entry
to practice, they were too small and underfunded to regulate the professional conduct of tens of thousands of
practitioners and respond effectively and efficiently to consumer complaints (Grad and Marti, 1979). During this era
several reforms were introduced, including recertification for professionals, periodic reviews of regulatory boards’
effectiveness, and the addition of non- professionals to those boards (Rubin 1980). The result was greater state and
public oversight of professional activity.”)
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public, who lobby for self-regulation.82 If the licensing intervention is intended to protect
the public, would we not expect the public to be lobbying for licensing standards?
Furthermore, if professional licensing supposedly corresponds with a minimal level of
professional competence within a given field, then why does so much disparity exist
across jurisdictions with respect to the same profession?83
Furthermore, tight-knit, highly-focused special interest groups are often most
successful at capturing regulators.84 This is especially true in consumer protection
industries, where consumer organization is challenging, and consumer costs are small
relative to industry gains and spread out across large market segments. 85 As discussed
under Chapter 2.1, professional licensing is in essence consumer protection legislation, as
professional licensing is often justified on the basis of asymmetry of information between
practitioners and consumers. 86
Taking a step back from self-regulation and capture, it is important to first
consider what regulatory capture means. Although seemingly straightforward, the abovereferenced formulation of regulatory capture is wrought with uncertainty and ambiguity.
Primarily, should every shift away from public interest and towards industry or
professional interests be considered ‘capture’? What about alternative mechanisms
which may cause regulators to shift over time, most notably, bureaucratic drift? 87
Posner, citing Bernstein, supports the idea that many regulatory agencies undergo a
typical ‘lifecycle’ culminating with agency maturity, which in many instances results in
agency policy becoming largely aligned with the interests of the regulated:
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perhaps the most marked development in a mature commission is the
growth of a passivity that borders on apathy. There is a desire to avoid
conflicts and to enjoy good relations with the regulated groups…. the
period of maturity culminates in the commission’s surrender to the
regulated… The commission finally becomes a captive of the regulated
groups.88
It is debatable whether such circumstances of ‘bureaucratic apathy’ can correctly
imply ‘capture’. Rather, according to Posner, “the deflection of an agency from its
original goals may accompany the natural tendency of an institution to bureaucratization,
but it is not entailed by it.”89
Furthermore, how does one define ‘public’ versus ‘industry’ interests? One of the
most immediate questions facing one seeks to allege that regulatory decision-making has
been captured is how does one know, or presume to know, what public welfare actually
is?90 This uncertainty is a critical issue for any such ‘regulatory capture’ analysis.
Daniel Carpenter states that several generations of regulatory capture research
have provided rather unsatisfactory definitions of what capture is and actual evidence of
when capture has taken place, challenging those who allege the existence of capture to
point concretely at the mechanisms by which capture might operate. 91 The lack of rigor
in defining a precise definition (or definitions) for capture runs the risk of generating
allegations of capture by any party that disagrees with the regulatory decisions made by a
legislator or agency. 92
Carpenter makes an important distinction between statutory capture, wherein
regulations sway interest in favour of a special interest group prior to any administrator
action, and ‘agency capture’, wherein “certain goals are expressed in legislation but
where the achievement of these goals is distorted, corrupted, watered down or otherwise
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turned into an industries advantage.” 93 As discussed below, this distinction becomes
significant when analyzing capture from a legal, rather than political or economic
perspective.
Statutory capture can be considered the byproduct of public choice theory, an
economic theory that attempts to define political processes and outcomes as the product
of economic interests and incentives. Put simply, public choice theory assumes that all
humans, are, more or less, motivated by individual self-interest and respond to individual
incentives.94 From a political perspective, public choice theory assumes that individual
legislators are primarily motivated by self-interest as opposed to the public interest. 95
Morriss and Nard summarize the basic tenets of public choice theory succinctly:
The basic public choice insights concerning legislation are deceptively
simple: small, homogenous organized interest groups have an
advantage in the political competition to obtain benefits and avoid costs
because they offer politicians a ready source of both votes and the
money necessary to obtain votes. The smaller and more homogenous
the interest group, the less costly it is to organize. As even the most
publicly-spirited politician cannot advance the public interest without
being in office, politicians are inevitably drawn to aid interest groups in
pursuit of the votes and money the interest groups can provide. The
result is that the political process tends to bestow benefits on
concentrated interest groups while dispersing costs over the broadest
possible population. The relatively small number of individuals in the
interest group thus reaps large rewards while the relatively large
number of individuals in the unorganized general public bears
individually small, dispersed costs.96
Public choice theory provides a powerful tool for predicting not only how selfregulatory professions come to exist as a matter of professional self-interest disguised as
public interest, but also predicts that such self-regulatory laws are incredibly resistant to
reform.97 Tight-knit professional groups can organize and effectively lobby political
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decision-makers, especially compared to the general public who may bear the social costs
of professional licensing. Furthermore, even after acquiring self-regulatory status, the
political power encapsulated within self-regulatory bodies becomes far more
concentrated than dispersed individual interests, allowing self-regulated professions to
effectively maintain their self-regulated monopoly. Recent studies have demonstrated that
an astonishingly low percentage of self-regulated professions across the U.S. have ever
been deregulated.98
Returning to our distinction between statutory versus regulatory capture, it is
important to recognize the limits that this distinction places upon judicial review of
regulatory behavior. Despite the insight of public choice theory, as discussed below
under Chapter 6.1(i), one of the basic principles of the law of judicial review of
administrative action is judicial respect for the boundary between law and politics. It is
the proper function of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, which in many cases
revolves almost entirely around a self-regulatory body’s enabling legislation. Thus, at
least in principle, a line is drawn between the political activities of professional interest
groups in lobbying and having self-regulatory legislation enacted, a line which the
judiciary cannot cross, and the regulatory conduct of self-regulatory bodies pursuant to
such legislation, which is properly within the scope of judicial review.
Carpenter provides a definition of regulatory capture as “the result or process by
which regulation [in law or application] is, at least partially by intent and action of the
industry regulated, consistently or repeatedly directed away from a defeasible model of
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry.” 99 To further

that public choice theory predicts are most resistant to political reform.' While regulatory critics often invoke public
choice too casually to oppose any regulation, the theory works well for occupational licensing. These laws provide
concentrated tangible benefits to organized groups with resources, while the costs of these restrictions are diffused
among the public as a whole.' Professional organizations also have the cohesion and the resources to lobby for
favorable laws, to prevent reforms, and to provide information to policymakers.' Under these conditions, occupational
licensing laws would be extremely difficult to change through the political process alone.” See also Larkin, supra note
82 at 225. “The Constitution makes the passage of legislation difficult, so, once enacted, laws do not fade away. Absent
an expiration date, laws remain in effect until they are repealed or held unconstitutional, giving rise to what has been
called "the tyranny of the status quo." Problems may be transient, but the statutes passed to remedy them may last
forever.”
98

Ibid at 869-70.

99

Carpenter & Moss, supra note 87 at 60-1.

31

elaborate, Carpenter sets out the following analytic framework for making a case for, or
against, the presence of agency capture:
•

There exists an identifiable “general interest” or “public interest”, or goal for
which a regulation was created- the public interest is embodied in the people’s
welfare;

•

There exists an identifiable interest our goal of the “industry” or “producers” an
interest of dominant or particular firms, or a special interest group;

•

The people’s welfare and industry interests or special interest group interests
conflict, in the sense that in applications of regulation or enforcement, the public
interest for statutory obligations of the agency and the industry/special interest do
not coincide;

•

There exists some mechanism of undue or disproportionate influence (hereby
referred to a ‘capture mechanism’) whereby the industry attempts to induce the
regulator to choose its interests over the people’s welfare;

•

Given a pattern in which the agencies statute and case evidence directs it to
choose to people’s welfare over Industry interests, and given the capture
mechanism, the agency nonetheless repeatedly chooses industry interests over
public welfare- very important, Carpenter makes the point that at this stage in the
analysis, one must consider that under the same conditions but in the absence of
the capture mechanism the agency would choose public welfare repeatedly over
industry interests.100

Regarding ‘public interest’, one may stipulate explicitly what they believe public
welfare to be based on any number of sources, including empirical evidence or well
accepted theories. 101 Furthermore, one could use evidence of public opinion based on
voting patterns of democratically elected officials, but this approach may be jeopardized
by special interest influence causing statutory capture. 102 If certain fields are susceptible
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to scientific analysis, such as areas involving public health or medicine, one could take a
technocratic approach to determining public welfare. 103
Given that providing a precise definition of ‘public interest’ can be challenging,
Carpenter suggests that the fallback option is acknowledging that one does not know
what public welfare actually is, and as such, must look for capture procedurally.104 This
procedural approach requires “(a) identifying the special interests involved and (b)
examining those institutions and outcomes that would seem consistent with their having
been advantaged.”105 This approach is the most empirically grounded- “we abandon any
pretense of knowing the public interest and instead focus on ‘circumstance evidence’
consistent with a capture ‘story’.” 106
Carpenter adds that diagnoses of agency capture requires at least some evidence of
intent. In the circumstances of agency capture, this requires a demonstration of at least
some active engagement on the part of the regulated to influence regulatory, that is
causal in leading to regulation that is favourable towards the regulated as opposed to the
public.107 Furthermore, what is most often missing from procedural analysis of capture is
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evidence of the capture mechanism, by which the special interest in question can achieve
its desired policy outcomes. 108
Accordingly, Carpenter concludes that a full diagnosis of agency capture needs:
(a) to posit a defensible model of public interest, (b) to show action and
intent by the regulated industry, and (c) to demonstrate that ultimate
policy is shifted away from the public interest toward industry interest.
If a capture analysis (whatever its conclusions) is lacking in one or
more of these demonstrations, then the analyst must accordingly be
circumspect about what he or she has shown. To demonstrate all three
of these conditions – preferably by a combination of quantitative and
qualitative evidence in which various types of evidence corroborate one
another – amounts to a gold standard of proof. 109
Carpenter’s ‘capture story’ is important conceptually as it remains open to nonmaterialist forms of capture. Traditional ‘materialist’ capture theories typically search for
a ‘smoking gun’ in the form of a regulator placing their own, personal material selfinterest in conflict with their public duties. One example includes the ‘revolving door’
between regulator and industry, where high-ranking regulatory officials are induced to
follow industry promoting conduct with the incentive of high-salaried industry jobs upon
departing the public sector.
However, recent non-materialist theories of capture, such as cultural or epistemic
capture, suggest that regulators may not necessarily be relegating the public’s interest to
their own individual material self-interest or acting out of a maliciousness or fraud.
Rather, prolonged proximity between regulator and regulated may create an environment
where regulators unquestionably adopt the narrative of the regulated along with its
presumptions regarding public welfare. James Kwak cites the example of the 2008
financial crises as an excellent case study of the phenomenon of cultural capture. Prior to
2008 financial collapse, four major regulators were responsible for oversight of the U.S.
banking industry- the Federal Reserve, responsible for managing economic growth and
“bureaucratic drift” stands always as an alternative mechanism for administrative capture.… In short, valid diagnosis
ease of capture should be able to show that somewhere, the regulated industry was acting anyway so I asked to bring
about the observed results”.
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inflation; the FDIC, responsible for safeguarding its deposit insurance fund; the OCC,
responsible for safety and soundness of banks; and the OTS, responsible for oversight of
thrift.110 Prior to passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 and the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, none of these agencies had a primary mandate of
protecting consumers. According to Kwak, this was because regulators, having spent
many years of close proximity to the regulated, identified with the predominant narrative
of the regulated that consumers’ interests were best protected by free market competition,
and as such, regulators viewed their public interest role as being ‘stewards of an efficient
financial system.’111
Similarly, epistemic capture occurs when a regulator develops a specific view of
an issue resulting from the fact that relevant information is provided almost entirely by a
distinctive group of people. According to Cass Sunstein, there are concerns caused by
such asymmetry of information, given that even the most well-intentioned of public
officials may have their own perspective “shaped by the limited class of people to whom
they are listening.”112 Such regulators “might be subject to epistemic capture in the sense
that they will ultimately form a view that fits with what they learn from the particular
people with whom they speak.”113
The reality of epistemic capture may be particularly egregious within the selfregulatory context, wherein insular groups of like-minded individuals are prone to move
towards extreme positions on issues of professional interest. 114 In these circumstances,
“group members come to rely exclusively on one another to validate new information,
and everything that they believe is a product of interactions within their enclaves.” 115
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, groups of confident, intelligent individuals may

110

James Kwak, “Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis” in Carpenter & Moss, supra note at 84.

111

Ibid.

112

Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: Humanizing the Regulatory State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014) at
32-33.
113

Ibid.

114

Cass Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (New York: Oxford University Press Inc.,
2009) at 42-3. Sunstein argues that where groups of individuals share a common identity, a high degree of solidarity
and group saliency, this will often lead to heightened levels of polarization on any given topic.
115

Ibid at 52.

35

be most susceptible to this phenomenon, with such groups moving to extreme positions
regarding perceptions of fairness and issues that affect their sense of ‘group
belongingness’.116 Such insular groups and the debate they foster have a natural built in
rhetorical advantage in favour of those seeking higher penalties for breach of accepted
group norms, and as such, may tend towards stringent protection of their group identity
and insularity.117 Again, it is important to re-iterate that in many ways, these individuals
are not engaged in a form of fraudulent or deceitful behavior, rather, many social utility
justifications exist for why many individuals in these circumstances would behave in
such fashion.118
Carpenter points out two important research strategies, relevant to his analytic
framework and identification of causal inferences in agency capture, which are of key
significance to this study. First, he advocates for clear demonstration of public interest
versus industry interest, and “an empirical design that permits rejection of the hypothesis
that both of these interests are served in a pattern of decisions.” 119 Second, he advocates
for a clear defining and understanding of the regulatory mechanisms of capture:
if the idea is to improve and not to abandon regulation, then an
understanding of the mechanisms of capture is critical. It is critical for
combatting capture, and it is critical for the important work of
implementing mechanisms that would induce regulators to proactively
pursue their agency's statutory mission.120 [emphasis added]
With respect to Carpenter’s first point, professional licensing presents a unique
challenge for the analysis. In the example of professional licensing, from a conceptual
perspective, the most basic professional self-interest, namely, pure market protection, in
and of itself may justify the regulatory intervention. Market protection is one of the
means to the end of consumer protection, and as such, the profession’s interest in market
protection and some level of economic protectionism is justified as a rational basis for
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serving the public’s interest. 121 In order to expect that professionals will act in the best
interests of their clients and not their own self-interest, they are afforded some level of
market protection to mitigate against self-interest tendencies caused by excessive
competition. As Garoupa states, “self-regulation is not necessarily a sign of rent-seeking.
Professional regulatory bodies are consistent with public interest theory. Identifying rentseeking requires a more detailed analysis of the legal substance than just the legal
form.”122
With respect to Carpenter’s second point, as discussed below, the proposed
capture mechanism in issue in this analysis is competency-based, entry-to-practice
standards for Canadian patent agents.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM ‘DEMOCRATIZED’ TO ‘PROFESSIONAL’ PATENT AGENCY
3.1 THE HISTORY OF PATENT AGENT REGULATION
3.1(i) The Early ‘Patent Agents’
The practice of patent agency, in both the U.K. and the U.S., dates to the early
19th century days of the Industrial Revolution. In the pre-regulation, Industrial
Revolution era of patent agent practice, the patent agent profession lacked a discrete set
of professional services forming the fabric of what could be called a professional identity.
While preparation of patent specifications was undoubtedly the core of their business,
their role as an ‘intermediary’ was far broader than just as solicitors of patents. The
patent agents of this era acted “as intermediaries between inventors, capitalists,
innovators and other users of inventive output” which included a wide range of services
including connecting inventors with manufacturers, brokering licensing deals and serving
as general commercialization agents. 123 Even from a strictly legal perspective, early
patent agents accumulated a broad scope of legal knowledge and in addition to providing
patent solicitation services, provided a range of commercial services across the legal
spectrum.124
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One of the most important roles of the patent agents of this era was dissemination
of knowledge. The role of patent agents in contributing to the dissemination of inventive
knowledge at the time of the early 19th century was a vital contributing force for the
democratization of invention. Patent literature was difficult to acquire, and the early
patent agents obtained patent documents, compiled large libraries of patent literature and
disseminated this knowledge to clients not only for patentability assessment but also
education and inventive activities. 125 The early patent agents were important agents for
public dissemination of patent literature; in fact, many of the earliest patent agents were
also publishers and/or editors of some of the most widely read technical journals of the
time, within which they regularly included relevant patent literature. 126 As discussed
below, control of the means of dissemination of patent literature also provided the early
patent agents a powerful means of influencing the development of substantive patent law,
often times in directions favorable to their own professional interests.
The culture and atmosphere of the artisanal yards and engineering shops of the
urban British provinces provides for a fascinating case study of early 19 th century patent
agency. Outside of the economic and political capital of London, in urban, Provincial
cities such as Birmingham, the patent agency network was ‘complex’, in an environment
present time, throughout the printed specifications of English patents, all of which, now numbering 150,000 are open to
his inspection in the patent office. He will advise as to the practicality of any mechanical contrivance process submitted
to him, asked to the mercantile value of the same, how best an inventor may introduce his improvement to the trade, or
to the general public; whether the event of finding someone inclined to take up the invention, a total or partial sale of
the patent should be affected, or an exclusive unlimited license granted and on what terms…[the patent agent will be]
familiar with all the foreign and colonial patent law[and]… will also be able to advise how to prevent a manufacturer
who owns a patent from intimidating the customers of a rival manufacturer by holding up the rival as an infringer… his
chief duties are to collect the inventors ideas, to arrange them in a specification, which will eventually prevent any rival
manufacturers from doing anything in the direction of the patent. If the invention is imperfect at the time it is submitted
to him, the patent agent will readily remove the difficulty… his great experience giving him facilities which no
ordinary inventor could be expected to possess” (ibid at 91-2).
125

Ibid at 90-3.

Ibid at 85, 94. See also Morris & Nard, supra note 94 at n 143. “Of note is that the proprietors of Scientific
American, Orson Munn and Alfred Beach, were, by 1850, the owners of the largest patent agency in the world.” See
also David Pretel, “The Global Rise of Patent Expertise During the Late 19th Century,” in David Pretel, Lino Camprubí
eds, Technology and Globalisation: Networks of Experts in World History (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018)
available online: <http://www.econsoc.hist.cam.ac.uk/docs/CWPESH%20number%2031%20Jan%202018.pdf> at 10.
“During the second half of the nineteenth century, patent agents published their own specialised technical and trade
journals that provided detailed information about patent procedures and descriptions of patented technology. The most
relevant examples of patent journals include the weekly Scientific American, edited by the leading American patent
agency Munn & Co., the Patent Journal and Inventors Magazine, edited by the London patent business of Barlow,
Payne and Parker, and the monthly publication Le Génie Industrielle published by the French ‘ingénieur-conseils’ from
the Armengaud family. For Latin America and the Caribbean, the agency Munn & Company published, from 1890, its
first international edition, La América Científica e Industrial, a mechanical magazine written in Spanish.”
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“in which scientific, artisan and business acumen mixed freely”. 127 In this atmosphere,
incremental machinofacture innovation was unleashed in an environment of proximity,
where technical know-how was shared and improved amongst skilled artisans.128
In this environment, the patent system and an emerging technology discourse
driven by the Industrial Revolution came head-to-head. The scientific discourse preIndustrial Revolution was dominated by the scientific theorists (or according to some,
elitists) of the royal academies and institutions. Along with their role as gatekeepers of
scientific knowledge and authority came social prestige. But in the emerging discourse
of the Industrial Revolution, the ‘mechanics’ of applied arts sought to elevate their own
social status through the social, economic and political means available to them.
According to Ian Inkster, this was the era of the ‘rise of artisanal culture’, driven “by
sharing knowledge through associations and lecture and…. textbooks to share their useful
knowledge” and formed “in local taverns and pubs as well as coffee houses and assembly
rooms, that linked a new world of useful and reliable knowledge with artisan skills,
intersecting with radical social alternatives and fast moving money makers.” 129 There
seems to be little doubt that the patent system led to tremendous social and economic
benefits within these urban provincial communities. Individual inventors climbed both
the social and economic ladder through “the capture and ownership of technological
knowledge [which] was becoming essential to small-business formation and success.” 130
While patent rights were instrumental in creating a new discourse that improved
the social and economic status of the skilled artisans, Inkster states that the “associational
culture that forged together patent agency and useful and reliable knowledge was to
become the hallmark of Birmingham as an inventors’ emporium.” 131 According to
Inkster:

Ian Inkster, “Highly Fraught with Good to Man: Patent Organization, Agency, and Useful and Reliable Knowledge
in British Machinofacture Circa 1780-1851 and Beyond” in Ian Inkster ed, History of Technology (London:
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2012) at 132.
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There seems to be good qualitative evidence that the rise of innovation
in Birmingham was strongly associated with increased facilities for
knowledge circulation and testing, and for basic technological training,
which went well beyond our familiar distinctions between the tacit
knowledge of apprenticeship and the trades on one hand, and a higher
scientific training on the other. Between such extremes lay an urban
culture of information circulation that was constantly tested and
reformulated by a competitive culture of innovation pursued by those
intent on rising ‘above the Lathe and File’ within one of the most
intensive patenting cities in the world. Prior to 1851 this was the
environment of patent agency. And this was itself a component of a
wide process of machinofacture.132 (emphasis added)
In this environment, patent agency was informal, embedded within and acting
alongside the many organizational, rather than institutional, associations common to
these urban sites of technical innovation. 133 Patent agency during this era was
“complex”, intertwined with professional associations, clubs as well as an emerging
series of lecture circuits “in which scientific, artisan and business acumen mixed
freely.”134 In this environment, “[patent] agency embraced a great deal of business lying
beyond the formal institution of the patent system” 135 and evidence appears to support the
conclusion that this form of ‘associative patent agency’ was linked to technological
improvement, diffusion of knowledge and incremental innovation within these urban
areas.136
Even more so than Britain, the early 19th century U.S. inventive landscape was
characterized by ‘democratized invention’ 137- “a broad range of individuals held patents
for an equally broad range of inventions.” 138 These individual inventors required
affordable access to secure and reliable patent protection in order to acquire investment,
manufacturing and to generally commercialize their inventions. 139 As in Britain, this
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atmosphere of democratized invention created a class of pre-regulation ‘invention agents’
that offered a wide range of services as ‘middlemen’ in the marketing of inventions. 140
These services included acting as intermediaries in the sale of technology, connecting
inventors to investors and manufacturers, and to a large extent distributing invention
information for innovation and commercialization purposes. 141
U.S. inventors required access to inventions and sharing was essential to
incremental innovation. 142 Thus, “inventors and consumers were often the same people,
as invention proceeded in large part through practical adaptation of earlier innovations
into new and improved forms and products.” 143 Accordingly, both inventors and patent
agents during this era had an important self-interest in ensuring that patent law balanced
protection with access. Patent practitioners, as an interest group, were “facilitators of
commercial transactions generally…[and] had an interest in making sure patents did not
interfere with the broader commercial sphere.” 144
Although it is well-documented that the earliest patent agents in both the U.K. and
the U.S. came from the engineering professions, in the case of the urban cities of the
Industrial Revolution era Britain, the line between patent agency and engineering was
hardly discrete. Patent agency and engineering formed a sort of ‘partnership’, wherein
many of the patent agents who sold what we consider discrete patent services (such as
preparation of patent specifications) also engaged in technological consulting and
technical publication.145 Many of the prominent patent agents of this era viewed the
patent system, dissemination of technical knowledge and improvement of incremental
technical innovation as all being linked. As these patent agents were also active
publishers of leading technological journals, they used their publications to promote
reform of aspects of the patent system which also connected with improvement of
dissemination of technical knowledge, such as improving requirements relating to
140

Ibid at 180.

141

Ibid.

142

Ibid at 175.

143

Ibid.

144

Ibid at 179.

145

Inkster, supra note 127 at 120.

42

preparation of technical illustrations.146 During this period of technical upheaval and free
association of knowledge through various forms, “[patent] agency and technological
journalism went hand in hand.”147
Thus, the patent agents of the early Industrial Revolution era were better
characterized as ‘invention agents’, individuals who conceived their role as inventors’
advocates broadly, both in legal and commercial terms. The informal, organizational
aspects of patent agency, which was intimately connected with professional associations,
lecture circuits and other avenues of associational dissemination of technical knowledge
were a key ingredient to the boom of incremental innovation and prosperity of
communities outside of major economic and political capitals such as London. While the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications was no doubt central to their role, they
viewed this obligation as part of a more holistic inventive endeavor. This included
improving the mechanisms of dissemination of knowledge as well as education for both
inventors and users of invention information.
3.1(ii) Towards a Reformed Patent System and Refined Patent Agency
As the Industrial Revolution approached the mid-19th century, the value and
importance of intellectual property had increased and the ad hoc patent institutions in
both the U.S. and U.K. required reform. It was at this time that the basic legal and
institutional framework for our modern patent systems began to develop, including such
fundamental concepts as patentable subject matter, novelty, utility, enablement and
institutions of patent application examination. 148 Although these legal concepts and
institutions have subsequently been fleshed out by courts and legislators, remarkably, for
the last 150 years, these concepts remain the foundation of our current patent system.

The “major journals of patent agency were fully engaged in reforming the institution itself” (ibid at 119). “A
particular interest in mechanical drawings brought [William Newton] even more firmly into inventor environs,
especially as a draughtsman to offices where specifications were recorded. This alerted Newton to the need for an
improved system of information diffusion, especially concerning specifications, as well as they’re very efficient
character under the ancient regulations… from 1820 Newton edited the London Journal of Arts and Sciences, and for
14 years reported all patented inventions from first-hand inspection of rolls in the enrolment office…. Newton and his
journal became very important in improving the application of British mechanical drawing to patenting (ibid at 11617).”
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Also by the mid-19th century, the increasing importance and value of patent rights
“called forth a class of men that occupy an intermediate position [between inventors and
the patent office].”149 By 1851, approximately 90% of all patents granted in Britain were
handled by a patent agent. 150 The labyrinth that was the early 19th Century British patent
office, with its Kafka-esque bureaucracy and opaque technical processes, was in many
ways the earliest justification for the creation of a patent agency profession- the
profession’s esoteric knowledge was navigation through the patent office maze. 151 In
Britain and the U.S., the first formal ‘patent agents’, individuals who advertised their
services distinctly as preparation and prosecution of patent applications, were former
patent office officials that used their knowledge and experience of patent office
formalities to guide patent applicants through the process.152 For example, Moses Poole,
one of the U.K.’s first and most influential early patent agents, held the official public
position of Clerk of Inventions at the British Patent Office (as did his father before him).
However, while still in his public role, he offered patent agency services for clients which
included review of specifications and filings on behalf of foreign clients. 153 Most of the
patent agents of the early to mid-19th century were either former patent office officials or
practicing engineers who gained their knowledge of patent office procedures through
their own patenting experience, few of whom were legally trained. 154
While the work of the pre-regulation ‘invention agents’ of the early 19th century
undoubtedly served a valuable public service, and contributed to the growth of an
entrepreneurial, innovation-based economy in the Industrial Revolution era, it hindered
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this emerging class of patent practitioners’ ability to ‘professionalize’. By the 1850s, the
lack of a discrete domain of professional expertise left many practitioners feeling
insecure and defensive regarding their claim to an area of exclusive expertise. 155 Similar
to other professional groups of the Industrial Revolution era, the 19th century patent
agents began to organize themselves, as well society generally (as discussed in detail
below) to create a regulated market for their own discrete set of professional services. 156
Slowly, the landscape of patent agency began to change, and with it, the patent
system itself. According to Morriss and Nard, the development of U.S. patent institutions
from the early to mid-19th century was very much the “story of the creation and growing
dominance of the patent bar as an interest group.” 157 The U.S. 1793 Patent Act, which
operated as a registration rather than patent examination system, was largely structural,
rather than substantive in nature. Accordingly, early 19th century patent law “open[ed] a
new avenue for change [and] gave entrepreneurial lawyers a choice in how to shape
patent law to their, and their clients’, preferences.” 158
It is in this context that the U.S. patent profession developed what Nard refers to
as its single most important innovation- the patent claim.159 The lack of an examination
system created the substantive problem of defining and delimiting an ‘invention’:
The 1793 Act did not provide a means to resolve this problem as it
merely required the inventor to “distinguish” his invention “from all
other things before known,” and did not specify how one was to do so.
Lawyers engaged in the practice of patent law created the means of
doing so: the patent claim as a component distinct from the
specification, allowing applicants to separate the new from the old. The
claim provided guidance for jurors as to the patentee’s invention and
Smit, supra note 151 at 83. See also Guagnini, supra note 4 at 146-47. “After the surge of applicants caused by the
lowering of fees and passing the 1883 Act, the result was an increase in the demand for expert technical and legal
assistants, but also a growing competition among the practitioners who offered it. At that point the definition (and
delimitation) of the occupational group, which had already been the underlying theme which had already been the
underlying theme of the debate on the professional identity of the patent agents, came to the fore. Other closely related
professions, the lawyers, the engineers and the accountants, had already gone through that process… however the
existence of well-established models did not make the process any easier; a main problem was the considerable
diversity and the way in which patent agency was carried out.”
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called “attention to what the inventor considered the salient features of
his invention.” An important consequence of the development of the
patent claim was that the demand for expert legal counsel in preparing
patent documents increased as technology grew more complex.160
(emphasis added)
Entrepreneurial U.S. patent practitioners saw an opportunity to work within the
open space of the 1793 Patent Act to create a legal mechanism for defining intellectual
property rights, as well as what would become the central feature of patent agency,
namely, working with patent claims. As Morriss and Nard state, “developing the patent
claim can thus be seen as an entrepreneurial response by the nascent patent bar, providing
them with a service to offer potential clients.”161 When the patent act was amended in
1836 and created a statutory requirement for patent claiming, it was merely formalizing
what the profession had created and customarily practiced for many years prior. 162 The
patent claim thus arose from the practice of U.S. patent agents, and was the result of
patent agents’ efforts to broadly assert the widest possible rights on behalf of their clients.
Over the course of the 19th century, the influence of U.S. patent agents continued
to grow and developed into a highly-effective interest group: “the rise of patent
specialists produced a relatively concentrated group with both a strong interest in patent
law’s development and the means to influence it.”163 Within the U.S. it was the legal
profession, who “possessed considerable social status and market power”, that came to
dominate patent agency. 164 The legal profession, which was coming into its own power
through effective professionalization efforts, wielded considerable influence:
the creation of the patent bar produced a group of attorneys with the
combination of deep knowledge and personal interest in patent law’s
development that yielded an effective interest group. Unlike patentees
and technology consumers, the patent bar was not widely dispersed.
Even the lawyers outside Washington were brought together through
journals and meetings. The patent bar’s interests lay in creating an
effective system of patent rights that maximized the value of its
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services in the acquisition, trading, and defense of patent rights.165
(emphasis added)
The 1836 Patent Act also created another powerful interest group: the patent
examining corps. By re-instituting a patent examination system alongside statutorily
mandating patent claims, the patent agent profession found a corresponding group with
vested interests in maintaining a specialization surrounding patent claiming. Realization
of the patent agent professional ideal in many ways depended on the patent office
maintaining its separation from inventors, as direct connection between the patent office
and inventors would have meant elimination of the intermediary role filled by patent
agents.166 There were certainly powerful patent office officials who were critical of the
idea of intermediaries standing between the patent office and the public it was meant to
serve.167 The intimate, personal links between patent agents and the early U.K. and U.S.
patent offices certainly played a strategic part in ensuring a role for intermediary
professional patent agents. 168
Furthermore, with the institutionalization of a patent examining corps, patent
agents no longer had to seek reform through courts and/or legislation to benefit their own
interests and the interests of their clients. Given the highly specialized nature of claim
drafting and examination, patent agents and the patent office had in many ways become
joined at the hip, and patent agents now found that they could lobby for change, such as
revised patent examination standards and lowering patentability thresholds, directly
through the patent office. 169 This hyper-proximity between the patent office and the
165
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agent profession continued into the early 20th century, where by some accounts, as many
as half of all U.S. patent practitioners began their careers as patent examiners. 170
3.1(iii) The Professional Patent Agent
It was in the late 19th century, following reform of both the British and U.S. patent
systems and increasing momentum of professionalization movements, that patent agents
in both jurisdictions sought to professionalize and regulate entry to their profession. On
both sides of the Atlantic, claims of professional incompetence, largely from incumbent
practitioners and occasionally from the public, were used as justification for the
establishment of entry-to-practice qualifications. However, it seems that little evidence
was ever presented to substantiate such claims.171 Many of the allegations came from
lawyers/solicitors, who viewed the non-lawyer patent agent profession as competition for
the growing inventor’s market for services. 172 Some inventors argued that “patent agents
were the only class to benefit from patents”, a complaint more than likely grounded in
frustration from commercial failure of their inventions rather than any demonstrable
evidence of negligence. 173 In both jurisdictions, there seems to be little in the way of
evidence of professional incompetence at the time of regulation. 174
The issue plaguing the profession in the late 19th century was more an issue of
professional ethics than competence. The public perception of the profession was being
tarnished by behavior of questionable ethics. The proximity between the profession and
the patent office created a strong perception of impropriety. Contingency fee patent
practice created an impetus for patent agents to push as many patents through the patent
office as quickly as possible at the risk of sacrificing patent claim scope. 175 Other issues
such as patent agents taking out patents in their own name on behalf of foreign inventors,

170

Hubbard, supra note 20 at 426.

171

Aoun, supra note 16 at 400. See also Dutton, supra note 123 at 94-5.

172

Dutton, ibid at 94.

173

Ibid at 95.

Ibid at 95. “There is little doubt that some patent agents abused their position of confidence and that some made
genuine mistakes, but there is little evidence to suggest that there was any substance in the allegations."
174

175

Ibid.

48

while serving legitimate purposes, made patent agents easy targets for allegations of
incompetence and impropriety. 176
Professionalization began in earnest in Britain in 1882, when a group of
practitioners formed the Institute of Patent Agents, a voluntary association to represent
the interests of patent agents.177 The Institute maintained strict entry guidelines for new
Associates, requiring either five years of practice experience or the passing of a rigorous
set of examinations.178 The Institute of Patent Agents was relentless in lobbying for
creation of a public register of patent agents along with entry qualifications, which in
1889, the British Board of Trade established. 179 However, the entry requirements were
limited, only requiring some proof of patent agency experience, and individuals who
were not entered on the register were merely precluded from using the ‘patent agent’ title
rather than prohibited from offering patent services. 180
Shortly thereafter, the Board of Trade amended its regulations to create an
examination requirement for entry to the registry. At this time, the profession was
dividing between ‘elite’ patent agency firms, headquartered in London and exclusively
practicing patent agency for large domestic and foreign corporate clients, and the
‘outsiders’, the pre-regulation ‘invention agents’ who mixed patent agency with
engineering consultancy in areas outside of the major cities.181 Even though less than one
third of registered patent agents were members of the Institute, they accounted for almost
half of the patent filings in the U.K. 182 After receiving a Royal Charter- becoming the
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (CIPA)- CIPA continued to lobby for higher barriers
to entry, but faced stiff opposition from the ‘outsiders’, who viewed CIPA as a small
group of practitioners attempting to impose their own ‘elitist’ professional standards
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across the entire profession. 183 The main point of contention between the two groups
revolved around the way patent agency was practiced, with the ‘outsiders’ practicing
largely in the provincial, urban areas where the demand for patent agency service did not
justify the same type of exclusive practice as that of the ‘elite’ practitioners in London. 184
These outsiders did not exclusively practice the drafting and prosecution of patent
applications, rather, as discussed above, these agents practiced a form of hybrid
engineering/patent agency.
The debate cut to the heart of what it meant to be a patent agent. More
importantly, the debate revolved around who was entitled to decide:
Obviously the interests of the public could hardly be overlooked by the
parties involved; nobody objected to the necessity to prevent and to
sanction misconduct. However, the decision to create a Register had
other more controversial implications: what was at stake was the
definition of who was entitled to practice in a publicly recognized and
therefore legitimized way. The fact that, along with the Register, the
Board of Trade established also examinations as a procedure for the
admission of agents, to be adopted subsequently to the first round of
enrolments, suggested that they were moving in that direction. And yet
neither that body nor the Patent Office took it upon itself the
responsibility of conducting the examinations: that task, as well as the
keeping of the Register, were delegated to a private association, the
Institute of Patent Agents; the same association was entrusted with the
task of levying registration fees and organizing the examinations.185
(emphasis added)
Come the turn of the century, CIPA firmly took hold of the profession, with a
majority of registered patent agents being CIPA members and CIPA being exclusively
responsible for setting entry standards. 186 By the early 20th century, registration as a
patent agent required formal education through an accredited program or five years of
apprenticeship followed by passage of a set of rigorous examinations. 187 While formal
education was an acceptable substitute for apprenticeship, hiring by elite firms in London
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typically required that newly minted patent agents had completed an apprenticeship at an
equally prestigious firm.188
In the U.S. context, the story of the regulation of patent agency was very much the
story of the growth of the legal profession, which in the early days of its own
professionalization, sought to expand its scope of exclusivity and professional identity to
include all who groups involved in any form of legal practice. With the growth of the
invention market towards the end of the 19th century, this brought lawyers and nonlawyer patent agents squarely into conflict.
While the legal profession was unable to convince Congress to eliminate the nonlawyer patent agent, it was successful in securing a number of entry barriers to practice.
From 1869 onward, a ‘‘good moral character and intelligence’ requirement had to be met
in order for individuals to be entered on the Register of patent agents. 189 For various
reasons, these requirements were loosely, if at all monitored by the Patent Office. 190 The
legal profession continued to push for a closing of the ranks of patent practitioners with
an imposition of an entry examination, a suggestion which was hotly contested by the
early 20th century Patent Office. According to Patent Office Commissioner Thomas
Ewing, the patent agency problem was one of ethics, not of competency, stating that “it
was less important that a patent prosecutor be proficient with patent laws and rules than
that he be ‘in actual touch’ with, and have the trust and confidence of his clients”. 191
However, the growing political influence of the practicing Bar along with the
ineffectiveness of the Patent Office to enforce ethical regulations, ultimately led in 1934
to a legislated competency examination requirement in order to practice before the U.S.
Patent Office.192
3.1(iv) The Internationalization of Patent Agency
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The development of the patent agent profession was born not only from the
growing professionalization phenomenon, but also from the rise of corporatization. In
many respects, the transition from a landscape of ‘democratized invention’ towards
corporate dominance over matters of intellectual property called for the creation of a
specialized practitioner with specific, specialized expertise in patent office practice. 193
As David Pretel states, “The transition to a modern corporate business model and the
growing demand for trained experts in patent issues were closely related.” 194 The
internalization of patent expertise through the development of corporate patent
departments was one reflection of the transition between the late 19 th and early 20th
century from individual to corporate inventive activity. 195 At the turn of the century, in
both the U.K. and the U.S., corporate patent activity replaced the individual inventor as
the centerpiece of patent practice and the patent narrative. 196
Along with this transition from individual to corporate patentee came the
internationalization of the patent system. Here, patent agents were instrumental in
developing a global framework for global corporate expansion of patent rights, acting as
the ‘invisible’ agency that shaped international transmission of patents.197 By the end of
the 19th century, patent agents had become a central and indispensable part of the global
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patent system, and particularly, outside of the major industrialized nations, in countries
such Spain, Brazil and Portugal. 198
With the growth of industry, led by such notable inventors as Edison, Marconi
and Westinghouse, came the need to develop global systems to extend patent protection
to jurisdictions around the world. It was here that the patent agent profession began to
take shape, as a means for the transnational transfer of rights over inventions. 199 In fact, a
study of the development of pivotal treaties for the international protection of patents
rights, such as the foundational Paris Convention, shows that it was largely international
networks of patent agents that were instrumental in the negotiation and completion of
such treaties.200 Global networks such as the International Federation of Patent Agents
(FICPI) allowed agents from both the major industrial nations, as well as the European
periphery and the developing world, to meet and form connections, to the point that only
members of these elite organizations relied on their mutual membership as key indicators
of trust and recognition of expertise. 201 Then, as now, there may not have existed another
profession with such an international level of connectivity as the patent agent profession.
Apart from simply acting as domestic agents for foreign corporate interests, patent
agents outside of the major industrial nations used their control over technical trade
journals as well as their political connections to push for patent reforms favourable to
their clients’, as well as their own, interests.202 This served not only the interests of the
major corporate clients of the elite agents in industrial nations, but also agents’ interests.
As global patent activity began to increase, the elite agents wished to see as much
harmonization of patent laws as possible to reduce the risks associated with professional
negligence.203
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However, international patent agency at the turn of the century tells a story of two
worlds- that of the major industrial countries, such as the U.S. and Britain, and those
outside of the major industrial countries, including peripheral European countries such as
Spain and Sweden. In these outside countries, small groups of patent agents
headquartered in capital cities practically monopolized patent work, most of which came
from the major industrial countries. 204 For example, at the turn of the 20th century,
approximately half-dozen Spanish patent agent firms controlled about 70 percent of total
Spanish patent applications and that “the totality of ‘elite’ foreign patents were channeled
through these leading agencies.” 205 In Spain, as in many of the other countries outside of
the major industrial nations, foreign patents were limited to those who could afford the
high agent fees.206 In fact, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Portugal and India had some
of the most expensive patent agency fees in the world. 207
As in Britain, the story in the European periphery was also one of ‘elite’ versus
‘outsider’ patent agents defining the terms of professionalization. However, in this
context, the internationalization of patent agency played a central role. In Spain at the
turn of the 20th century, the country’s patent agency business was becoming consolidated
by a very small group of patent agents, who functioned mainly as domestic agents filing
Spanish patent applications on behalf of elite foreign agents and their corporate clients. 208
These agents were mostly headquartered in the capital city, legally trained and highly
active in the movement to professionalize the practice of patent agency. However, a
number of smaller engineering firms devoted part of their professional practice to
assisting domestic Spanish inventors and industrialists.209 After professionalization of
patent agency in Spain and the creation of a public register of patent agents, the larger
elite firms appeared to absorb the smaller firms and consolidate their grasp over the entire
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profession.210 Thus, Pretel concludes that it was the internationalization of corporate
patenting along with their elite agents that seems to have given rise to the
professionalization of patent agency in Spain. 211
It is in relation to these issues, Pretel raises several important points, that are as
relevant today as they were in the late 19th century. Primarily, with the growth of
corporatization and the professionalization of patent agency, patent institutions that had
been open and designed for a broad segment of the public may have become “primarily
accessible only to powerful social classes and corporations with a large amount of
capital.”212 Furthermore, while global patent agent networks were instrumental in
creating an efficient international framework for transmission of patent rights, they
themselves remained a barrier for patenting across national boundaries given that in most
jurisdictions, a domestic patent agent was (and still is) required to acquire domestic
patent protection.213 Thus, patent agents, especially in countries outside of the major
industrial jurisdictions, may have become “actors that support an excessive concentration
of power over technologies.”214
3.2

DEFINING PATENT AGENT COMPETENCY
3.2(i) The Purpose of Patent Agent Regulation
If we fast-forward to the present day, we must ask ourselves, what exactly is the

expertise forming the professional identity of a patent agent? More pertinent for the
purposes of this analysis, the question is better framed as why do we regulate patent
agents? What is the justification for regulation? Considering this justification, and the
discussion of professional licensing set out under Chapter 2.1(i), what is the minimum
entry-level competence the public demands of patent agents?
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Viewing the regulation of patent agents from a state-centric, top-down
perspective, what is the overarching state interest justifying governance of patent agents?
In areas such as health, engineering or justice, there exist externalities justifying
regulation in the public interest apart from asymmetry of information within the
consumer-professional relationship. For example, there are concerns with maintaining
public health, apart from individual health concerns, which justify regulation of health
professionals. There is a public interest in ensuring that structures are designed by
licensed engineers to avoid public injury due to negligence. A strong justice system,
many would argue, requires an independent legal profession to ensure separation of
powers and protection from illegitimate government encroachment on individual rights
and freedoms. All these fields involve significant externality considerations justifying
state governance in the public’s interest.
It is hard to identify what significant state interest, an essential public service so
intimately intertwined with public order and safety, is involved in regulation of patent
agents, necessitating state intrusion. 215 There are no immediately apparent externalities
involved in the patent system as one would encounter in other professions. Some might
argue that without necessary regulation to ensure a competent body of domestic patent
agents offering valuable service, the public will lose faith in the patent system, which will
in turn effect economic growth and innovation. This is a dubious assertion at best, one
with little (if any) empirical foundation. Generally, in professions involving individual
property rights and interests with no significant externalities, the lack of state interest
justifies a certification rather than licensing regime. 216 In bottom-up regulation, namely
where regulation is justified almost entirely on market inefficiency considerations such as
asymmetry of information, it is the market rather than the state that has a predominant
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interest in professional regulation, with market solutions such as certification
designations being the preferred mechanism rather than state imposed licensing. It would
seem that the patent agent profession should operate as a certification rather than a
license.217
In the European context, entities regularly domiciled within a European Patent
Convention (EPC) country are not required to appoint a registered European patent
attorney to conduct business before the European Patent Office (EPO). Foreign nationals
are required to appoint a European patent attorney to conduct business on their behalf
before the EPO, the rationale for this requirement being to ensure that there is an agent on
whom proceedings may be served within the jurisdiction. 218 It seems that one of the
predominant reasons that the EPO regulates European patent attorneys is administrative
efficiency. Although the EPO has not been insensitive to the effect that European patent
attorney regulation may have on cost and access to profession services, by requiring that
European patent attorneys master EPO practices (through qualifying as a European patent
attorney), this minimizes administrative inefficiencies associated with inexperienced
practitioners prosecuting EPO applications. 219 In that sense, EPO competency regulation
appears to be less about market efficiency and more about administrative efficiency.
Furthermore, many individual European countries independently regulate their own
domestic patent agent professions. Again, the true rationales are somewhat questionable,
given that in most European countries, the majority of domestic applications in these
countries come through the EPO- once the application is approved by the EPO, the
domestic agents in various European countries simply act to courier the application
through the formalities of the domestic patent office. These European domestic agents
collect relatively large fees from translations into domestic languages, with some
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questioning whether these regulatory frameworks exist solely at the behest of patent
agent special interest lobbying for rent-seeking purposes.220
Outside of the world’s most active domestic patenting jurisdictions, namely the
U.S., Japan, China, U.K. and Germany, most domestic patent agent professions simply
act as patent couriers, filing patent applications prepared abroad with their domestic
patent office at the behest of foreign corporations and/or patent agents. 221 This often
causes client capture, wherein domestic patent agents act almost entirely on behalf of
large foreign corporate interests at the expense of domestic interests, particularly the
interests of small-to-medium inventors.222 Evidence suggests that foreign client capture
Vincenzo Di Cataldo, “From the European Patent to a Community Patent” (2002) 8 Colum J Eur L 19 at 29.
Examining attempts to harmonizing individual European patent translation requirements, Di Cataldo states “The
deadlock on this issue seems to stem only from the interests of the patent agents, who in Europe today derive a major
part of their income from patent application translations…. Unfortunately, some governments are unable to distinguish
between their national interests and the interests of a small group of their citizens, in this case a few hundred patent
agents.” (emphasis added) See also Theo R. Bremer, “Commentary: Patent Protection in Europe and Japan” (2000) 4
Int'l Intell Prop L & Pol'y 27-1 at 27-2. “My first comment is on the costs, especially the costs raised for translation by
languages. I think the panel this morning demonstrated clearly, with three Germans and one Belgian, speaking
professionally all excellent English-maybe, as my English, some "Euro-English" as we call it-that there is a lingua
franca, one language used by professionals, and I think that is a reason to look very seriously to the main language
being English with translations of abstracts as the solution. Of course, there are elements at stake: the national prestige
of the countries involved, the private interests from especially the patent agent profession earning quite a substantial
part of its income from the translations of the patents in their own national language. I think that I share the opinion that
there is not so much the interests of the public at stake because it is impossible to really attack a patent problem without
professional assistance and a practitioner must be able to read his documentation in English-not only the patent
involved, but all the other literature that he has to study. So I think there, indeed, such a solution could be found”
(emphasis added). Furthermore, see Walter G. Park, “Globalization, Patent Reform, and Patent Professional Services”
(2001) 83 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 303 at 317, 332. According to Park, in the event that international patent
services were liberalized, the domestic patent agent professions that would end up losing the most revenue would likely
be jurisdictions that require local professional translations, which makes up a significant percentage of local agents’
revenue. The biggest losers from liberalization would be several smaller EPO member states, including Portugal, Spain
and Denmark. See also Rousso, supra note 13 at 794. “Another basis for criticism has been that the benrishi are not
effective advocates for their clients. Foreign applicants have found, for example, that benrishi typically provide
services limited to the translation and filing of a patent application. Beyond that, however, the foreign applicants have
not been able to count on benrishi to vigorously pursue the patent.” (emphasis added)
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has left the reputation of domestic patent attorney professions in numerous jurisdictions
in disrepute.223 Given the precarious regulatory nature of these domestic patent agent
professions, domestic patent agents often lobby against any forms of patent reform which
may threaten their livelihoods. 224 As domestic patent agents are largely dependent on
foreign interests for their livelihood, it is not surprising that domestic patent agents in
many jurisdictions lobby for harmonization of domestic patent laws with that of major
patent exporting countries (such as the U.S. and China). Thus, there is also a strong
likelihood that patent agents from major patenting jurisdictions support stringent
regulation of domestic patent agents in patent service exporting countries (despite their
rent seeking behaviour), as these domestic patent agents act as a strong domestic lobby
for pro-patent legislation. 225
3.2(ii) Defining Core Competencies
Based on all of the foregoing, how do we define the core competency of a patent
agent? According to Peter Drahos:
The comparative advantage of patent attorneys lies not in their
knowledge of patent law, but in their knowledge of many hundreds of
rules and guidelines that make up patent procedure and the drafting of
that the best patent attorneys in India are likely to be the ones that work for multinationals since they pay the most.
Local inventors are, for the most part, left with those that are less able to work the system in favour of their clients”
(ibid at 219-220). “Just as in other developing countries, when I came to the role of the local profession I was told that
the large attorney offices in Brazil spend most of their time bringing foreign patents to Brazil rather than helping
Brazilian companies obtain patents in Brazil and abroad” (ibid at 255). Indonesian patent attorneys “function just like
couriers” (ibid at 262).
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claims that define the invention. A key part of their work is keeping
track of the many deadlines that exist for the submission of
documentation that accompanies the application process, deadlines
which if not kept to will result in extra fees or in some cases the loss of
the applicant’s rights. The tedium of precise time and document
management over what may be many years in relation to a single
application, which may end up being withdrawn or rejected, is the price
patent attorneys pay for the lucrative practices. Like tax attorneys, they
help their corporate clients navigate through these rules, delaying,
speeding up, splitting or redrafting the application as needs be.
While the foregoing seems straightforward, Samuel Oddi points out the unique
nature of patent agent practice which makes comparison to other professions difficult.
According to Oddi, “compared to other professions (e.g., medicine, accounting, or
engineering), [patent agent] practice standards may be subjective, as opposed to an
objectively recognized standard that can be documented by reference to an authoritative
source.” The standards-versus-rules based nature of substantive patent law is such that
there are few statutory and/or case law based rules regarding patent practice, and
specifically, claim drafting and patent prosecution.
That is not to say that there are no standards, or to down-play the skill involved in
the art of claim drafting, which has been recognized as one of the most challenging, if not
the most challenging, of all legal drafting. The difficulty lies in the fact that there have
been few attempts to articulate a clear standard or approach to what constitutes good
claim drafting, let alone minimally-competent claim drafting. Historically, on an
international basis, there have been very few university-based programs or
comprehensive academic attempts to study the art of claim drafting. There is a distinct
possibility that the number of accepted standards of professional conduct with respect to
claim drafting may correspond to any number of different expert opinions on the matter.
Apart from an abstract discussion of the difficulties associated with drafting
‘good’ claims, from a practical perspective, how does one distinguish ‘good’ claim
drafting from minimally competent claim drafting for licensing purposes? Is it possible?
More importantly, what objective does testing claim drafting, from a licensing
perspective, achieve? According to John R. Thomas:
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The quality of patent claims varies, of course, because drafters possess
differing degrees of legal competence and technical foresight. It is
nonetheless an extremely difficult task to assess the capabilities of a
particular claim drafter beyond a rudimentary level. .... The long history
of our patent system suggests that patent professionals have
consistently failed to draft claims of optimal scope, however, and that
imposing more onerous obligations upon them is unlikely to enhance
social welfare.
Thomas further opines that, contrary to conventional wisdom, claim drafting and
prosecution may be most challenging for inventions that present only a narrow
advancement in the art, whereas “pioneer inventions are not always accompanied by such
difficulty in drafting claims.” Accepting the validity of the foregoing, and given that the
majority of patents covering ‘incremental’ innovation, which are the most challenging to
draft, are owned by sophisticated corporate clients that can effectively gauge practitioner
quality in the market place, who then is patent attorney regulation intended to protect?
Of the jurisdictions that still test claim drafting as part of their licensing
examination process, there is little, if any evidence that any jurisdiction has ever
completed what would be considered a rigorous, objective validation process to assess
entry-level claim drafting competence. Beginning in the early 20th century, the U.S.
Patent Bar Exam included a comprehensive set of claim drafting questions, a practice that
was later eliminated in favour of an entirely multiple-choice based examination. While
the U.S. is the only jurisdiction that utilizes a professional third-party testing organization
for examination validation and administration, it is debatable whether any validation of
claim drafting exercises has even taken place and the reasons for eliminating claim
drafting exercises being undue subjectivity in marking standards.
3.2(iii) Patent Agent Negligence
Assuming that entry-level patent agent competence is synonymous with
practitioner malpractice, what does this teach us about practitioner licensing? Many
empirical studies have demonstrated that the overwhelming number of patents have little,
if any, value.226 Similarly, the likelihood of success in patent practitioner negligence
See for example Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, “Probabilistic Patents” (2005) 19 J Econ Persp 75 at 79- 80:"Only
1.5 percent of all patents are litigated, and only 0.1 percent are litigated to trial .... Of patents litigated to a final
determination, . . . 46 percent are held invalid."
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cases is mitigated by the fact that the quantum of damages in patent cases are largely
speculative- although patent owners always tend to subjectively increase the value of
their patent rights, in reality, any patent value at all may be difficult to prove. 227 It is
difficult to track actual numbers of patent practitioner malpractice claims, given that
insurer information is often unavailable, but by some estimates, by 2009, there had been
only 24 reported patent malpractices cases within the previous two decades, and of those
cases, only a “handful” have involved malpractice in claim drafting/prosecution.228 The
overwhelming majority of reported cases involving allegations of patent practitioner
negligence pertain to procedural rules, including failures to meet certain filing
deadlines.229 In the few cases involving allegations of negligence relating to patent
drafting/prosecution, plaintiffs have struggled to prove negligence apart from any issues
surrounding quantum of damages. 230 In the Canadian context, there is very little
evidence of practitioner negligence and as in the U.S., what few reported cases exist
almost entirely revolve around procedural matters such as missed deadlines. 231
3.2(iv) Patent Agent Regulation and Patent Quality
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Based on all the foregoing, it is only natural to question the justification and
effects of the regulation of patent agents. The work of Port, Hjelle and Littman (“Port et.
al.”) challenges the alleged ‘truism’ that “high, reified standards…for individuals to
become patent attorneys is somehow connected to the ‘quality’ of American patents.” 232
According to the authors, countries have “for good or bad reasons (or for no reason we
can discern at all), established a uniquely reified class of individuals who can become
patent attorneys” under the apparent assumption that doing so maintains a level of quality
in patent practice.233 Tracing U.S. history of patent practice, Port et. al. state that the
establishment of technical requirement was “meant to serve as a proxy for possession of
the technical knowledge necessary for a practitioner to ‘render applicants for patents
valuable service,’ therefore insuring the quality of patents applications.” 234 However, as
discussed above, historical evidence of practitioner incompetence is sparse.
Nicholas Matich summarizes the origin of United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) patent practice regulation, stating that “the primary purpose of the
USPTO's regulations, ratified by Congress, was to prevent fraud, not to regulate
professional competence. The USPTO specifically cited fraud as the justification for the
rules, and the rules imposed no new requirements on attorneys because they were
presumed to be competent and adequately regulated.”235 Furthermore, according to Port
et. al.:
This reified standard, created by one person to avoid fraud on the
public, has rendered today a very valuable monopoly for those admitted
to the patent bar. Today, it is said that this monopoly is required to
ensure American patent quality instead of avoiding fraud on the public.
That is, one rhetoric has been replaced with another.236 (emphasis
added)
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Accordingly, “although the high price of entry is a positive for subsisting patent
attorneys as they understandably protect market share” 237, Port et. al. question the merit
of the assertion that this new, dominant rhetoric is necessary to ensure patent quality.
Adopting the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
definition and data regarding ‘patent quality’, they examine the patent quality of various
jurisdictions around the world with disparate levels of patent agent standards of practice.
The authors conclude:
If reification of admission standards impacts patent quality, there
should be disparate levels of quality between the disparate countries. In
fact, we see no significant difference in patent quality between the
countries of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France,
Canada and Germany, even though these countries have very disparate
standards regarding admission to the patent bar…. all of these countries
have essentially the same rate of patent quality as determined by the
OECD.238
Substituting ‘patent enforcement’ statistics as a measure of patent quality, as
opposed to OECD definition and data, the authors find that “reified patent bar admission
standards, at best, have a dubious, if any, correlation to quality if quality is defined as the
win rate of the respective patentees.” 239 Although the definitions used for ‘patent quality’,
as any definition of ‘quality’ generally, can be debated, the authors’ analysis seems to
correspond with studies from other jurisdictions which appear to demonstrate that
deregulation of respective domestic patent agent professions has not lead to an influx of
incompetent practitioners into the market. 240 The authors frankly conclude that “there
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appears to be no evidence to support a causal connection between quality of admissions
to the patent bar and patent quality.” 241
3.3 CANADIAN PATENT AGENT REGULATION – A CASE STUDY IN CAPTURE?
3.3(i) From Pre-Confederation to Regulation (1867 - 1948)
The history of Canadian patent agent regulation is in many ways similar to the
history of many other self-regulating professions in Canada as well as the historical
development of patent agent regulation in other jurisdictions. However, several features,
unique to Canada, have led Canada down a path towards its own distinctive style of
Canadian patent agent regulation. 242
Similar to the U.K., the earliest patent agents were accomplished engineers,
largely coming from the civil and mechanical engineering disciplines, who were
businesspeople, engineers and patent agents. 243 Canada has historically had a small
domestic invention base compared to many of its major trading partners, and prior to
Canada’s adherence to the Paris Convention244, Canadian patent agents depended largely
on work from foreign patent agents in order to maintain their practices. 245 Then, as now,
the overwhelming majority of Canadian patent filings, perhaps as high as 90% 246, are
prepared in other jurisdictions and Canadian agents act as ‘patent post office’ for foreign
patent associates responsible for actual patent application preparation. 247 Quite often, this
required and still requires nothing more than filing the identical foreign application in
Canada without any need for an in depth knowledge of the invention or strategy in
Supra note 241 at 115, 118. Furthermore, “although the desire to improve patent quality is one of the more
compelling motivations to artificially inflate the qualification requirements for patent practitioners, there appears to be
no empirical support for the notion that reified admission standards necessarily lead to higher quality patents.”
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preparing the application. 248 This reality has created a profitable arrangement for the
majority of Canadian patent agents:
The result of all of this, so far as Canadian practitioners were
concerned, was that many of them were merely acting as a post office
for patent applications prepared and prosecuted by someone else. To a
certain extent that is still the case today, because roughly 90% of patent
applications filed in Canada originate somewhere else, but under
present rules most of them are handled by Canadian agents who have
some control over and often considerable input in the filing and
prosecution of the applications, not to mention a modest profit. 249
(emphasis added)
The early Canadian patent agent firms maintained U.S. based offices, in addition
to their Canadian offices, in order to service the U.S. based market of patent attorneys
seeking Canadian patent protection on behalf of their clients.250 Then, much like now,
Canadian patent agents depended largely on maintaining relationships with foreign patent
attorneys, and U.S. patent attorneys in particular, as referrals from these attorneys made
up an overwhelming percentage of many Canadian patent agents’ practices.251 However,
this created an environment of severe competition between Canadian practitioners for
foreign work from the U.S. market, and several early Canadian patent agents aggressively
marketed to U.S. based customers, to both U.S. based patent agents as well as to
inventors directly, in order to acquire Canadian filings.252 This threatened to upend the
delicate balance that most Canadian patent agents had struck with their U.S. counterparts,
potentially causing U.S. patent agents to begin filing directly into Canada on behalf of
their clients, thereby eliminating the need for a Canadian patent agent.

“Having no knowledge of the invention they could only copy the American patent and hope that it would satisfy the
requirements of the Canadian Patent Office which it usually did” (ibid at 24).
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Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “IP Canada Report 2017”, online: (2017) IP Can Rep at Figure 1, Figure 6,
Figure 7, Figure 8 < https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04333.html>. It appears that
generally speaking, foreign applicants file approximately 4 times as many Canadian patent applications as do domestic
Canadian applicants.
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The ‘advertising war’ of the late 1800’s, caused by increasing competition
between the relatively small pool of Canadian patent agents, led to many Canadian patent
practitioners engaging in advertising of questionable ethics. 253 The advertising war took
on new dimensions after Canada’s adherence to the Paris Convention in the 1920s. As
foreign countries now had a convenient mechanism to acquire Canadian patent
protection, the number of foreign-based Canadian patent applications nearly doubled. 254
Many Canadian patent agents began closing their U.S. offices in order to avoid
competition with the U.S. based agents who were responsible for such a large majority of
their work. The aggressive marketing conduct had the potential to destroy these valuable
relationships:
The profession itself was in disarray…the direct solicitation of business
from American patentees by some Canadian patent agents was
adversely affecting the standing of the profession and the business of
practitioners who acted as Canadian agents for American attorneys and
were therefore not about to solicit business from a patentee who might
well be a client of one of their American associates. Moreover, since
foreign attorneys could practice in Canada, many of them did so. Some
so-called international agents, such as B. Singer dealt directly with the
Patent Office and even after an address for service in Canada was
required, they would merely notify a Canadian agent who permitted his
address to be used for a nominal fee. 255
Protection of this foreign filing market was one of the driving forces behind
formation of the Canadian Institute of Patent Solicitors (the “Institute”), the predecessor
to what is today the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) 256, and the first steps
towards regulation of the Canadian patent agent profession. 257 One of the first acts of the
Institute was to establish a set of mandatory advertising restrictions and the imposition of
253
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a tariff of fees on its members, controversial acts which led to the refusal of several
prominent practitioners to join the Institute and several high-profile founding members
resigning.258
Similar to the U.S. situation, as the Canadian patent agent profession began to
grow, it soon ran into the boundary disputes with the Law Societies of the provinces.
Much to the dismay of the Provincial Law Societies, the early patent agents had
interchangeably used titles such as ‘patent attorney’, ‘patent solicitor’ and ‘patent
agent’.259 With the fear of an escalating dispute between the lawyers and ‘patent agents’,
then acting president of the Institute, Harold Fox, brokered an agreement between the
Provincial Law Societies, the Institute and the Patent Office, wherein the Rules would be
amended to allow for the use of the term “patent agent” by non-lawyers and at the same
time the Law Society conceded the right of the Patent Office to require all individuals to
pass an examination in order to practice before the Patent Office. 260 Thus, in 1948, the
Canadian patent agent examination was born, and thereafter all individuals, lawyers and
non-lawyers alike, were required to first pass this examination to both represent
individuals before the Canadian Patent Office and to use the ‘patent agent’ title.
3.3(ii) From Regulation to the Present (1948-2018)
There is very little documented history of the Canadian patent agent profession
from the time of regulation to the present. From what little information is available, it
seems that the Canadian profession exhibits the same sort of historical over-proximity
between the profession and the patent office as in other jurisdictions. In fact, the hyperinfluence of the current Canadian profession over the patent office has at times been so
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extreme that at one point it appeared as if CIPO sought the approval of the profession for
suitable locations of a new patent office prior to moving. 261
Similarly, as discussed below, there exists very little documented history
pertaining to the licensing of patent agents. It appears that Canada has maintained a
licensing examination from 1948 to the present, although unlike in other jurisdictions, no
one has maintained a historical archive. 262 While the available evidence does indicate that
the nature of the exam, in terms of scope, duration and content, has changed over the
years, unfortunately, the nature of these changes has largely been lost to time.
There is little documented history of the Canadian patent agent profession, and
regulation thereof, between 1948, when the examination requirement was established,
and the early 2000s. Regarding regulation, there is practically no evidence of how the
patent agent examination was set over the course of this time, if it had ever been
validated, how it was administered or any other pertinent information. 263 This is more
than a matter of mere historical curiosity; it speaks to a series of validation issues
currently plaguing the examination process and the regulatory framework.
As we have seen, the historical origin of Canadian patent agent regulation
demonstrates a concern for advertising regulation and preventing a hostile market place
rather than a careful analysis of public protection and practitioner incompetence. The
advertising wars of the late 1800s and early 1900s created fierce competition over the
lucrative U.S. foreign patent market. While both market control and ethical business
practices are both important professional considerations, these are separate considerations
from professional competency. Despite the allegedly fierce competition between the early
See e.g R. V. Jackson, “Patent Institute of Canada” (1957) 39 J Pat Off Soc'y 845. For an interesting discussion of
the lively debate at the 1957 Patent Institute of Canada annual meeting regarding appropriate locations for the “much
needed” new Canadian Patent Office.
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patent agents, there seems to be little, if any, evidence of incompetent practitioners
causing harm to an unsuspecting Canadian public. 264
From the available information, it appears that the last (and possibly only) time
between 1948 to the mid-2000s that the Canadian patent agent examination development
and administration process was reviewed was in the mid-1970s. At the request of then
CIPO Commissioner Andre Gareipy, IPIC conducted a review of the examination
process. This review was conducted entirely by IPIC, with practically no information
available regarding the nature of this review other than a list of recommendations
presented to CIPO. 265 This mid-1970’s review resulted in IPIC recommending, and
CIPO implementing, increasing the ‘carry-over’ pass mark from 50/100 to 60/100, a
minimum 240/400 score on all 4 exams to receive a ‘universal pass’ and enacting a carryover limit for the number of years a candidate can carry over a pass grade on one or more
patent agent exams. Approximately 8 years after adopting these reforms, the carry-over
limit for patent agent exams was rescinded. 266 However, again during the 1990’s, IPIC
successfully convinced CIPO to institute a carry-over limit, requiring that candidates
must pass at least 3 out of the 4 exams with a cumulative average of at least 60% in order
to carry over these passing marks for only two years. This carry-over limit was rescinded
several years later.
The only documented comprehensive review of the examination process in the
last two decades took place in the mid-2000s. The IPIC Exam Revision Committee, a
committee entirely organized and operated by IPIC, upon its own initiative undertook to
review examination administration and development with an intention to reform the exam
process. Although the IPIC Exam Revision Committee is an independent IPIC
committee, in no way affiliated with the Patent Agent Examination Board or CIPO, the
Board and CIPO have no knowledge or information of the workings of the IPIC Exam
264
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Revision Committee or any details regarding the nature of the mid-2000s ‘exam
revision’.267 This review followed what was a dramatic increase in the numbers of
candidates writing the patent agent exams, which began in the early 2000s and reached
historical record numbers in 2004. 268 In 2008, the IPIC Exam Revision Committee
completed its ‘reform’ of Papers A, B and D and beginning in 2009, the newly reformed
examinations were put into effect.269 Since then, pass rates have continuously dropped,
with the most drastic decline demonstrated in the first time pass rate. Furthermore, with
exam pass rates drastically decreasing, the number of candidates writing the Patent Agent
Exam have dropped close to their pre-2000 numbers.270 Given the perceived futility in
attempting to pass the examination, the number of candidates aspiring to write the exam
has dropped considerably over the last several years. 271
3.3(iii) Patent Agent Examination - Validation Issues
IPIC has taken responsibility for all aspects of development and marking of
Papers A, B and D of the patent agent examination, with no oversight of the Board. 272
Each year, exam questions and responses for Papers A, B and D are developed by a small
number of individuals (between 3 to 4) selected by IPIC who among themselves are
responsible for all aspects of development, validation and marking of each paper. The
267
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time of writing, for the 2017 exam, 147 candidates.
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work of these individuals is entirely confidential, even to and the Chairperson of the
Patent Agent Examination Board. There are no external validation efforts- these 3 to 4
individuals, alone, are responsible for all aspects of preparing and validating the exam
entirely amongst themselves. This validation process is out of line not only from other
Canadian professional bodies, but also other patent agent licensing examinations from
other jurisdictions. 273 Little, if any, evidence exists to demonstrate how and why the
Canadian pass score has been set at its current level and there is no available documented
evidence justifying the historical assertions, by the profession, for the need to increase the
pass level for the examination. 274
CIPO has remained responsible for development and administration of Paper C,
although, as discussed below, IPIC also exercises influence over development of this
Paper as well. Paper C, covering practice before the Patent Office, can be considered the
core component of patent agent practice- as set out under Chapter 3.2(ii) above, this is the
only activity covered by the Canadian patent agent exam that only registered patent
agents may engage in. 275 Pass rates for Paper C have historically been much higher than
Papers A, B and D and have been trending upward over the last decade. 276 Meanwhile,
Papers A, B and D under responsibility of IPIC have continued to drastically trend
downwards with respect to pass rates. 277 This fact is even more concerning considering
that these papers, and especially Paper D, cover knowledge and skills that are peripheral
to the core competency of patent agent practice.
The lack of serious validation efforts have undoubtedly contributed to the very
poor pass rates.278 For example, the subjective nature of Paper A, which uses a
hypothetical invention scenario for a constructed response problem, has over the last
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decade suffered from serious issues involving subjective solution guides and substantial
lack of consistency from year-to-year.279 In the recent 2016 Paper A examination, the
solution guide implemented a new marking score sheet, which scoring included an
entirely unprecedented ‘-10 mark’ reduction for candidates’ inclusion of an erroneous
element in their solution. 280 For the previous ten years prior to the 2016 examination, the
Paper A examination, along with corresponding solution guide, had used practically the
same format in each year. Furthermore, for at least the last 3 years, the Paper D
examination has suffered from severe validation issues involving inclusion of incorrect
questions/answers.281
Adding to the issues surrounding lack of exam validation and content/construct
problems is the fact that there are practically no real preparatory programs for individuals
wishing to write the exam. CIPO makes available previous years’ exams, but regular
format changes severely limit the usefulness of such material. Other than a handful of
IPIC tutorials, patent agent education is almost entirely non-existent. The existing IPIC
programs provide no comprehensive curriculum, as would be expected of a typical
Canadian professional licensing program. 282 There is substantial disconnect between the
available IPIC programs and the actual content and format of the patent agent
examination.283 The lack of curricular validity between the available IPIC programs and
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the actual exam is concerning given the substantial role IPIC plays in setting exam
content and format on an annual basis.
Patent agent candidates have also reported perceptions of poor exam validation in
the Canadian patent agent qualifying process. Following the 2014 patent agent
examination, CIPO conducted an analysis of the patent agent licensing process, which
included feedback from patent agent examinees, and produced the “2014 Patent Agent
Qualifying Examination Evaluation High-Level Analysis.”284 A respectively large
percentage of respondents (74%) chose to provide detailed qualitative feedback. 285 The
analysis summary states that candidate responses typically projected a sense of frustration
on a number of reoccurring themes, including poor exam setting, lack of viable training
programs and perceived conflict of interest. 286 Following the 2016 patent agent
examination, CIPO conducted a follow-up analysis to the 2014 analysis and produced the
“2016 Patent Agent Qualifying Examination Evaluation High-Level Analysis.”287
Similar to the 2014 analysis, numerous candidates again highlighted many of same
validation issues surrounding the examination, which indicates that validation concerns
are an ongoing problem.288
3.3(iv) Professional Judgement or Institutional Bias?
The validation issues surrounding the examination, viewed alongside the
historical over-proximity between the profession (and specifically, IPIC) and CIPO,
creates potential for apprehension of bias. For over 20 years, CIPO has outsourced
administration and development of the patent agent exam to the IPIC, the voluntary
professional association responsible for advocating for the interests of Canadian
intellectual property professionals including patent agents. Although Rule 13(2) of the
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Patent Rules stipulates that the chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination Board shall
appoint at least five IPIC members to the Board, it is important to distinguish the precise
nature of IPIC’s involvement vis-à-vis development and administration of the Exam.
Primarily, the outsourcing of examination development is to the IPIC organization
directly. IPIC is not a regulator, rather, it is the voluntary association responsible for
lobbying and advocating for the interests of the profession. 289 This outsourcing comes
with a relatively large sum of public money, in recent years as much as $62,000.00/year,
which CIPO pays directly to IPIC for ‘development and administration of the patent
agent examination’ and for which IPIC is in no way accountable to CIPO for how such
funds are used.290
In addition, CIPO has, for the last several years, publicized that it works with a
psychometric expert with respect to Patent Agent Examination development and
administration processes. However, it is in fact the IPIC organization, rather than CIPO,
that directly retains this psychometric expert. Despite CIPO’s many mixed messages
regarding the work of this psychometric expert, the reality is that the work of this expert
is entirely with, and pursuant to, IPIC’s instructions, and no one from CIPO, including
any CIPO appointed members of the Patent Agent Examination Board (as well as the
Chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination Board), have participated in any session
with this expert or have any knowledge of the nature of his retainer with IPIC. 291
Any and all available documentation regarding the history of the Canadian patent
agent licensing process, including any mention of exam development, only references the
work of IPIC committees and yet does not include any details regarding the role or work
of these committees. 292 For example, available documentation states that “IPIC appoints
a liaison officer (the “IPIC liaison”) and IPIC employees (e.g. the Director of
Professional Development) that work closely with the Examining Board, as well as the
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IPIC Standards Committee that works with the Examining Board to monitor and improve
the examinations.”293 Furthermore, the instruction document outlining the official duties
and responsibilities of Members of the Patent Agent Examination Board states that all
members of the Examination Board are required to “adhere to the guidance provided by
the ‘Templates for exam setting and marking’ prepared by IPIC for each of the papers”
(emphasis added).294
All of the above-referenced ‘Confidential Templates for Exam Setting and
Marking’, other than for the Paper C exam (which Paper CIPO Board Members develop)
are confidential and inaccessible. 295 Furthermore, practically the entirety of the accessible
Paper C template is redacted. Interestingly, the headings in the ‘Confidential Template
for Exam Setting and Marking’ for the Paper C exams, without anything else, tell an
intriguing story. For example, the heading for Section 3.0 is labelled ‘Mark
Distribution’, Section 4.0 is labelled ‘Scoring’ and includes a heading ‘Sample
Conversion Table’. These headings appear to include charts/graphs, all of which have
been redacted. Although the redaction makes definite conclusions difficult, this does
raise the appearance of the possibility that marks are being scored and converted to reach
an ideal mark distribution pattern. Such an approach could, in theory, be used to limit or
increase passage rates depending on an ideal mark distribution pattern. 296
Patent agent candidates have also reported a perception of conflict in the
Canadian patent agent qualifying process. In CIPO’s 2014 High Level Analysis report,
examinees expressed their frustration regarding their perception of conflict of interest
created by the involvement of the profession, through IPIC, in the development and
administration of the Patent Agent Examination. 297 Similarly, in the 2016 High Level
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Analysis, several candidates again highlighted the significant perception of bias created
by IPIC’s role in the exam process. 298
3.3(v) Epistemic Capture in Canadian Patent Agent Licensing
In light of the low Patent Agent Examination passing statistics and the influence
of the profession in setting entry-to-practice standards, it is easy to simply conclude that
the current licensing examination process has been commandeered by incumbent
Canadian patent agents who seek to limit new entrants to the profession to protect their
own material self-interests. While there may be some element of protectionism involved,
this conclusion, alone, does not paint a complete picture. The reality is far more
complex.
As discussed under Chapter 1.2, many within the Canadian profession genuinely
believe that the current regulatory framework is not only adequate, but should be
celebrated as a necessary and commendable program for protecting the public interest
and promoting innovation. Those outside organizations that have reviewed the current
licensing framework, such as the Canadian Bar Association 299 and the Federation of Law
Societies of Canada300, have commented that the current framework creates a serious
potential for apprehension of bias. Furthermore, jurisdictions such as Australia and the
U.K., that have previously conducted external reviews of their patent agent governance
frameworks, frameworks which at the time of review were very similar to the current
Canadian framework, highlighted concerns regarding perceptions of bias and the effect of
298
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respect to the relationship between IPIC and self-governance, the Federation states that separation is “fundamental to
ensuring that the public interest prevails over the interests of IP agents in case of conflict”.
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the regulation on inhibiting access to services and inflated professional fees. 301 One
commentator has referred to current patent agent regulatory framework as a “behind the
scenes arrangement between government and the profession.” 302
Yet to the individuals within this system, everything seems normal. CIPO
officials regularly attend IPIC events, sometimes to the exclusion of practically all other
public presentations.303 Despite all of the critical comments received as part of the 2014
and 2016 High-Level Analyses, CIPO sought IPIC’s direction and guidance on how best
to proceed.304 Despite external comments regarding perceptions of bias, IPIC boasts of
its independent governance of the profession. 305 This sort of hyper-proximity between
patent agents and patent offices has existed since the foundation of modern patent
“Review of the Regulation Regime for Patent Attorneys”, A Report to the Hon. Peter J. McGauran MP Minister for
Science and Technology, June 1996 (Australia). In Australia, in the late 1990s, a committee of experts conducted a
thorough review of regulation and qualifying examination in the Australian patent attorney profession (the “Australian
Review”). At the time of the Australian Review, the Australian profession was regulated in an almost identical fashion
to the current Canadian regulatory scheme, including the administration and development of the patent agent qualifying
examination (See Aoun, supra note 16 at 412). Specifically, Australia’s professional association of patent attorneys,
the Institute of Patent Attorneys of Australia (IPAA), played an almost identical role in the Australian patent agent
qualifying exam process vis-à-vis Australia’s exam board, the Patent Attorneys Professional Standards Board
(PAPSB), that IPIC currently plays in the development and administration of the Canadian exam vis-à-vis the Board.
Even though the IPAA’s role was not nearly as involved as IPIC’s current role in Canada, the Australian committee
still found that the IPAA’s role created problems with the patent agent exam and with the public image of the patent
agent examination process, creating an image of self-interest, perceptions that the patent agent exam may be used to
limit numbers of new entrants to the profession and a lack of educational expertise in patent agent exam training and
development. The Australian committee found that the PAPSB should be concerned with its operations and public
image, and recommended that a new examination body be created to “change the public perception of the overlap in
activities between PAPSB and the IPAA”.
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G. Bruce Doern, The Regulation of Patent and Trade-mark Agent Qualifications: Institutional Issues and Options
(Ottawa: Canadian Intellectual Property Office 1995) at 118. Doern states that “there is certainly no volunteered view
that [IPIC] should take over the examination process itself, an issue that would inevitably have to be coupled with other
aspects of a full self-regulating profession” (ibid at 48).
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Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request No. A2017-00847 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2017). The information
disclosed in this document indicates that as of early 2017, CIPO’s current CEO, Johanne Bélisle, had only participated
in what appears to be three public events, the 2016 IP Statistics for Decision Makers Conference, the 2016 WIPO
General Assembly and the IPIC Annual Meeting.
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See Appendix ‘G’.

IPIC, supra note 16 at 7,8, 27, 41, 190, and 196. IPIC’s public comments openly acknowledge this overlapping role
between IPIC and CIPO in regulation of the profession. In its recent government submission in support of its goal of
full self-governance of the profession, IPIC asserted, as a highlight of the profession’s ability to regulate itself, that
IPIC itself hires an expert in measurement and evaluation of competency to “assist with the preparation of the exams”
and that “in its participation in the examination process [IPIC] currently calls upon the services of [an] expert for its
current work on the exams.” Furthermore, IPIC states that it “has been working with an expert on contract to IPIC for a
number of years to develop the templates for the current exams, train the examiners, and continuously improve the
exams. IPIC also has exam standard committees that have worked on improving the exams. IPIC also states that “with
the help of measurement and evaluation experts, such as the one currently under contract with IPIC, the [proposed selfregulatory body] can always monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the whole admission process.” 305 Furthermore,
all its “expertise would be transferred to the [proposed self-regulatory body] to implement [IPIC’s] recommendations.”
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systems. In a jurisdiction like Canada, where intellectual property in general has never
been a major public priority, the current regulatory framework has managed to exist
without any tension or serious consideration for almost 100 years. Individuals on both
sides, the profession and CIPO, have enjoyed a frictionless relationship and have likely
developed deeply entrenched, self-interested reasons to maintain the status quo if for no
other reason other than convenience.
The unique nature of patent office operations contributes to this phenomenon.
Patent offices are exceptional amongst government agencies. As most patent offices
derive their budget from filings- and in some jurisdictions to surplus levels 306 - it is
natural for such patent offices, under a customer service mentality, to view the person
filing the application as their customer and to whom their duty is owed. The resulting
changes in organizational behavior have created a system where the needs and desires of
the ‘customer’ begin to overshadow other duties and obligations. 307 In a jurisdiction such
as Canada, the overwhelming majority of applications are filed from abroad, and a
Canadian patent agent must be appointed to file and prosecute such applications. In most
circumstances, CIPO is only speaking to patent agents, as these are the only individuals
legally entitled to correspond with CIPO with respect to any patent office business. This
creates a one-way channel between patent agents and CIPO, and CIPO’s rational view of
its mission becomes bounded by this insularity. The historical over-proximity between
the Canadian patent agent profession and CIPO has caused CIPO to view the patent agent
profession, rather than the Canadian public or inventors, as their primary customer. 308

“The EU Agency That Has Too Much Money”, euobserver, March 21, 2016 online: <
https://euobserver.com/institutional/132723> accessed on July 8, 2018; commenting on the EU IPO’s substantial
budget surplus, and the concerns regarding use of such surplus to fund general EU activities.
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Drahos, supra 214 at 36.

“Sylvian Laporte, Canadian Intellectual Property Office: Inventors, Not IP Agents”, Managing Intellectual Property,
(13 July 2012), online: <http://www.managingip.com/Article/3060569/Sylvain-Laporte-Canadian-IntellectualProperty-Office-Inventors-not-IP-agents.html> accessed on July 18, 2018. This article is a feature on former CIPO
Commissioner of Patents, Sylvain Laporte. The article tagline reads “Laporte’s priority is innovation, not patent
agents”. Furthermore, the article goes on to quote Laporte as saying “I was a bit amazed by how little CIPO
understood our customer- the paying customer, the innovator…We have a fantastic relationship with our IP agents to
the point that the organization would confuse the customer with the IP agent.” Regarding balancing competing
innovator and agent priorities, the article states “So, when faced with recommendations to reform regulation, [Laporte]
asks himself two things. Is this good for the customer and innovation in Canada? Or is this an administrative
improvement that would be good for CIPO or the IP agent community in terms of reduced red tape or bureaucracy?”
Laporte is quoted as saying “Those two categorizations can lead to very different priorities…One is aligned with the
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Much like other Canadian professions, the patent agent profession governs itself based on
model that places considerable emphasis on competency, to the exception of practically
all other relevant considerations. Given the esoteric nature of patent practice, and its
extreme insularity, it is not surprising that the profession has drifted towards a position of
extremity with respect to competence, despite a lack of rational, objective justifications.

government’s priorities to move innovation, and the other is more administrative in nature. The priority for me is
aligned with the government priority to improve innovation. In the past, those lines were blurred.”(emphasis added)
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CHAPTER 4
THE FUTURE OF PATENT AGENCY
The foregoing Chapters set out an analysis of the necessity of patent agent
regulation and an intriguing historical account. This certainly makes for an interesting
academic case study, but likely leads to questions as to the practical significance of this
analysis. To put it simply- why should we care about the regulation of patent agents
beyond satisfying academic curiosity?
The following Chapters will demonstrate that as we move forward into a new era
of technological advances and changing public perception regarding the delivery of
professional services, the impact of patent agent regulation can no longer be overlooked.
As with all regulated professions, we must question what effect the regulation of patent
agency is having on access to services. However, from a more fundamental perspective,
the historical effect of patent agent regulation on influencing the patent narrative will
likely come to the forefront as technological disruption and changing public expectations
regarding the patent system begin to take shape. As such, the regulation of patent agency
is now moving into an era where it can no longer be considered in isolation, but as being
intertwined with the objectives of the patent system itself.
4.1 THE RETURN OF DEMOCRATIZED INVENTION: DEMOCRATIZED PATENT
AGENCY?
4.1(i) Professionalization of Patent Agency and the Patent Discourse
Inkster poses an intriguing question: in the early days of the first Industrial
Revolution, where artisanal culture and circulation of useful knowledge mixed freely
with inventive activity and production, where did patent agency begin and where did it
end?309 Should all support within this inventive environment be considered as part of
patent agency, or only those who directly sold their patent application preparation and
prosecution services for gain?310 To reformulate the question, how do we differentiate
knowledge from technique and ‘urban savvy’ when examining inventorship,
309
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entrepreneurship and patent agency in the pre-formalized patent landscape of the
Industrial Revolution era? In the democratized world of invention during this era, within
the industrial hubs where technical information flowed freely “amid patent agency widely
defined but closely proximate”, many of these inventors “could command his own
agency as well as receive it from others” when engaging in inventive and
commercialization activity. 311 If it is the case that during this era, “agency [lay] beyond
the patentees and patent agents of formal institutions”, then how have external factors
affected the development of formal patent institutions and what lessons might this teach
us for the future?312
Academic scholarship of various disciplines has overlooked the patent agent
profession, and this inattention may create an incomplete picture of how our current
patent institutions have developed. Specifically, what effect has the professionalization
of patent agency had on the development of patent law institutions? According to
Guagnini:
The changes and the profile of the patent agents at the turn-of-thecentury and in the early twentieth, and the process by which their
professional interests and agenda were negotiated and defined, deserve
to be examined on the basis of a more systematic empirical research. So
does the way and the extent to which their interests were brought to
bear, along those of the other ‘players’, on the evolution of the ‘rules of
the game’- the patent system as an institution…313 (emphasis added)
The role of patent agents, and the professionalization thereof, in influencing the
development of the patent system as an institution begins at a more fundamental level.
According to Smit, the conceptual core of a patent agent’s esoteric knowledge was
founded on the ability to define ‘units of technology’ following the growth of
technological innovation in the Industrial Revolution.314 From the early 19th century,
patent agents “contrived to profit” from the development of patent law and practice, and
undertook an active role in “the preservation of a strong legal element [which] ensured
311

Ibid at 137.

312

Ibid at 140.

313

Supra note 4 at 159.

314

Supra note 151 at 92.

82

that the ‘professional’ skill of patent experts would remain important in the delineation
and defense of units of new technology.” 315
Fundamentally, the Industrial Revolution was more than a technical revolution, as
it ushered in philosophical debates over the control of ‘technology’. The emerging
entrepreneurial middle class, empowered by new reforms directed towards the
dissemination of knowledge, hostility towards ‘patronage’-domination of government
bureaucracy and the creation of labor rights, was the site of a growing philosophical
debate over control of technology. While many within this emerging middle class
staunchly supported the idea of property rights over the product of intellectual labor, they
also viewed monopolies as a vestige of patronage governance and as such were hesitant
to fully embrace strong property rights for patents. Even those who supported property
rights for inventions had mixed feelings regarding administration of such rights, whether
by way of examination or automatic creation (similar to copyright).
The ambiguities of the middle class ideal regarding control of technology is what
provided the early patent agents room to maneuver. 316 According to Smit, it was here
that the early patent agents “not only marshalled and deployed ‘ideological resources’ but
went further and themselves created such resources, particularly through their conceptive
work in the legal sphere.”317 Once these patent agents were able to author the conceptual
discourse, from there they could move to shape patent legislation and institutions which
ultimately resulted in the authoring of the discourse of their own professional identity. 318
As many of the patent agents of this era were also entrenched within the network of the
most widely read technological publications of the time, they were able to publish pieces
arguing for “sophisticated ideological justifications” for a patent system that ensured a
central role for patent agents. 319 With the rise of corporatization and the pursuit of global
corporate patenting strategies, patent agents within the European periphery also became
315
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vocal advocates for patent reform. In countries such as Spain, domestic patent agents
used their political influence and control over technical publications to lobby for patent
reform, which reforms aligned both with foreign corporate strategies as well as
streamlined patent processes involving a central role for domestic patent agents. 320
In the emerging discourse surrounding control of technology during Britain’s
Industrial Revolution era, the entrepreneurial middle class wished to see an ideological
construction of the control of technology that in many ways would have involved no role
for professional patent agents to play at all. 321 The early pre-regulation ‘invention agents’
were not a discrete professional group in and of themselves, rather, as discussed above,
patent agency was latent and homogenous within the inventive community. In this
regard, the significance of the active exercise of power by a newly ‘professionalizing’
patent agent group cannot be discounted- their “position of trust” as a professional group
was in many ways authored by the profession itself and achieved through their own social
and political action.322 The nascent profession mastered the ability to “disagree with
fractions of the middle class without having to move outside of the middle class ideal”,
thereby allowing the early patent agents to harness the ideological power of middle class
ownership of the product of its labour while circumventing middle class hostility towards
bureaucracy, professionalization and monopolies.323
In Britain, patent agents used their political influence and connections to build
institutions that required their specialized form of legal expertise. In many respects, this
same influence not only developed institutions, but also furthered a political ideology that
justified those institutions. Although many during the pre-1850’s era accepted the
rationale for a patent system, disagreements regarding the formal institutions of this
system still existed. One major ideological battleground involved the debate surrounding
the role of ‘scientific’ versus ‘legal experts’ in assessing the scope of invention and patent
Supra note 205 at 110. “From the 1880s some agents – including Julio Vizcarrondo, Gerónimo Bolibar and Alberto
Clarke – carried lobbying activities through their journals, privileged political connections and active membership in
foreign associations such as the London Chartered Institute of Patent Agents and the International Association for the
Protection of Industrial Property.”
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rights. Influential members of the scientific community believed that the assessment of
inventions was a scientific question, and should be assessed by members of the scientific
community, while the patent practitioners argued that patentability was essentially a legal
question. The position of the scientific community, which might have effectively
eliminated the professional independence of the patent agent profession, were vigorously
disputed by the profession. 324 The political saavy of patent agents compared to the
scientific community was so dominant that even the establishment of examination by
scientifically trained patent examiners was viewed as a compromise on their part. 325
The political savvy of patent agents extended across different forums. For
example, in 1848, a British Treasury Committee was tasked with review of the
administration of the patent system and options for reform of the costly, convoluted and
at times, opaque patent system. While the subsequent reforms were commendable, in
that they largely eliminated the system of patronage that had until then dominated the
patent system, that patent agents of the day still managed, where possible, to turn the
discussion to their advantage and increase the need for their scope of expertise. 326 The
mid-19th century British patent agents largely dominated this reform discourse:
The domination of the findings of this Committee by patent experts was
complete. Not only was the evidence of the traditional administrators
rejected, but no evidence was placed before the Committee from
entrepreneurs or inventors who were primarily interested in the
exploitation of their inventions. Therefore, the only version of the
possibilities of reform came from the patent experts. Their strategic
occupational position had led them to being accepted by the Committee
as the only witnesses with the necessary expertise. They were thus able
to ensure that their version of how the patent system ought to be
changed formed the basis of later debates in the subsequent phase of
legislative reform. 327 (emphasis added)
In the early 19th century U.S. patent landscape, the patent practitioners of this era
fought their ideological battles within U.S. courts. Here, much like in Britain, judges
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across the U.S. geographical landscape remained torn between respect for the middle
class ideal, along with the empowering effect the patent system could have on the lives
and fortunes of individual inventors and small enterprises, and apprehensions towards
growing corporatization and abusive monopolies.328 Slowly, over the course of the early
19th century, the patent bar not only gained judicial recognition for their practical
innovations (such as the patent claim) but also a growing body of judicial precedent
favouring stronger patent rights and enhanced scope of patent protection. This judicial
recognition was symbolic of an ideological shift, one that the growing patent profession
was eager to capture. Accordingly, the passage of the U.S. 1836 Patent Act was more
than simply a statutory recognition of previous customary patent practice. It was in many
ways the securing of an ideological foundation, one which enhanced efficiency of the
patent system for an emerging class of corporate patentees and secured the livelihood of
patent agents.329
It is here that Smit distinguishes patent agent professionalization from other
professions. In other professional disciplines, the profession is defined by “a segment of
social reality”, and in that respect, are an agent of such social classes to achieve certain
political and economic goals. 330 While to some extent this was the case during the
professionalization of patent agency, for the patent agent profession, the profession itself
actively shaped the domain of their participation- the patent system itself- and with it
their role as professionals within that system. This shaping took place on an ideological
level, by actively participating in the defining of a discourse of technology, as well as
through various institutional engagements. Patent office rules and court decisions did not
simply define the identity of the early patent agent profession, rather, these decisions
were assimilated and redeployed by patent agents to further influence the gradual
transformation of these institutions. 331
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The professionalization of patent agency is no doubt intertwined with the
establishment of the underlying ideology that has served as the foundation of our patent
system in its current form. Numerous studies have examined the various socioeconomic
impacts of corporate patent activity, but few have questioned the impact of patent agency
on either furthering or hindering the objectives of the patent system. Furthermore, fewer
still have questioned the impact of professionalization of patent agency. As Guagnini
states:
However the issue I want to highlight here is more narrowly focused: it
is the impact that the introduction of the examination had on the profile
of the registered agents. It is not unreasonable to assume that this
procedure, not only the examination as such but also the formation by
apprenticeship before and after the examination, favored a growing
homologation in the characteristics of the new, post 1883 generation of
patent agents. If that was the case, did such homologation extend not
only to the characteristics of their profile but also more generally to
their approach to the profession? And did that have an impact on the
evolving pattern of patents procedures and specifications, favoring the
emergence of distinctive and possibly more homogeneous standards? 332
Guagnini cites the example of the pre-regulation ‘invention agents’, those
individuals who took a more holistic role in the inventor (rather than corporate)
dominated landscape of the early Industrial Revolution era. As discussed above, these
individuals played a variety of roles in the patent services market, including assisting in
introducing inventors to manufacturers and acting as patent brokers. At the turn of the
century, when patent agent regulation was beginning to take shape in Britain, a lively
debate existed amongst patent agents regarding the propriety of agents acting as patent
brokers.333 The more ‘elite’ agents of London were strongly against any such conduct,
viewing an agent’s role in the narrow sense of preparation and prosecution of patent
332
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applications. However, many agents felt that such practices may not be entirely
improper, provided that adequate steps were taken to eliminate any conflicts of interest
between agent and client. While this debate was, and in many ways still is presented as a
question of ethics, Guagnini views this from the perspective of the effect of patent agent
professionalization:
the different attitudes among the practitioners seems to bring back the
problem outlined before, namely that also their involvement in
intermediation might somehow relate to specific characteristics and
professional interests of different segments of the professional
community, into what they regarded as the prevalent interests of their
clients…. The attitudes of patent agents whose portfolio was closely
associated to particular sectors might have reflected or responded to the
interests of their particular clientele. 334
Where professionalization draws distinct boundary lines between occupational
groups, any crossing of these lines is viewed as a competency and/or ethical breach. But
in the pre-regulation era, prior to the drawing of such professional boundary lines, where
broad notions of patent agency, technical innovation, dissemination of knowledge and
business acumen flowed freely, it is hard to draw such clear-cut distinctions. It is possible
that in this environment, the organization of patent agency was intertwined with the
needs of individual inventors and the combination of corporatization and the
professionalization movement may have institutionalized patent agency and created
artificial barriers between individual inventors and the delivery of patent agent services.
Admittedly, these questions raise a chicken/egg dilemma- did professionalization
limit individual inventors’ inventive activity and access to the patent system, or was
professionalization an effect of the growing corporatization of the patent system and thus
a natural response to changing socioeconomic landscapes? Similarly, was the effect of
patent agency on the development of patent institutions and substantive patent law a
natural reflection of changes in the socioeconomic landscape, or was it the combined
result of the over-influence of corporate and patent agent professional interests, and if so,
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has institutionalized patent agency in some ways disconnected the patent system from its
earliest foundations?335
A detailed review of the origins patent institutions and patent practice is of far
greater significance then both satisfying historical curiosity and illustrating the precarious
foundation of patent agent regulation. Rather, as Morriss and Nard state, “[e]xplaining
the origins of nineteenth century American patent institutions is thus crucial to
understanding twenty-first century American patent law, the current debates concerning
patent reform initiatives in developed countries, and the appropriate patent law
institutions for developing economies, which today are positioned similarly to the United
States in the nineteenth century.” 336
Furthermore, viewing the patent agent profession as an interest group in and of
itself, along with other key interest groups (such as inventors, corporations, the patent
office, the public), provides key insights into the development of future patent law
institutions:
The past … holds important lessons for the future…. Moreover,
focusing on the choice of institutions by interest groups offers insights
into the evolution of the institutions as well as the law that they
produce. …The question of institutional choice in the development of
patent law is as important today as it was 150 years ago. 337
Accordingly, the future of the patent agent profession, and the challenges that lie
ahead, must be placed within proper context dictated not only by the present and future,
but also the past.
4.1(ii) Regulation and Access to Services
A critical examination of any professional licensing regime typically begins with
the question of the effect of regulation on access to services. With respect to patent agent
regulation, the lack of rational correlation between entry-standards and patent quality
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may have serious negative economic effects, in that “reified standards are driving people
away from the job of patenting.”338 In the U.S. context, statistical analysis demonstrates
that as Patent Bar eligibility remains stringent and Patent Bar pass rates continue to drop,
the aggregate size of the patent agent applicant pool will shrink drastically. 339 This may
lead to excessive specialization of services, with current patent agents focusing greater
and greater effort on high value services such as drafting and prosecution as opposed to
general IP strategic services, and with large corporate clients capturing the available
market for services at the expense of small-to-medium sized inventors. 340 The impact on
small-to-medium sized inventors may be significant:
As the number of patent attorneys shrinks, the cost per patent is likely
to increase to pay for the salaries of existing patent attorneys that will
ultimately be in higher demand. As the cost per patent increases, it will
discourage inventors from filing patents. This is precisely the opposite
incentive provided by the American Invents Act, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office itself, all law schools with any interest in
intellectual property, and inventor-support groups across the country. 341
Viewed in light of these statistics, it is difficult to understand how and why so
many recent initiatives to further include small-to-medium inventors into the patent
system have seemingly neglected a regulatory framework with impacts that appear to
undermine the objectives of those initiatives. It appears that, at least in the U.S. context,
much of the regulations surrounding entry-qualifications to the patent agent profession
have been “established through the unfettered discretion of the Director [of the USPTO]
338
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in years past and this has only been continued out of disinterest or the fallacy that the
reified standards somehow contributes to the quality of [patents].” 342 While much of the
recent patent law reform discourse revolves around improving access to the patent system
for individual inventors and small-to-medium enterprises, there has been surprisingly
little effort to connect with these groups and only minimal effort to connect with
academia.343
In Europe, debate has long existed whether regulation of European patent
agents344 has contributed to poor inventive output, at least compared to the U.S. (where
patent practice is not as strictly regulated). 345 There is very little written about the topic
of regulation of European patent practice and less still regarding economic impacts of
regulation. The EPO has acknowledged a shortage of practitioners in new European
Patent Convention member states, such as Albania and Bulgaria, and has launched a
Candidate Support Project to encourage and support the training of new practitioners
within these states. 346 However, the EPO provides very little information regarding this
program or its outcomes.
Turning to the Canadian context, Canada continues to lag its peers in various
innovation criteria, including patent application filings.347 Recent studies demonstrate
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“There will be many consequences to the United States patent bar and its economy for having fewer and, perhaps,
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that segments of the Canadian population, specifically, individual inventors and small-tomedium enterprises, lack access to meaningful intellectual property services. 348 Canada
has a historically had a problem with mobility of patent agents across the country, a
problem that some have pointed to as a contributing factor to lack of access to patent
services in various market segments. 349 While no specific study has directly linked these
issues to regulation of the Canadian patent agent profession, studies from comparable
jurisdictions raise a presumption that regulation may be a contributing factor. A study of
the Australian profession, which at the time of the study was regulated in almost identical
fashion to the current Canadian regulatory framework, found a correlation between
regulation, limiting access to services and excessive professional fees. 350 Furthermore,
U.S. studies long ago demonstrated that U.S. licensing standards, which are far less
stringent than current Canadian standards, contributed to an environment where
competent practitioners are spread out across the U.S., providing inventors across the
country with meaningful access to services .351
4.1(iii) Regulation and an Emerging Patent Discourse
Along with technological advances and changing societal attitudes regarding
professional services, the public’s expectation regarding delivery of patent services has
drastically changed in recent years. Although the patent system has existed, largely
unchanged, for almost two centuries, it was not until only recently that intellectual
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property became a Canadian policy priority. As such, the Canadian experience and
expectations regarding patent service delivery is still very nascent.
In the early 1990s, a shift in perception of the patent office’s passive ‘examination
and patent publication’ role to an active ‘customer service model’ began to emerge. 352
According to Bruce Doern, this new climate emerged due to intellectual property issues
having “moved from the sidelines to the front lines of what used to be a narrow part of
industrial policy and framework law.” 353 But as Doern highlights, as intellectual
property “moves into the limelight, it does not move into a realm with totally clear
ideas.”354
As Doern pointed out in the late-90s, the natural outgrowth of the different roles
of the profession, the patent office and the public’s expectation could lead to important
misunderstandings in the future if these new, emerging realities were left unaddressed. In
the Canadian context, in the late-90s, confusion began emerge between the patent agent
profession and the patent office as to objectives of the patent system and each group’s
role in furthering those objectives:
[T]here are some differences between CIPO and [the profession] as to
just what the key features of the regime are in the late 1990s. CIPO is
giving far greater priority to those clients who are users of intellectual
property or who are potential or unreached inventors than in the past.
The [profession], in my view, sees the regulatory regime much more
exclusively in terms of the protection of the creators of intellectual
property.355
Fast-forward twenty years, and the public’s expectation regarding the objectives
of the patent system and delivery of patent services has drastically changed. Again,
Doern effectively foreshadows the nature of these forthcoming changes:
consider the issue of CIPO’s desire to offer services to the two clients it
often feels it has ignored by, in the past, thinking of itself only or
primarily as a regulator. The desire to serve inventors who are “out
352
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there” is one such client. They are persons who are not aware of what
they need to do protect inventions. The other client is the more diffuse
and more numerous users of patent information and hence those most
interested in the circulation of such information rather than only in the
protection of inventions per se. Can or should CIPO carry out such
roles vis-à-vis these clients?356 (emphasis added)
Today, as predicted, the respective roles and lines between educators, agents and
the patent office have begun to blur. CIPO, driven by a customer service mentality, has
launched a series of comprehensive intellectual property educational programs along with
positioning numerous intellectual property advisors across the country with the intention
of assisting Canadian entrepreneurs in capturing value through intellectual property.357
This begs the question- is this within CIPO’s public interest mandate? What is
CIPO’s public interest mandate? Should CIPO be engaging in a campaign to encourage
individuals to protect intellectual property? Does this pose a conflict of interest? Some
are beginning to question how much a patent office, tasked with being the protector of the
public interest while also being largely self-funded through user fees, should be actively
appealing to ‘customers’?358 Similar ‘mid-level’ intellectual property jurisdictions (i.e.
developed countries outside of the U.S./Japan/EPO major patent filers) have taken this
customer service mentality even farther, setting up patent office owned corporations to
assist individuals with commercialization of technology.359 These are all no doubt
difficult questions to answer, but regardless, these issues are indicative of the realities of
an emerging patent discourse in which the nature of patent agency is a central
consideration.
More important is the question of who, within this melting pot of interest groups
and confused objectives, is responsible for advocating for the public’s interest. Peter
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Drahos has pointed out that Universities, with their public interest mandate and goal of
dissemination of knowledge, are one of the top options to take on the task of refocusing
patent practice towards a broader public social contract mandate.360 Many developing
countries are now examining new modalities of patent service offerings, largely housed
within institutional settings, and specifically, on university campuses. Several developing
countries have, with the assistance of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), established innovative and progressive programs for the delivery of intellectual
property services and education. WIPO has assisted in the establishment and
development of Technology and Innovation Support Centres (TISCs) on university
campuses and research institutes throughout the developing world, which TISCs provide
many important and diverse intellectual property related services to both the research
community and public at large.361 This has led to suggestions for creating novel,
international, university-based technology transfer networks between developed and
developing countries.362 However, entitlement to practice issues have already come up in
some developing countries, threatening to possibly derail promising and innovative
movements.363
Furthermore, University based intellectual property clinical programs have
become a growing phenomenon across North America. USPTO certified patent clinics
are now emerging on campuses across the U.S and are starting to form part of a large
entrepreneurial eco-system that includes a menu of legal services. Clinical programs are
360
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now experimenting with university technology transfer office (TTO) collaborations to
create novel forms of university-based innovation ecosystems.364
There exist very few institutional educational programs relating to Canadian
patent practice, a point that Doern long-ago critically highlighted.365 In Europe, where
the profession is regulated in very similar fashion to the Canadian profession, the EPO
long ago recognized that “everybody has been able to agree that better training
possibilities are necessary” in order to better service a European market of small-tomedium enterprises and counteract the fact that “the education of patent agents in all
countries fundamentally still has the character of the traditional master apprenticeship
known since the guilds of the Middle Ages.”366 A nascent Canadian intellectual property
clinical movement is beginning to take shape. This clinical movement would provide
education and training for future practitioners within a non-profit driven setting, along
with providing patent assistance to individuals who would not other be able to access
such services. Thus, university based clinical programs seem like a natural conclusionthere is a need for intellectual property service delivery for traditionally under-serviced
market segments along with a need for greater institutional educational programs for
professional training. Intellectual property clinical programs are perfectly situated to
satisfy both needs.
However, Canadian patent agent regulation already seems to be developing into a
barrier against such innovative programs. In the profession’s recent bid for greater selfregulatory powers, the proposal clearly stated that there is no intention to incorporate a
university/institutional education component as part of the licensing agenda and at least
one commentator seems reluctant to embrace a university component despite the fact that
many comparable jurisdictions have already done so.367 Part of the Canadian patent
Cynthia L. Dahl, “Technology Transfer Client Work for an Intellectual Property Legal Clinic” (2017) 23 B U J Sci
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agent profession’s desire for expanded self-regulatory powers is to police against
unauthorized practice of patent agency, creating tension regarding a possible turf war
between the profession and clinical programs in the near future.368 Since the Federal
government recently announced support for intellectual property clinical programs as one
component of its Intellectual Property Strategy, the profession has not publicly
acknowledged support for clinical programs.369 Even CIPO has made relatively modest
statements regarding intellectual property clinical programs, advocating for a form of
clinical programs with far less capacity and scope from those in the U.S.370
A new IP profession requires a new re-orientation to refocus on the public’s
needs, specifically, the needs of individual inventors and small-to-medium enterprises in
the broadest sense. Several leading academics are calling for the creation of a new breed
of patent practitioner. Nefissa Chakroun has called for an enhanced emphasis on creation
of a ‘patent information specialist profession’, to provide small-to-medium inventors with
assistance in locating and using patent invention information for incremental innovation
purposes.371 Port et. al., espousing concerns regarding a possible serious shortage of
patent practitioners in the upcoming years, which shortage will disproportionately impact
small-to-medium enterprises, have suggested the creation of a new ‘patent drafting’
profession to service market needs.372
Each of above-referenced suggestions circle around the same unspoken issue,
namely, that regulatory exclusivity surrounding patent office practice remains an
impediment in the chain of patent service delivery, one that continues to stifle access to
Salvatore Guerriero, “Certification or licensure? Charting the move toward self-regulation for patent and trademark
agents”, (2005) available online: < http://www.peo.on.ca/index.php/ci_id/21277/la_id/1.htm>.
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services and innovation in service delivery. Technological development (as discussed
below) is set to disrupt and unbundle many patent services, including searching,
preliminary patentability assessment and patent drafting. Yet when all is said and done,
inventors must still engage with a registered patent agent to have their application filed
and prosecuted in the respective patent office. Hence the seamless web of activities is
broken for this part of a much larger comprehensive set of service offerings. The most
logical question becomes ‘why is this regulatory intervention required’? When the
services are all unbundled, the sore thumb sticks out, calling the necessity of the
regulatory intervention into question.
4.1(iv) Technological Disruption, Professional Services and Patent Agency
The reality facing the future of the patent agent profession is in many ways the
same reality that all legal service providers will need to confront in the upcoming years.
Technological advances in service delivery are challenging the ways in which we
conceive of not only professional competence but also how professional services are
delivered. These technological advances have empowered the ‘unbundling’ movement,
wherein delivery of professional services are viewed not as a holistic continuum leading
to one output, but rather a fragmented collection of numerous inputs/outputs possibly
delivered by various services providers. 373
Technological advances have slowly started to chip away at the professional
knowledge/service gap between patent agents and their clients, as well as between patent
agents and other service providers. As discussed above, for many years, one of the main
professional activities of patent agents was dissemination of patent knowledge. Searching
and dissemination of patent knowledge was one of the first casualties of technological
advance. Patent office records are now freely published and accessible through a
plethora of free and subscription databases. Search companies now offer comprehensive
search services at affordable rates. Law firms hire full time ‘searchers’, who may or may
not be patent agents.

Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at
32-3.
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The potentially disruptive effect of technological advance to patent agent practice
was not entirely unforeseen. One of the EPO’s earliest Directors, Lise Dybdahl
Osterborg, long ago recognized the link between patent agents, regulation and the ‘chain’
of patent agent services. Specifically, Osterborg foresaw that the coming storm of
technological advances and specialization of services could have a disruptive effect on
patent agent professionalization:
It is certain that action has to be taken here and now. If not, we are
likely to experience other professions’ arrogating the patent work for
themselves. Solicitors, accountants, technical consultants, computerbased payment firms and private novelty search agencies immediately
come to mind. It is also possible that industry, which in the past years
has increasingly merged into bigger units, will find out that employees
in their patent departments, after having received some education, are
by and large able to handle the task themselves without assistance from
a patent attorney’s office.374
Furthermore, Osterborg recognized the potential effect that this delicate tension
between regulation and provision of services, if not properly balanced, could have on
individual inventors’ and small-to-medium enterprises’ access to services:
It stands to reason that to some extent patent attorneys’ fees may be
detrimental to the patent system as a whole. This is the case if the fees
charged are on a level which by social standards are too high and can
remain so only owing to measure from the profession restricting
competition…If in the future European patents are still largely applied
for and obtained by small-to-medium enterprises, one of the links in the
price-raising chain has to be broken… (emphasis added)375
Doern also foresaw the oncoming ‘unbundling’ movement and its potential
disruptive effect on patent agent regulation and practice:
if one thinks literally of the potential unbundling of activities in the
patent and trademark application process… then some activities
potentially come to mind. One already exists in that some firms, which
otherwise do not do patent and trade-mark work, do patent and
trademark ‘search’ work. In other words, they carry out a specialized
form of initial research at the front end of the application cycle. To the
extent that some of the front end work in the regulatory cycle is a kind
374
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of ‘form filing’ activity, there is potential for some other suppliers to do
perhaps routine aspects of this kind of activity. But almost immediately
comes the rub! There may well be no obvious or practical discrete cut
off points between routine form-filing activities and those closely
connected activities that involve mixes of procedural knowledge,
extremely real science and technology, and detailed knowledge of the
law. Hence the notion of a seamless web of activities quickly emerges
and hence…the notion of numerous unique outputs of service must be
confronted. (emphasis added)376
The ‘rub’, as Doern has eloquently characterized it, with respect to patent
agent/attorney regulation, unbundling, technological disruption and access to services is
the central dilemma at the heart of an emerging challenge to patent agent regulation. This
in many ways is a dilemma facing all professions generally, the fragmentation and
automation of professional services caused by emerging technologies.377 Technology
splintered searching from the patent agent identity and it has now taken on a life and
identity of its own.378 Are other patent services far behind? Will new automated and AIdriven technologies for patent drafting create a new ‘patent drafting’ service provider?
For example, new automated patent drafting software can, in a matter of minutes,
automatically prepare an entire patent application specification based off one or more
draft patent claims. 379 New AI driven software automates the specification drafting
process, using a sophisticated system for claim charting, illustration labelling and
connection to the detailed description. 380 These programs also automate the process for
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responding to patent office communications, by connecting with patent office databases,
scanning communications, and preparing template responses. 381
New programs also automate patent office strategy and analysis. By uploading a
sample of a patent application, such as draft claims and portions of a specification,
available software can conduct a USPTO patent search, provide a listing of relevant prior
art, map out prosecution path (such as likely Art. Unit and examiners) and provides fairly
detailed feedback on novelty and obviousness.382
AI-driven software now provides comprehensive searching based on rudimentary
invention disclosures.383 New cloud-based patent file management software automate the
entire patent file management process. 384 These programs connect to the patent office
network and automatically downloads documents and self-update anytime patent office
correspondence or deadlines are released or activated respectively. Furthermore, these
providers are now exploring cost-effective pricing models, making them accessible for
practitioners and/or clients who may not have large patent portfolios to manage.
Patent offices are now exploring possibilities for automating administration. Both
the USPTO and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) has already launched pilot projects
testing the use of AI-driven software for automating several patent office procedures,
including examination, and other domestic patent offices are not far behind. 385 The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has developed an AI based tool for translating
patents into any of the official languages of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), with

381

Ibid.

382

Ibid.

383

See for example AI Patents, online: <http://www.aipatents.com>.

384

AppColl, online: (2018) Patent & Trademark Docketing Software <http://www.appcoll.com/>.

“Application of AI technologies to IP Processes - Japan Patent Office”, August 22, 2017, online:
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ae8d79a4-540f-4eb9-84ab-d98d8385b00d>;
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/27/role-artificial-intelligence-intellectual-property/id=86085/. North Carolina
based AI Patents (online: www.aipatents.com) had secured USPTO contracts to test its AI-driven patent search
software for patent examination pre-screening; see online: < https://www.aipatents.com/TrustedByGovernment.pdf>.
See generally WIPO’s survey on use of AI by international patent offices- WIPO, UN WIPO/IP/ITAI/GE/18/1 (8
February
2018),
available
online:
<
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18_1.pdf>.
385

101

the Korean Intellectual Property Office having adopted this technology for domestic
use.386
All of this begs a challenging question- how long before AI driven software can
interact with inventors and automate the entire patent drafting process? In a recent debate
hosted by CIPA, the majority of panelists seemed to believe that such technology may be
operable by as soon as 2025. 387 New providers are already lining up to develop this
technology.388 Along with all of this comes the inevitable debates regarding entitlement
to practice. The border skirmishes have already begun between the licensed profession
and new forms of mass-market intellectual property service providers.389 As the patent
agent profession begins to feel the disruption caused by these new technologies, it is
inevitable that the issue of regulation will move to the forefront.
4.1(v) Democratization of Invention, Democratization of Patent Agency and the
Patent Discourse
The patent system has served many objectives- “systems of intellectual property
right, mechanisms of technology transfer and blockage and information systems, and at
different times and places succeeded or failed on each of these levels.” 390 In its earliest
days, broad dissemination of knowledge was a central feature of the patent system and
practice, and in recent years, it can doubtful whether this is a key objective (if it is
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achieving this objective at all). 391 These changes are the result of fluctuating
socioeconomic conditions and technological advance. But socioeconomic changes and
technological advance also have a profound impact on patent agency, which in turn
impacts the patent system itself.
We are now entering a new Industrial Revolution. Access to information, access
to means of production (such as 3D printing), access to source material (such as file
sharing) and AI are the driving forces behind this new revolution. The on-campus
hackathons and maker-spaces of the current industrial revolution are similar to the
artisanal yards and engineering shops of the first industrial revolution. Here, education,
experimentation, ‘tinkering’ and invention all intermingle, each equally important to the
creation of a new atmosphere in this new industrial revolution. Within this atmosphere,
we are returning to the democratization of invention.
In the days of the first industrial revolution, patent agency and the patent narrative
organized itself around the culture of democratized invention. The seeds of the patent
narrative grew from the inventive spirit and liberty of the individual inventor, and patent
agency served this humble master. As Inkster states, “patent agency owed little
obligation to elites, whether political or cultural.” 392 However, the rise of corporate
domination over the patent system, internationalization of the patent system,
professionalization as a mechanism of organizing labour and the emergence of patent
agents as a distinct interest group have all contributed to the disconnect between the
patent system and the individual inventor. Patent agency, in many ways, became elitist.
The centuries old stability in our patent system may lead us to believe that the
core elements upon which it currently rests are somehow mandatory and permanent.
However, as demonstrated herein, much of the current system was developed during an
era of “significant change, experimentation, and development in the nature of patent
rights, the patent system’s institutional structure, and the basic doctrines of patent
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law.”393 Thus, according to Gregory Reilly, “recognizing that the roots of our patent
system lie in the 19th century can provide useful insights into on-going debates about
whether, and to what extent, long-standing foundational aspects of the patent system
should be altered.”394 The technological challenges likely to result from the new
industrial revolution will pose new challenges to our patent system, and the question of
what foundational aspects require altering are also likely to follow.
Some have begun to question whether essential aspects of substantive patent law,
such as term and scope of protection and standard of obviousness, require substantial
revision in light of disruptive technologies such as 3D printing 395 and AI driven
invention.396 And while it is important that we remain cautious about making significant
changes to the patent system that might “disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing
community”397, if the nature of the inventive community itself is being disrupted, then
change may be necessary.
In recent years, the effect of patent law administration on the development of
substantive patent law has gained academic prominence. 398 As Clarisa Long states, the
USPTO’s considerable discretion “to establish regulations that ‘govern the conduct of
proceedings in the office,’ that ‘facilitate and expedite the processing of patent
applications,’ and that ‘govern the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other
393
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persons representing applicants or other parties’” and the “seemingly mundane
procedural changes” flowing therefrom may “have resulted in the most profound changes
in U.S. patent policy and practice since 1836.” 399 Several recent studies have raised the
possibility that biases inherent in patent office administration processes, such as patent
office funding, patent examiner hiring, and routine patent examination frameworks may
have significant impacts on the development of substantive law. 400 Yet few to date have
comprehensively examined the effect of patent agent practice, and the regulation thereof,
on the development of substantive patent law.
Coincidentally, as we re-enter a period of democratized invention, many scholars
are also beginning to propose changes to the patent system that mimic many aspects of
early 19th century patent law and practice. Some have proposed that standards of
patentability should be increased through patent application examination by individuals
of exceptional technical expertise 401 or incorporating aspects of scientific peer review 402,
elements that the scientific community lobbied for in the early 19 th century. Along with a
renewed interest in use of patent information have come suggestions on how to improve
access to, and use of, patent disclosures. 403 It has also been suggested that we begin
engaging in forms of patent experimentation, changing various patent law variables
assess their impacts on promoting, or hindering, innovation. 404
Despite a return to democratized invention, the return of original utility functions
of the patent system and a variety of reform suggestions which re-invigorate early 19th
century patent law practices, the question of patent agency remains overlooked. This is
surprising given the substantial impact of patent agency on the development of patent law
over the course of the 19th century. Much of substantive patent law evolved through the
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“learning by doing” of the patent practitioners.405 Indeed, what patent law currently
looks like was largely discovered through the interaction of stakeholders- inventors,
investors, manufacturers, agents - and the intermediaries cannot be overlooked in this
equation.406 As Morriss and Nard state:
Why did these principles and procedures evolve through practice rather
than through legislation (between the 1793 and 1836 Acts)?... how to
change patent law was something patentees, patent lawyers, and patent
agents had to first figure out. Indeed, lawyers and others had to first
discover that they were patent lawyers and patent agents – the
discovery of a specialized role for these intermediaries was itself the
result of entrepreneurial activity.407 (emphasis added)
As we enter the new industrial revolution, where we have started to see the return
of democratized invention as well as the slow erosion of the discrete boundaries of
professionalization in many fields, including patent agency, it seems that democratized
forms of patent agency may be returning. Thus, the question of regulation of patent
agency can no longer be avoided. Considering new forms of patent agency, including
rethinking the form and scope of regulation, may be one of the simplest mechanisms of
change, requiring very little in the way of variations to substantive law. The disruptive
results may be more political then legal, potentially disrupting the political power of one
very influential interest group – patent agents – and facilitating the coalescing of new
interest groups surrounding independent inventors, users of inventive information and
small-to-medium enterprises.
The significance of this cannot be overstated. What is at stake in the
democratization of patent agency is more than providing access to services for
traditionally under-serviced market segments. New patent practice processes and
institutions, serving an emerging class of historically under-represented clientele, will
likely lead to substantive developments that benefit this emerging interest group. The
main substantive aspects of what patent law looks like today was co-developed through
patent practice, between patent practitioners and the patent office in the early days of
405
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patent agent practice. These practices were recognized by other institutional decision
makers, such as courts and legislators, and influenced development of international patent
law treaties, networks and institutions. Thus, like Escher’s famous painting of one hand
drawing the other, patent agency has shaped the major patent institutions and those
institutions have defined patent agency, and together, they have historically co-evolved
the patent system.408
4.2 THE (IL)LEGITIMACY OF PATENT AGENT REGULATION
4.2(i) The Global Patent Discourse and Patent Agent Governance
Examining the global patent system from within the unique perspective of patent
offices around the world, Drahos witnesses first-hand the narrative created by what he
calls a ‘private governance network’. According to Drahos, the patent system is “patent
law as administered by various actors such as patent offices, courts and the patent
attorney profession.”409 Viewing the patent system from the lens of these stakeholders,
one sees that much of the harmonization of the global patent system takes place not
through international treaties, but through a form of ‘invisible harmonization’, which is a
“quiet technocratic cooperation” between patent offices and agents around the world. 410
The large corporate users of the patent system have a very strong incentive to encourage
uniformity and cooperation between patent offices, in order to maximize efficiency in
obtaining global patent protection. 411
Thus, corporate users of the patent system, their patent agents and patent offices
form this insider, private ‘governance network’, a network that harmonizes international
patent practice outside of the traditional mechanisms of public accountability. 412 From
this perspective, international patent practice might be one of the most entrenched forms
408
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of regulatory capture, resilient against many of the typical forms of political and legal
accountability. Drahos’ summary of the situation is worth quoting in its entirety:
There are of course public accountability mechanisms for patent
offices. As we have seen in preceding chapters, they are part of public
service department structures and the heads of patent offices are
ultimately answerable to politicians, such as ministers who in
parliamentary systems are responsible for government departments.
However, the formal mechanisms of public accountability that operate
here are meaningless. Patent rules do not get decided at the ballot box.
Tax, law and order, and public health services are the stuff of election
campaigns. Patents are not. The patent system is so densely
technocratic that politicians do not take the lead on patent policy unless
an industry lobby dictates a clear direction…The real accountability of
patent offices lies with the private governance network of the large
businesses that dominate patent applications…. Every patent office
proposal for reform is carefully scrutinized by the patent attorneys that
represent the large players. The business networks that surround the
patent offices are amongst the most watchful and expert in the world.
The displacement of public accountability mechanisms by private
networked power is, in the case of patent offices, not a new
phenomenon. Business networks have been co-evolving with patent
offices for at least 100 years. Public accountability mechanisms are the
convenient front men of legitimacy. They help hide the fact that an
organization created to represent the public under a social contract has
become deeply intertwined and absorbed by a private governance
network.413 (emphasis added)
How is it that this entrenched form of capture has come to exist, and why is it so
difficult to challenge this system? As we have seen, for several reasons, what happens in
the patent office is just as important to the development of patent law as what happens in
courts.414 In this regard, patent agents, as an interest group itself, have, along with patent
offices, been able to ‘co-evolve’ the patent system in directions favourable to the
profession and their most influential clients. 415 It is here that the patent agent profession
has gained “considerable influence of global patent policy.” 416 Patent agents have,
through lobbying and other acts of persuasion, influenced patent offices to accept certain
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norms, rules and behavior 417, which no doubt favour both the profession and the large
corporate clients the profession predominantly serves.418
Around the globe, many patent office officials are less than ‘enchanted’ with the
patent profession, viewing them as a “tightly controlled monopoly squeezing rents out of
business, often in exchange for comparatively little service”. 419 Despite this fact, patent
offices around the world are clear that maintaining good relations with the patent agent
profession is a priority for them. 420 Furthermore, “legislators and ministers in many
countries generally do not understand the extent of regulatory capture of patent offices”
and tend to be reliant on patent offices and agents “for advice, advice that tends to be of a
predictable kind.”421
Patent agents in many countries operate under a form of self-regulation,
regardless of whether actually granted self-regulatory authority by statute, given that the
“cosy networked relationship between the professional body that represents patent agents
and the patent office” has afforded the patent profession a tremendous amount of
professional freedom.422 With non-existent political oversight, it is unlikely that any
form or progressive patent law or practice reforms will be led by the profession itself. 423
This system, largely influenced and evolved by the profession, has also afforded them a
very lucrative practice niche, and it is for this reason that “patent [agents] live in fear of
deregulation.”424
Over many years, this influence of patent agents and offices has coalesced into a
dominant discourse. What happens when this discourse excludes the interests of large
segments of the population, such as independent inventors, small-to-medium enterprises
417
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and consumers of invention information? As these atomized interests are widely
dispersed compared to the tight-knit patent agent and patent office interest groups, it is
difficult for these groups to influence institutional decision makers. How then does one
go about disrupting this dominant discourse?
Drahos bluntly advocates that as one of the first mechanisms of accountability,
patent offices need to be less connected to the patent agent profession. 425 Specifically,
what is required are mechanisms that push the patent agent profession “out of its comfort
zone of self-regulation.”426 Forming separation between the patent office and the patent
agent profession will create space for new outsider groups, groups with technical
expertise in patent practice but independent from the profession and patent offices, to
enter into and begin to influence the patent system. 427 Creating separation between the
profession and the patent office will generate new and different information flows to
institutional decision makers, including patent offices, legislators and courts, and help
challenge the current dominant patent discourse. 428
4.2(ii) Canadian Patent Agent Governance – What Challenges Lie Ahead?
The Canadian patent agent regulatory framework exhibits many of the same
indicia that contributed to the decline of self-regulation generally in both U.K. and
Australia. For example, the Canadian patent agent profession is one of the few Canadian
federally self-regulated professions. The Canadian profession has historically exhibited
an over-proximity between the regulated and regulator, namely, patent agents and CIPO
respectively. Furthermore, this over-proximity has included a hyper-influence of the
patent agents’ professional association, IPIC, in matters of regulation, with the overlap
between IPIC and CIPO being practically inseparable.
Furthermore, the current Canadian patent agent regulatory regime bears
tremendous similarity to other Canadian professions with respect to over-emphasis on
competency as the central ‘public interest’ concern to the exclusion of various other
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public interest considerations. Similar to other Canadian self-regulated professions,
regulation of Canadian patent agents began as a matter of professional ethics.
Competence was not a prevailing concern, and in fact, in many jurisdictions, there is little
documented historical evidence of practitioner incompetence justifying regulation of the
profession. Following regulation, ethics took a back seat to competency to the point that
ethics, in Canadian patent agent regulation, is almost a non-existent concern.
Competency, however, has become the only focus, to the point that the entire regulatory
framework has become structured around an ambiguous concept of competency that has
been poorly validated and lacks substantial empirical connection to defined public
interests.
With respect to the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework, to briefly
summarize some of the specific facts set out under Chapter 3.3:
•

an annual payment of public funds to the IPIC organization, as opposed to the
individual IPIC appointed members of the Patent Agent Examination Board, for
‘exam administration and development’, funds which are used non-transparently
and with no accountability to the public;

•

the IPIC organization has been solely responsible for all aspects of standard
setting and examination development, with practically no accountability or
transparency regarding this work;

•

the IPIC organization hires its own psychometric expert, who ‘coaches’ only IPIC
Patent Agent Examination Board members and IPIC committees on standards and
exam setting; no one from CIPO, including the Chairperson of the Patent Agent
Examination Board, have ever participated in, or have any knowledge of the
details of these ‘coaching’ sessions;

•

the IPIC organization has been an active lobbyist for the interests of the Canadian
patent agent profession, and for several decades has actively lobbied for raising
the standards for entry to the Canadian patent agent profession;

•

the IPIC organization offers what is practically the only examination training and
preparation program available in Canada, which program is referenced by CIPO
as being the key resource for examination preparation;
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•

frequent unannounced changes in exam format and marking create a perception of
arbitrariness, which enhances the perception of bias as an attempt to adjust
marking distribution;

•

communications between members of the Patent Agent Examination Board and
the IPIC organization, including the Chairperson of the Examination Board, with
regard to detailed analysis and recommendations pertaining to exam development
and administration;

•

patent agent examinee candidates, other professional organizations and other
government reports have all commented on the perception of bias created by the
over-proximity between IPIC and CIPO in the governance of the patent agent
profession; and

•

the current Canadian patent agent examination appears to have by far the lowest
pass rate of any comparable jurisdiction in the world.

Competency-based entry-to-practice standards appear to be having a detrimental
effect on public access to service. Client capture dominates the Canadian patent agent
profession, with the overwhelming percentage of patent agent work consumed by large
corporations and foreign clients. In many respects, client capture was the motivating
factor for establishing and maintaining a regulatory framework for Canadian patent
agents. Recent studies show that many Canadian market segments made up of individual
inventors and small-to-medium enterprises lack access to meaningful intellectual
property services, and studies from comparable jurisdictions have pointed to patent agent
regulation as a key contributing factor to this problem. U.S. and Australian studies have
demonstrated patent agents generally command higher rates than regular attorneys, and
although there is no similar Canadian study, it is reasonable to expect comparable
statistics in Canada given that the Canadian profession is far more stringently regulated
than these jurisdictions. 429
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The current licensing examination process demonstrates serious validation issues.
There has been little historical effort to validate standards, examination content or
constructs. Each year, the examination is developed and administered by a small group
of individuals with practically no objective validation. The profession’s influence over
the examination process has created a perception of bias in the regulatory framework.
CIPO has had practically no involvement in the development, either historically or an
annual basis, of the exam format, competencies and marking guidelines. IPIC is not
accountable to CIPO regarding use of publicly-funded fees earmarked for licensing
administration, and CIPO has no information regarding how those funds are used. Similar
perceptions of bias in patent agent regulatory frameworks has been documented in
comparable jurisdictions.
While much of the foregoing discussion surrounding competency and self-regulation
draws considerable similarities between the Canadian patent agent profession and other
Canadian professions, there are several key factors that are unique to patent agent
practice. Internationally, the patent agent profession, since its inception at the time of the
early 19th century, has always been a small, esoteric profession uniquely suited to secure
its own political interests. Specifically, patent agents, being a tight-knit, specialized and
highly-focused interest group compared to the atomized interests of independent
inventors and the general public has allowed patent agents to self-define their own
professional domain through political influence and a unique proximity to patent offices.
The proximity between patent agents and patent offices, a relationship which in many
ways is historically unique, has allowed the two groups to co-evolve and co-develop
many aspects of the patent system itself, defining a narrative which serves the interests of
patent agents and their corporate clients. Advanced industrialized economies that are net
exporters of patent services, a group to which Canada belongs, are particularly sensitive
to this phenomenon. Patent agent governance may be the epitome of epistemic capture.
Accordingly, patent agent regulation in many respects is less about public interest as
it is about maintaining a dominant narrative. Competency, as the lynchpin of this
narrative, is as flexible as the patent system itself. Since the beginning of Western patent
systems, patent agents as a unique profession have taken an active role in defining the
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social patent narrative, and with it, their own social role. Thus, competency in many
ways is synonymous with administrative efficiency- competency maintains a set structure
for the patent system between the patent office, patent agents and the major corporate
filers, each as an interest group in and of themselves. Efficiency in and of itself is not
objectionable, and in many ways, is a desirable objective. But what happens when this
dominant narrative, sealed closed at the point of ‘competency’, fails to accommodate for
the needs and interests of large groups of individuals, such as individual inventors and
small-to-medium enterprises? What happens if this narrative fails to consider broader
public interests in access to and dissemination of knowledge? How will patent agency
respond to future technological developments, such AI-driven solutions and other
technological developments, which threaten to disrupt the nature of patent agency? With
competency being the cornerstone of this narrative, challenging the narrative may require
the uneasy task of challenging the concept of patent agent competency.
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PART 2: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CAPTURE AND PATENT AGENT
REGULATION
CHAPTER 5
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AND PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS
Part 1 of this thesis has set the stage for the significance of patent agent
competency and regulation, not only in the narrow sense of effect on access to patent
services, but also its impact in supporting and maintaining a social patent narrative. As
Part 1 concluded, if one wishes to challenge this dominant narrative, one of the leading
options is to challenge the regulatory framework surrounding patent agency and
specifically, patent agent competency.
Part 2 of this thesis will explore the available legal mechanisms under Canadian
law for challenging self-regulatory, entry-to-practice competency standards. This analysis
will explore the available administrative law mechanisms for challenging self-regulatory,
entry-to-practice standards, with the following Chapter focusing on administrative law
challenges to the reasonableness of such standards.
5.1 SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AND THE REASONABLENESS OF COMPETENCY
BASED ENTRY-TO-PRACTICE STANDARDS
5.1(i) Introduction – Reasonableness Dissected
To date, there has been a paucity of cases challenging the substantive legality of
professional competency-based entry standards, and even fewer pertaining directly to
licensing examinations. Many of the cases cited herein do not relate directly to
competency-based entry standards, rather, they deal with self-regulatory bodies and rulemaking pertaining to practice standards for individuals who are already members of the
profession. Both sets of cases pertain to self-governing bodies’ authority to define who
may and may not practice the licensed profession and how they may practice. Thus,
much like competency-based entry standards, cases relate to self-regulatory bodies’
ability to create a boundary between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ of the profession. While
there are certainly legal distinctions between entry qualifications for those who are
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‘outside trying to get in’ the profession and governance situations involving those who
already within the profession, for reasons discussed below, many of these cases are
persuasive for this current analysis.
Coincidentally, one of few cases relating to licensing examinations comes from
within the area of patent agent licensing- the 2011 Engfield v. Canada (Attorney General)
decision.430 This decision is significant in that it highlights issues prevalent in numerous
cases involving substantive review of competency-based entry standards. What is the
level of deference self-regulatory boards are entitled to when setting competency-based
standards? How does one properly characterize a substantive versus a procedural issue?
How are the issues defined and how does one prove their case? What evidence is
required, how is it acquired and how should it be presented?
The self-represented applicant in Engfield had failed three of the four papers of
the Canadian patent agent examination. He requested a grade appeal, which led to no
change in his marks. He appealed to the federal court (rather than an application for
judicial review) loosely alleging that that setting of the exam and the marking of his
examination were unreasonable.431 The applicant requested that the court effectively
substitute the marks he believed he was entitled to for the marks he had received, which
ultimately would have allowed him to pass the examination.
The court acknowledged the daunting pass rate statistics and challenging nature of
the examination.432 However, the court stated that “[t]he functions of setting and
marking the annual fall squarely within the Board's specialized expertise and it is fully
entitled, as it has done, to set exacting standards for entry to this profession.” 433 In this
regard, the court stated that the Patent Agent Examination Board is entitled to a high
degree of deference in setting and marking the patent agent examination. 434
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The court also highlighted the challenges in clearly discerning the applicant’s
grounds for review. The applicant appeared to be arguing either that the exam was too
challenging or that he believed he was entitled to greater marks on his exam than he was
awarded, and accordingly, the examination was unreasonable. The court characterized
this as a “substantive, albeit misguided, attack on the test results before the Court.” 435 The
applicant presented no clear evidence of unreasonableness, with the court stating that the
“fact that he is able to advance a more favourable interpretation of his answers than that
adopted by the examiners is no basis for concluding that the appeal results were
unreasonable.”436
The court stated that whatever legal obligations might be owed to the applicant,
they were at best minimal and were largely procedural in nature. The Board was required
to act in good faith and only in instances where the record demonstrated that the Board
manifestly failed to assess a candidate’s answers would a court intervene on review.437
Regarding procedure, the court stated that “the Board has no duty to provide reasons
beyond the provision of the marking guides, the examination questions, the answers and
the record of the conclusions reached by the reviewers.”438 As the record showed that the
applicant received all of the foregoing, and that the reviewers did in fact mark his exam
in accordance with the marking guides, the court dismissed his review. 439
The way that courts have approached these issues and how courts have viewed
their role on judicial review has changed considerably in the pre and post Dunsmuir eras.
In the pre-Dunsmuir years (pre-2008), as well as the years following shortly after
Dunsmuir, courts conflated substantive and procedural issues, inadequately articulated
the issues on review and most importantly, were quick to set aside decisions of the selfregulatory bodies on substantive grounds. However, in recent years, this trend has
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slowed and particularly, the level of deference afforded to self-regulatory bodies has
increased significantly.
A good example of the way courts approached review in the pre-Dunsmuir era is
the 1993 Brett v. Board of Directors of Physiotherapy (Ontario) decision.440 In Brett, a
licensed physiotherapist was charged by the profession’s regulatory board with three
cases of misconduct under regulations passed pursuant to the Drugless Practitioners Act,
1925.441 The regulations in question permitted the board to set standards governing
professional ‘misconduct’, which misconduct included “failure to maintain the standards
of practice of the profession” and “permitting, counselling or assisting any person to
engage in the practice of physiotherapy whom the physiotherapist knows or ought to
know is not registered as a physiotherapist”. 442 Pursuant to such authority, the board set
“Standards of Practice” guidelines which prohibited registered physiotherapists from 1)
treating more than 5.5 patients per hour, 2) having more than one auxiliary staff member
employed per physiotherapist and 3) permitting auxiliary staff and students from
administering treatment, in its entirety, without a physiotherapist having had contact with
the patient.
The applicant was charged and found guilty of violating all three of the abovereferenced standards and on request for judicial review, challenged verdict as being
unreasonable. Although not pertaining directly to entry-level competency-based
qualifications, the standards did concern acceptable “modalities of physiotherapy
treatment” separating and distinguishing acceptable involvement of individuals deemed
competent (i.e. registered practitioners) and incompetent (i.e. staff and students) in the
delivery of professional services.443 As such, Brett related to the respective roles and
authority of self-governing bodies and courts in assessing the boundary between
competent and incompetent practice.
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The issue in Brett was framed as a review of the Board decision that the applicant
was guilty of professional misconduct. The issue was not framed as review of the
reasonableness of the Board’s interpretation of its “standards of practice” regulatory
authority nor as the reasonableness of the impugned “Standards of Practice” guidelines
passed pursuant to that authority. 444 Furthermore, Brett involved several other issues,
including bias surrounding the role of counsel to the Board in carrying out investigation
of the applicant and errors committed during the investigation. At times, the court’s
reasoning seems to blend these issues into a single analysis.
Regarding the applicant’s alleged misconduct due to breach of the impugned
guidelines, the court stated that “all [of the impugned guidelines] rest on the assumption
that all patient treatment or virtually all patient treatment should be given only by a
physiotherapist. If that assumption is not well founded, then findings of misconduct based
thereon must fail.”445 Accordingly, the court conducted a thorough review of the process
used to establish the guidelines. The court was highly critical of the fact that the
guidelines were established based almost entirely on a single survey distributed to
registered practitioners across the province, a survey which the board itself recognized as
having shortcomings.446 The Board itself acknowledged that it was an ‘assumption’ that
patient loads over the 5.5/hour might place the public at risk447 and that in the absence of
an evaluative component linking caseloads to outcome measures and ensuring validity
and reliability “the establishment of caseload guidelines will remain a somewhat arbitrary
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procedure.”448 Guidelines pertaining to use of auxiliary staff were developed in a similar
manner.449
The court did not dispute that increased patient loads could affect competent
delivery of services and that there were certain kinds of treatment that should only be
delivered by a registered physiotherapist. 450 However, the court received evidence from
several doctors- doctors also being legally entitled to provide physiotherapy servicesstating that the impugned guidelines relating to use of auxiliaries was contrary to the way
physiotherapy was customarily being practiced in Ontario. 451 The court stated that a
professional cannot be charged with professional misconduct where “there exists a
responsible and competent body of professional opinion that supports that conduct or
judgment.”452 The court concluded that:
In the light of that evidence, and even assuming that the great majority
of physiotherapists are of the opinion that only physiotherapists should
give treatment to patients, I am of the view that the board was not
entitled to find that because Brett's clinic employs more than one
auxiliary for every two physiotherapists and treats more than 5.5
patients per hour per physiotherapist, that Brett is for those reasons
guilty of failing to maintain the standards of practice of her
profession.453
In a relatively brief judgement, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court
ruling, stating that:
…the standards of practice purportedly contravened by the respondent
were promulgated as a result of the survey referred to in the reasons of
the Divisional Court. We agree with its comments with respect to those
standards. Although the standards applied purportedly had as their
objective the protection of members of the public having resort to
treatment by physiotherapists, the method by which the standards were
448
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established was so flawed that the resulting standards cannot be said to
come close to meeting that objective. Consequently, any decision
respecting standards of practice based only on failure to meet those
standards, as in this case, we consider to be patently unreasonable. 454
There are many curious aspects to the Brett decision. Primarily, with the issue
being exclusively framed as reasonableness of the misconduct verdict, it is interesting
that the court instead emphasized the reasonableness of the guidelines as the basis for its
reasoning. Furthermore, it is not only difficult to understand the relevance of the
evidence provided by the several doctors pertaining to the unreasonableness of the
guidelines, but also how such evidence was permitted on the record. Ultimately, it is
difficult to ascertain a clear set of legal principles from the court’s reasoning that would
provide direction for self-regulatory bodies, practitioners and future courts.455
Things have changed since the time Brett was decided. As discussed below, the
scope of how and when courts will set aside competency-based standards based on what
it considers to be improper validation processes, and the evidence upon which it can base
such decisions, has diminished considerably. Furthermore, the scope of discretion
afforded to self-regulatory bodies in interpreting and implementing their statutory
mandate has increased considerably. Lastly, although there are still many unanswered
questions, in the post-Dunsmuir era, and especially in recent years, courts of all levels,
including the Supreme Court, have provided considerable clarity regarding scope of selfregulatory discretion with respect to setting competency-based standards.
5.1(ii) Expertise, Legislative Intent and Professional Self-Regulation
Courts have stated that self-regulatory discretion is grounded not only legislative
intent, but also out of recognition of the need for deference to administrative expertise.
For example, in Patterson v. Dental Assn. & College (Alberta), three foreign trained
dentists initiated the process of becoming licensed dentists in the province of Alberta,
454

Ibid at para 7.

455

The reasoning in Brett pertaining to evaluation of competing sets of professional opinions pertaining to acceptable
standards of practice appears to have only once been followed. In Provincial Dental Board of Nova Scotia v. Dr. Clive
Creager, 2005 NSCA 9 (CanLII) at para 36. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal cites Brett for the proposition that:
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which process involved writing a set of equivalency examinations administered by the
Alberta’s licensing Tribunal. Upon failing the exams on repeated occasions, the three
doctors brought applications for judicial review.
Although decided on procedural considerations unique to the facts of the case and
based on the pre-Dunsmuir patent unreasonableness standard of review, the court’s
comments regarding its role in substantive review of professional licensing standards, and
the legal justifications supporting its position, are nonetheless reflective of general
propositions adopted by numerous courts:
…[T]he real decisions of the [licensing Tribunal] were decisions on the
technical qualifications necessary for the practice of dentistry in
Alberta…. On that issue, the tribunals appealed from have relative
expertise — the courts do not. Given the nature of the issue before the
tribunals, the required relative expertise is technical and professional;
the courts do not have expertise in matters such as endodontics,
removable prosthodontics, fixed prosthodontics, pedodontics, operative
dentistry, periodontics, orthodontics. The relative expertise of the
Council includes the balancing of the public interest in minimal
professional qualifications with the interests of the applicants. The
court’s expertise is less in balancing public health interests against other
claims than in resolving disputes between two parties. Moreover, the
mandate given to those tribunals by the Legislature of Alberta was to
protect the health of persons residing in Alberta requiring dental care.
Professional qualifications are obviously an important component of the
public interest in this matter… After weighing all those factors, the
court concludes that it owes great deference to these decisions of the
[licensing Tribunal]. Indeed, in matters relating essentially to health
standards, those tribunals have the right to make “near exclusive
determinations”; they are entitled to make decisions, even decisions that
are incorrect in law, so long as the decisions are not clearly irrational.
456 (emphasis added)
The court in Patterson stated that the purpose of the licensing legislation was to
“protect the health of Albertans who require dental care by ensuring that dentists licensed
to practice in this province are at least minimally qualified to do so” and that selfregulation of the profession “allows, and requires, the profession to establish and monitor
standards for admission to the practice of dentistry” and “the task of balancing the safety
of the public and the interests of individuals who wish to practice dentistry in this
456
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province.”457 The court acknowledged both the technical expertise of the Tribunal, with
respect to dental competency, as well as its “broad representation of public policy
perspectives”, stating that “while the court must be alert to public policy objectives, it
does not have the means of obtaining input on public policy objectives.”458
5.1(iii) The Difficulty in Challenging ‘Difficulty’
The difficulty that most applicants face in attempting to challenge licensing
standards is largely evidentiary in nature. Even where courts are seemingly sympathetic
to what appears to be unduly onerous standards, without an evidentiary basis or
benchmark of what is reasonable or unreasonable, how can applicants legally challenge
such standards?
For example, in Safai-Naini v. Quebec (Attorney General)459, a group of foreign
trained physicians sought judicial review after failing Quebec’s licensing examination
process, alleging that the process was conducted in bad faith, was unreasonable, arbitrary
or discriminatory. The evidence demonstrated that between 1995 to 2001, the pass rate
for foreign trained doctors had dropped from 25 percent to 19.3 percent, compared to an
average pass rate of 94 to 95 percent for Quebec medical graduates. 460
While both foreign and domestic trained doctors wrote the same examination, the
applicants presented several differences in the examination process which they alleged
led to unequal treatment. Foreign trained students had to first pass a qualifying
examination that domestic students did not have to pass.461 Unlike domestic trained
students, foreign trained doctors were prohibited from taking a supplemental examination
upon failure, instead having to wait until the following year to retake the examination. 462
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Furthermore, they were not entitled to access a preparation course offered to domestic
students as part of the education, and no preparatory assistance was provided. 463
The court accepted that differences in requirements between foreign and domestic
students was necessary to guarantee the quality of education received in the diversity of
schools around the world with curricula and systems which cannot be adequately
monitored in Canada.464 While the court also acknowledged that the applicants’
complaints pertaining to the significantly disparate pass rates between domestic and
foreign students “at face value seem plausible”, the court stated that it had “no real and
verifiable way of knowing why so many foreign trained graduates do not succeed.” 465
With a lack of evidence providing details as to how and why foreign trained students
were failing is such greater numbers, the court stated that “it would be wrong for the
Court to decline to accord the required curial deference to the College with respect to the
manner it has decided to examine these candidates, especially because the written exam is
the same as the one written by Quebec medical school graduates.” 466 Thus, in the
absence of verifiable record demonstrating the cause of the disparate failure rates, the
court dismissed the applicantion. 467
Similarly, Togher v. Law Society (Alberta) centered around Section 37 of
Alberta’s Legal Profession Act468 which granted broad authorization to the Benchers to
make rules dealing with evaluation of academic qualifications and bar admission. 469 The
applicant, midway through her foreign legal education, was informed that the Law
Society of Alberta had changed the foreign accreditation process, switching to the FCA’s
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NCA examination. It was undisputed that the FCA requirements, which included a series
of nine equivalency examinations, were far more onerous than the previous
requirements.470
The applicant raised a number grounds for review, including a “beguiling”
assertion that the Law Society acted outside of its mandate by retaining the NCA to
determine foreign legal education equivalency and imposing a higher standard upon
students with foreign law degrees than for domestic law students. 471 While the court
readily dismissed this argument, Hart J. stated:
I am sympathetic to the proposition that the number of examinations
and required subjects is onerous, and in fact appears arguably
excessive. However, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to
interfere in the decision of the Law Society to defer to the NCA in
determining the educational program required to achieve equivalence,
even on a standard of correctness.472 (emphasis added)

5.1(iv) Legislative Interpretation and the Range of Acceptable Solutions
In circumstances involving questions of scope of a self-regulatory body’s
governance authority, courts have afforded self-governing bodies considerable discretion
in interpreting their enabling statute. For example, in Basciano v. Assn. of Landscape
Architects (Ontario), the Association of Landscape Architects [the “Association”] had
passed a By-law expanding the definition of the certification title “Landscape Architect”
to include a broad range of activities along with a reduction in certification examination
standards.473 The applicant challenged the legality of the By-law, arguing that
broadening the scope of the activities captured by the ‘landscape architect’ title was
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Basciano v. Assn. of Landscape Architects 2008 OJ at para 24, 3751CarswellOnt 5660 [Basciano]. “The Association
adopts an expansive interpretation of the term "landscape architecture": it views the activities reasonably
comprehended by "landscape architecture" to include activities such as urban design, site planning, regional landscape
planning, ecological planning and design, heritage conservation, and landscape reclamation and restoration.”
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either ultra vires the Association’s discretion to act in the ‘public interest’ or that the Bylaw was passed for the improper purpose of simply increasing membership. 474
Interestingly, the Ontario Association of Landscape Architects Act, 1984 475 does
not define ‘landscape architecture’, which the court found to be an “elastic term” granting
the Association “liberty to self-define”.476 In upholding the validity of the By-law, the
court stated that the Association’s mandate to enact by-laws as well as its ‘public interest’
mandate granted it broad discretion to set its own professional standards:
Here, the Association has the mandate of regulating the practice of the
profession of landscape architecture. With that mandate goes a dual
obligation to its constituency of practitioners on one hand and to
members of the public on the other. In the discharge of that mandate,
the association is empowered by statute to determine the standards that
are appropriate and necessary by way of educational and other
qualifications for membership. No body is in better position to assess
those needs than the Association and it is clearly better placed to make
those determinations than the court. The court should therefore defer to
the Association's greater expertise. 477
Despite the foregoing, courts have, in recent years, invalidated competency-based
entry standards as unreasonable. In these instances, the matter typically involves
particular legislative context and statutory language, and as such, the matter can be
characterized as the reasonableness of a self-regulatory body’s interpretation of its
statutory authority. An excellent example is Laffin v. Assn. of Professional Geoscientists
(Ontario).478 In issue in Laffin was the Professional Geoscientists Act, 2000 479, which
Ibid at 16-17. However, the court at para 43 states that “The heart of the applicant's challenge goes to the wisdom of
lowering the bar for qualification for full membership.”
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governs the practice of professional geoscience but not define ‘geoscience’. 480
Individuals seeking licensing as a professional geoscientist must meet certain ‘prescribed
requirements’, and the Council of the Association of Professional Geoscientists is
authorized, subject to the approval of the Minister of Northern Development, Mines and
Forestry, to make Regulations “respecting eligibility for membership, standards relating
to the practice of the profession, including educational requirements for members, and the
discipline of members and certificate holders, including what constitutes professional
misconduct”.481
The applicant in Laffin sought licensing as a geoscientist. At the time of her
application, s. 8(1)1(i) of the relevant eligibility Regulation stated that applicants must
hold:

a four-year bachelor of science degree or its equivalent, awarded by a
Canadian university, in an area of geoscience and have at the time of
applying at least four years of qualifying work experience, as
determined by the Registration Committee, in an area of geoscience
that was obtained within the previous 10 years. 482
The applicant had completed a four year Bachelor of Science degree with a
double major in Geology and Geography and completed the requisite work experience. 483
Upon application for licensing, the applicant was informed that upon review of her
educational transcript, it was determined that she needed to complete further educational
requirements in order to qualify. 484 A special appeal committee upheld the decision,
referencing an Association education guideline, developed pursuant to s. 8(1)1(i) of the
eligibility Regulation, which set out detailed sample curriculum course content for
Ibid. Sec. 2(1) defines the practice of professional geoscience as “An individual practises professional geoscience
when he or she performs an activity that requires the knowledge, understanding and application of the principles of
geoscience and that concerns the safeguarding of the welfare of the public or the safeguarding of life, health or property
including the natural environment.”
480
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application until she met further educational requirements: two foundation mathematics and science courses, including
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licensing consideration. 485 As the applicant’s course of study was deficient in several
respects compared to the guideline, the committee found that additional educational
courses would be required for licensing.
On application for judicial review486, the superior court, characterizing the issue
as reasonableness of the Association’s interpretation of s. 8(1)1(i), found the
Association’s interpretation unreasonable. Applying Dunsmuir, the court found that
although not explicitly stated, the Association had accepted that s. 8(1)1(i) had granted it
authority to review the course content of Canadian university programs to determine
whether such curriculum was satisfactory to the Association. 487 Upon analysis of s.
8(1)1(i) within the context of the entire statutory scheme, the court found it “telling that
other parts of the regulation clearly give the authority to the Registration Committee to
assess the quality of work experience or to assess the equivalency of a degree… It does
not use that language with respect to the evaluation of the requisite Canadian degree.” 488
The court stated that:
The absence of a reference to a discretion to evaluate the content of a
Canadian degree is significant. There is no question that the
Registration Committee has the authority to determine whether the
degree is in an area of geoscience. But once there has been an
assessment of the applicant’s major field of study, the Committee does
not appear to have the authority to specify the particular components of
the degree. That appears to have been left to the Canadian universities.
For the Registration Committee to go further and evaluate the content
of the degree gives the Association a role similar to the power of
accreditation…489 (emphasis added)
The court distinguished the Basciano decision, stating that in Basciano, the
legislation in question explicitly granted the Association of Landscape Architects
authority to prescribe a curriculum and courses of study for students. 490 Furthermore, the
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court highlighted the significance of the Regulation-making process, stating that
education Regulation required Ministerial approval and was originally passed after
rounds of revisions and a public consultation process.491 If the Association wished to
change its educational requirements, it would again have to go through regulatory
approval process, “a process that includes an opportunity for notice, as well as public
scrutiny and comment from interested stakeholders, including members and prospective
members” and approval by the Minister. 492
The court’s conclusion, ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeal493, was that:

The Registration Committee and Special Committee never addressed
the scope of the Association’s power under the registration regulation.
In my view, the decision of the Special Committee, which is the
decision under appeal, meets neither part of the reasonableness test in
Dunsmuir: the decision lacks justification, and it does not fall within the
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible, given the
legislative framework. When the wording of s. 8(1)1(i) of the regulation
is examined in the context of the regulation as a whole, the Act and
other similar legislation, the decision to impose additional educational
requirements on the appellant was unreasonable. Ms. Laffin has a four
year Bachelor of Science degree in an area of geoscience — geography
and geology — from a Canadian university. From the material, it
appears there is no question that she has met the experience criterion. 494
(emphasis added)
5.1(v) Public Interest and Rule-Making Authority
Decisions such as Laffin, involving specific statutory context limiting broad
discretion to govern competency-based entry standards, are few and far between.
Furthermore, recent Supreme Court and appellate court jurisprudence has set a wide
scope of discretion for self-regulatory, competency-based rule making authority. The
recent Green v. Law Society of Manitoba decision may epitomize this line of
jurisprudence. Although not decided in the context of entry-based competency standards,
491
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Green directly involved competency-based rulemaking in the form of continuing
professional development (CPD) requirements for lawyers, and as such, is undoubtedly
persuasive.
In Green, the Law Society of Manitoba had passed rules regarding mandatory
CPD requirements for licensed lawyers. Under the rules, lawyers failing to comply with
mandatory CPD requirements would receive several warnings notifying them to comply
within a certain timeline. After a certain number of warnings were received, the lawyer
in default of their CPD obligations would automatically have their license suspended.
The Court begins its analysis by summarizing the issues:
Mr. Green has challenged the impugned rules because he has no interest
in complying with them. Since these rules came into force in 2012, Mr.
Green has not reported completing any CPD hours. He argues that the
impugned rules are unfair because they impose a suspension without a
right to a hearing or a right of appeal. Yet Mr. Green has not applied for
judicial review of the Law Society’s decision to suspend him. He has
not complained that the Law Society treated him unfairly. Mr. Green is
challenging these rules on these procedural grounds, not for fear of
injustice. He is simply not interested in attending a mandated number of
CPD activities. Despite these motivations for Mr. Green’s challenge to
the impugned rules, this Court must now determine whether those rules
fall outside the Law Society’s statutory mandate. 495
With respect to rule-setting authority, the Court stated that the standard applicable
to the review of law society rules is reasonableness. Citing its decision in Catalyst
Paper, a case involving the reasonableness of a taxation by-law passed by a municipal
council, wherein the Court stated:
It is thus clear that courts reviewing bylaws for reasonableness must
approach the task against the backdrop of the wide variety of factors
that elected municipal councillors may legitimately consider in enacting
bylaws. The applicable test is this: only if the bylaw is one no
reasonable body informed by these factors could have taken will the
bylaw be set aside. The fact that wide deference is owed to municipal
councils does not mean that they have carte blanche….Reasonableness
limits municipal councils in the sense that the substance of their bylaws
must conform to the rationale of the statutory regime set up by the
legislature. The range of reasonable outcomes is thus circumscribed by
495
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the purview of the legislative scheme that empowers a municipality to
pass a bylaw.496 [emphasis added]
According to the Court, “a law society rule will be set aside only if the rule ‘is one
no reasonable body informed by [the relevant] factors could have [enacted]’… this means
‘that the substance of [law society rules] must conform to the rationale of the statutory
regime set up by the legislature’”. 497 The Court stated that:
Similar considerations (as Catalyst Paper) are relevant in the context of
rules made by a law society. The legislature specifically gave the Law
Society a broad discretion to regulate the legal profession on the basis
of a number of policy considerations related to the public interest. The
Act empowers the benchers of the Law Society to make rules of general
application to the profession, and in doing so, the benchers act in a
legislative capacity. Further, reasonableness is the appropriate standard
because many of the benchers of the Law Society are elected by and
accountable to members of the legal profession. While it is true that the
public does not directly vote for the benchers, the rules the benchers
make apply only to members of the profession. Thus, McLachlin C.J.’s
comments in Catalyst Paper in the context of municipal bylaws are apt
here as well: “. . . reasonableness means courts must respect the
responsibility of elected representatives to serve the people who elected
them and to whom they are ultimately accountable”498 (emphasis
added)
With respect to the rationale of the statutory regime, the Court cited Edmonton
City as supporting the proposition that “the Law Society has expertise in regulating the
legal profession ‘at an institutional level’” 499 and highlighted its previous history of
recognizing that self-governing professional bodies have “particular expertise when it
comes to deciding on the policies and procedures that govern the practice of their
professions”.500 In upholding the reasonableness of the mandatory CPD rule, the Court
concluded that “the Law Society must therefore be afforded considerable latitude in
496
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making rules based on its interpretation of the “public interest” in the context of its
enabling statute”.501
The companion cases of Sobeys West Inc. v. College of Pharmacists of British
Columbia502 and Alberta College of Pharmacists v Sobeys West Inc. 503 provide a recent
look at the reasonableness of bylaws passed by self-regulatory bodies, and specifically, in
the context of balancing ‘public interest’ considerations with economic considerations
such as cost of services, access to services and competition. Both Sobeys West and
Alberta College, similar to Green, followed and applied Catalyst Paper’s test pertaining
to reasonableness of self-regulatory by-laws, and Alberta College, decided shortly after
Green, provides an early glimpse into Green’s impact.
In Sobeys West, the College of Pharmacists of British Columbia passed By-laws
prohibiting pharmacists from adopting ‘customer incentive programs’ to induce the
purchase of pharmacy services, drugs or devices from particular pharmacies or
pharmacists.504 The College is governed by a Council authorized to pass By-laws for the
achievement of several professional objectives, pursuant to its duty to serve and protect
the public, such as establishing competency-standards for entry to practice as well as
professional ethics standards. 505 Such By-laws must be filed by the Minister of Health
“who may disallow the bylaw or a portion thereof, or declare that the bylaw or a portion
thereof will come into force on a specified date.” 506
The impugned By-law, passed unanimously by a 12-person Council consisting of
four public members appointed by the Minister of Health and eight members elected by
the College, prohibited members from providing ‘incentives’ to patients for the purpose
Ibid at para 24. The Court states: “I agree with the courts below that the Law Society has the authority to do so. The
Law Society is required by statute to protect members of the public who seek to obtain legal services by establishing
and enforcing educational standards for practicing lawyers. CPD programs serve this public interest and enhance
confidence in the legal profession by requiring lawyers to participate, on an ongoing basis, in activities that enhance
their skills, integrity and professionalism. CPD programs have in fact become an essential aspect of professional
education in Canada. Most law societies across the country have implemented compulsory CPD programs.”
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of inducing them to deliver prescriptions or obtain pharmacy services from the particular
member.507 The By-law defined incentives as “money, gifts, discounts, rebates, refunds,
customer loyalty schemes, coupons, goods or rewards.”508 The College asserted that
incentive programs could affect fiduciary obligations in the pharmacist-patient
relationship as well as leading to a number of ‘potential harms’ including causing patients
to defer filing prescriptions until incentive ‘bonus days’, causing patients to repeatedly
transfer prescriptions thereby interrupting continuity of care and incentivizing customers
to procure more drugs than necessary. 509
The Superior Court invalidated the By-law as an unreasonable exercise of
discretion. The court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the impugned Bylaws were
motivated by a desire to protect smaller pharmacies from competition, finding no
evidence to support any such assertion.510 While acknowledging that evidence of ‘actual
harm’ was not required, in the case at hand, the Council had passed the impugned By-law
based only on conjecture of a possibility of harm. 511 The court stated that what was in the
‘public interest’ had to be justified by facts established before the Board. 512
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treatments… There are no Documents that relate to any specific harm caused by loyalty points or loyalty programs and
pharmaceutical services and prescriptions.”
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Four of the twelve Council Members who had voted in favour of the impugned
Bylaw proffered affidavits highlighting the risks associated with incentive practice,
including ethical concerns involving pharmacist conflict of interest and over-dispensing
of drugs.513 The court stated that the affiants’ evidence “defied common sense”, in that
“customer purchasing of drugs and devices whose prices will far exceed the value of the
incentives offered”, and especially for those in vulnerable, low-income populations, it
would seem highly unlikely that such individuals would repeatedly fill orders to receive
such a comparatively small reward. 514 The court highlighted the overbreadth of the
impugned Bylaw in light of its objectives, pointing out several more precise actions the
College could have taken to mitigate against the allegedly undesirable conduct, stating
that “the broader approach adopted by the respondent is thus unnecessary to meet this
concern, and contrary to the public interest in obtaining drugs and devices at the lowest
cost.”515 The court concluded that the College’s “decision to pass the Impugned Bylaws
falls outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes, given the competing public
interests, and the respondent’s ability to pass bylaws that are narrower in scope to address
their reasonable concerns.”516
On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the Superior Court’s
finding that the impugned Bylaws were unreasonable. As a preliminary matter, the Court
of Appeal addressed the issue of the petitioners’ evidence, and the proper scope of an
evidentiary record in judicial review of regulatory by-law making authority. To the
extent that evidence that was not directly before the Council during the decision-making
process was admitted, which evidence included material such as studies regarding
incentive programs from other jurisdictions, the Competition Bureau opinion letter and
opinions of pharmacists regarding their perceptions of incentive programs, the Superior
Court had erred in law. 517 The Court of Appeal acknowledged that under certain limited
513
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circumstances, a more flexible view of the evidentiary record may be justified, such as
where an administrative body is attempting to ‘immunize its decisions from any
scrutiny’, situations involving fraud or allegations of bad faith. 518 However, in the case at
hand where no such circumstances existed, the Court of Appeal rejected the admissibility
of such evidence. 519
Regarding substantive reasonableness, the Court of Appeal stated that the
unifying theme of the Act, much like other professional regulatory statutes allowing selfgovernance in the ‘public’s interest’, is that “[t]here can be no doubt that ‘public interest’
in this context extends to the maintenance of high ethical standards and professionalism
on the part of the profession.”520 While nothing in the Act granted the Council authority
to regulate professional fees, similarly, nothing required the Council to ensure that
services were provided to the public at the lowest price. 521
Incentive programs were a matter of concern to the public, and given the
evidence, “anecdotal though it may have been in whole or in part”, the Council acted
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Ibid at para 52: “There is ample authority for the proposition that evidence that could or should have been before the
tribunal, but which was not in fact before it, is generally not admitted in judicial review proceedings. The court is
reviewing, and must show some deference for, the decision already taken, rather than decide the matter anew on
different evidence”. At para 49-50, the Court discussed and cited “Evidentiary Rules in a Post-Dunsmuir World:
Modernizing the Scope of Admissible Evidence on Judicial Review” by Lauren Wihak and Benjamin Oliphant in
(2015) 28 Can. J. Admin. L. & P. 323, wherein the authors advocated a broader approach to the evidentiary record on
applications for judicial review of policy-based decisions. Regarding this issue, the Court stated that “any changes to
the rules of admissibility going forward will have to permit what the authors refer to as “meaningful review” without
effectively transforming judicial reviews into trials – i.e., without ‘judicializing’ the administration of government to a
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proceedings, evidence and findings of fact and law, as one would typically find in a formal adjudicative matter, would
not violate Dunsmuir’s “justifiable, transparent or intelligible” standard. Interestingly, the Court stated that these
qualities relate more to reasonableness in procedural, rather than substantive terms, and that the substantive standard of
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bona fide to address those concerns and “preserve the professional standards of
pharmacists across the province”. 522 According to the Court of Appeal:

Although the evidence supporting the need for the bylaws was thin, the
Council was not, in the absence of a Charter challenge, required to
select the least intrusive path, nor to wait until there was empirical
evidence demonstrating the harm of customer incentive programs. The
question was whether, given the expertise of Council members and
their concerns, the bylaws represented a reasonable response. This was
a question of policy that would benefit from the particular expertise of
pharmacists as opposed to a court of law. 523
The Court of Appeal echoed the Superior Court’s acknowledgement that the
Council is not a publicly elected body524, but still analogized the case to Catalyst Paper,
stating that:
Although the Council is of course not elected directly by the public as
municipal councilors are, it is elected by the members of the College
and includes experienced pharmacists from disparate locations and
types of practices, as well as four government appointees. Its meetings
are open to the public and various procedural safeguards are in place.
As mentioned earlier, bylaws passed by the Council do not become
effective until they have been considered by the Minister of Health and
are thus subject to a degree of oversight by a government official. 525
Furthermore, following Catalyst Paper, the Court of Appeal stated that selfgoverning bodies, much like municipal councils, are not obligated to meet a test of
“demonstrable rationality in terms of process and outcome.” 526 Applying the foregoing
to the facts of the case, the Council was not obliged to adduce evidence of actual harm,
and “must be free to take preventative measures before actual harm occurs.”527 On that
point, the Court of Appeal was not persuaded that the Council “was required as a matter
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of law to prove that its concerns were ‘justified by the facts established’ before it.” 528
Thus, in the Court of Appeal’s view, it was inappropriate to view the reasonableness
standard as requiring empirical evidence of harm in circumstances involving weighing of
competing public interests and striking the Bylaws down as falling outside of the range of
reasonable outcomes because they could have been narrower.529
The companion case of Alberta College played out in very similar fashion as
Sobeys West, taking a somewhat different route with respect to legal analysis only to end
up at the same conclusion. The issue was framed predominantly as one of jurisdictionthe applicants argued that in passing the impugned incentive prohibition Bylaws, the
Alberta College was acting outside of its legal authority to govern in the ‘public interest’
pursuant to section 3(1)(a) of the Alberta Health Professions Act.530
Specifically, the issue was framed as whether “the College has gone beyond its
power, and acted ultra vires to regulate the conduct of pharmacies and pharmacists so as
to protect the public interest in receiving safe and competent care, and that it has stepped
into the area of regulating pricing of pharmaceutical products and services.” 531 With
respect to this issue, it is important to highlight Section 3(2) of the Health Professions Act
which provided a limit on the application of Section 3(1) ‘public interest’ authority:
A college may not set professional fees, provide guidelines for
professional fees or negotiate professional fees on behalf of some or all
of its regulated members unless the Minister grants the college an
approval under section 27.
Applying the Dunsmuir analysis for standard of review, the court stated that the
College did not have greater institutional competence than the court in delineating the
scope of its public interest mandate in the given circumstances. 532 The court reasoned
528
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RSA 2000 c. H-7. The section in question reads “3(1) A college: (a) must carry out its activities and govern its
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that the interpretation of the ‘public interest’ mandate was of central importance to the
legal system generally, given that the Health Professions Act governed 27 other
professions outside of pharmacists and therefore consistency in interpretation across
professions was important.533 As such, the court found that the presumption of
reasonableness standard was rebutted in favour of the correctness standard.
In the court’s opinion, the limitation that regulatory conduct “must be done ‘in a
manner that protects and serves the public interest’ was a clear indication of legislature’s
intention that the subject professions did not have unfettered regulatory discretion. 534
Turning to Hansard to review legislative history of the Health Professions Act, the court
recognized that competency of the professions was of significant importance to the
legislature535, as was public accountability, transparency and “providing for greater
flexibility when it comes to improved choice and access for consumers”. 536
Significantly, the court stated that with respect to the public interest, “the
legislature clearly saw and drew a distinction between the Colleges’ regulatory functions,
in terms of professional self-regulation of practice by its members, and their economic
functions.”537 It was legislature’s intention that the licensing and operating of
pharmacies, including scheduling of drugs, was to be governed under the companion
Pharmacy and Drug Act while conduct and competency of pharmacists would be
governed under the Health Professions Act, hence the inclusion of Section 3(2) of the
Health Professions Act.538
The court concluded that the impugned inducement provisions had “a clear and
direct economic function”539, which amounted to “controlling the way commercial
entities (pharmacies) operate and compete amongst themselves in terms of prices offered
533
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to consumers and costs incurred by the affected patient consumers.” 540 The legislative
intent was clear that with respect to the public interest, the practice of professions (in this
case, pharmacists) would be distinctly and separately governed apart from the economic
aspects of the profession, namely, pharmacies. The court concluded that the impugned
inducement provisions “do nothing to protect from incompetent or unethical
pharmacists”541, the selective approach in which inducements were prohibited lacked
transparency542 and the provisions had nothing to do with competency. 543 Accordingly,
the concluded that the impugned provisions were ultra vires the Board’s statutory
authority.
In a relatively brief judgement, the Alberta Court of Appeal reversed the lower
court decision. With respect to standard of review, the Court of Appeal stated that the
trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s Green decision which had
clearly set a reasonableness standard for review of such rules and bylaws. 544
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal, agreeing with the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Sobeys West Inc, rejected admissibility of affidavit material containing evidence that was
not before the Board when making its decision. 545
Reviewing the matter anew, regarding the issue of vires, the Court of Appeal
stated:
We see no difference in principle between the Policy enacted by the
College in this case, and the rule implemented by the Law Society of
Manitoba in Green, and the policy under consideration in Sobeys West
Inc v College of Pharmacists of British Columbia. In both of the latter
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decisions, the rule and policy were consistent with the statutory
purposes of their enabling legislation. 546
The Court of Appeal took a critical view of the application judge’s use of
Hansard, stating that “[f]rankly, we are of the view that in this case little, if any, weight
ought to have been given to the excerpts from Hansard.”547 Finally, the Court, citing
Katz, stated that impugned regulations must be “irrelevant”, “extraneous” or “completely
unrelated” to the statutory purpose to be found to be ultra vires on the basis of
inconsistency with statutory purpose, and “it would take an egregious case to warrant
such action”.548 Given that the impugned regulations conformed to the rationale of the
statutory regime, the Court concluded that “it cannot be said to be “irrelevant”,
“extraneous” or “completely unrelated” to the statutory purpose.” 549
The Court of Appeal’s judgement was at its briefest with respect to
reasonableness of the impugned provisions. The Court relied on Green, stating the test as
only bylaws that no reasonable body informed of the relevant factors could have taken
would be considered unreasonable. 550 The Court found that the application judge had
erred by not assessing the impugned regulations in light of the test set out in Green.
Finally, the Court of Appeal cited Sobeys West Inc., and its comments regarding the
reasonableness of the by-laws in question not being dependent on actual demonstrated
harm or being the least intrusive option, as being determinative of the matter. 551
5.2 ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AND REASONABLENESS
5.2(i) Public Choice, Regulatory Capture and Deference
An analysis of substantive judicial review of competency-based entry-to-practice
standards, and the corresponding concerns regarding competency-based ‘capture’, should
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begin by revisiting the concerns surrounding regulatory capture and public choice theory
discussed under Chapter 2.3. Specifically, what is the concern, or rather the connection,
between substantive review, capture and competency-based entry-to-practice standards?
The concern regarding capture has been framed as tension between the legal standard of
‘reasonableness’ and giving deference to the expertise of specialized boards.
Although the deference/expertise dichotomy is theoretically sensible, from a
practical perspective, what happens if the expertise of regulatory decision-makers has
somehow been affected by the influence of special interests? If the tenets of capture hold
true, and special interests can easily influence regulators, at least compared to the public
interest, how does this effect our view of the proper role of courts with respect to
deference for regulatory expertise? In light of this phenomenon, several commentators
have expressed the need for a restructuring of legal doctrine to account for possible
regulatory capture.552
But this brings us full circle to the discussion set out under Chapter 2.3, and the
significance of carefully elaborating what precisely is meant by ‘regulatory capture’ and
concerns regarding competency-based capture. As discussed under Chapter 2.3, the
professional self-regulatory framework is challenging for many of the precisely defined
concepts of ‘regulatory capture’. The perpetuation of the traditional Canadian selfregulatory model, and concerns regarding the ability of self-regulatory bodies to balance
professional and public interests within their broad, legislated authority are best
categorized as a by-product of the operation of public choice theory rather than
regulatory capture.
Accepting the foregoing, public choice theory is best characterized as a political
rather than legal explanation. If the concern is framed as one of biased decision-making
and its effect on expertise, most self-regulatory legislation explicitly provides for such
For example, see supra note 106 at 396. According to Niles, if the reasonableness standard of review “is founded
on the assumption that agency action is entitled to some measure of "deference" because it is informed by the kind of
specific expertise that agencies are presumed to not only enjoy, but to incorporate in their factual determinations, legal
interpretations, or policy pronouncements. If one accepts the notion that some, if not many, agencies are the victims of
the hyper-influence of the very private entities that they are obliged to regulate, then the assumption that any expertise
the agencies might have is actually being relied upon in their decision- making process is dubious, at best, and the
relationship between the courts and the agencies would require a dramatic restructuring.”
552
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biased decision-making. Typical self-regulatory legislation creates regulatory boards that
are dominated, if not completely than at least in majority, by members of the profession
itself. Furthermore, self-regulatory legislation typically grants such boards the authority
to set entry-to-practice standards pursuant to legislated public interest and competency
governance mandates. In this scenario, if professional special interests have ‘captured’
the governance framework, this capture has taken place at the political level, by
influencing legislators to pass legislation favourable to the special interests of the
profession. This would be an example of public choice, rather than regulatory capture, as
defined under Chapter 2.3. The question becomes what role can courts play in
combatting public choice versus regulatory capture concerns? Where does the line
between the two begin and end?
Canadian courts of all levels have elaborated that the role of a court in exercising
its substantive judicial review function involves carefully navigating the boundary line
between law and politics. Deference not only respects expertise, but also legislative
intent. A long line of Canadian jurisprudence has identified a well-established legislative
intent granting self-regulatory bodies broad discretion in setting practice standards within
their professional field pursuant to their public interest mandate. Thus, the role of a court
reviewing substantive matters is severely limited by legislative text and intent, and
recourse pertaining to concerns that self-regulatory bodies cannot effectively accomplish
their objective of balancing professional and public interests most often lies at the polls
rather than the courts. The political movements in the U.K. and Australia to reform selfregulatory governance models resulted in legislative amendments creating broad selfregulatory bodies incorporating non-professional majority membership and external
standard-setting organizations. 553 As long as the Canadian self-regulatory framework, as
is customary in most self-regulatory legislation, remains an accepted form of professional
governance, the role that courts can play in challenging over-influence of professional
influence may be limited.
Judicial review and its deference for legislative intent is always a function of
statutory context. Every case will inevitably be decided based on specific legislative
553
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context, and each situation presents unique statutory provisions. This makes drawing
generalizations across professions and cases challenging, as every statutory context
presents unique factors either broadening or constraining the range of acceptable
decision-making authority. However, it appears that several conclusions can be derived
from the case law analysis set out above.
5.2(ii) Public Interest, Competency and Self-Regulatory Authority
Based on the broad statutory grant of authority typical of most self-governing
legislation, arguments that standards set by self-regulatory bodies are unreasonable solely
because of the alleged adverse economic impacts they create will not likely carry much
weight. For example, with respect to Sobeys West, some have remarked that elements of
regulatory capture may have influenced the self-regulatory decision makers to favour
adopting prohibitions on incentive programs despite the abundance of evidence
suggesting that the economic costs far outweigh the benefits.554 While some may be
critical of a tightly-knit group of professionals placing emphasis on notions of
‘professionalism’ ahead of consumer concerns for pricing and competition, and may
disagree with prohibitions such as those at issue in Sobeys West, any recourse would
likely need to be political rather than legal. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
examined the record, which demonstrated consideration on the part of the Board of all
relevant factors, prior to coming to its decision. Within the context of the self-regulatory
legislation in question, and the broad discretion granted to the Board, it is hard to argue
that the Board abused its discretion. As demonstrated in many of the cases discussed
herein, courts have not been shy in expressing that certain self-regulatory conduct may
appear excessive, while still respecting that on substantive review, it is inappropriate for
courts to substitute their own opinion of what may be better alternatives in the face of
clear legislative intent that such decisions should be made by a self-governing body.

See Paul Daly, “Capturing Regulatory Capture by Expanding the Record: Sobeys West Inc. v. College of
Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 41” Administrative Law Matters (blog) (29 February 2016), online:
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2016/02/29/capturing-regulatory-capture-by-expanding-the-recordsobeys-west-inc-v-college-of-pharmacists-of-british-columbia-2016-bcca-41/>.
Despite the provocative title,
“Capturing Regulatory Capture”, Daly himself acknowledges the challenge in defining ‘regulatory capture’:
“Moreover, there are considerations of good administration that might justify expanding the record in a case like this
one. Where it is plausible to suggest that a regulatory body has been ‘captured’ by an influential interest group (though
I appreciate that this may not always be easy to demonstrate)….”.
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The mandates to govern ‘professional competence’ in the ‘public interest’, which
is common to most self-governance statutes, provides self-regulating professions very
broad authority to set professional standards. Nowhere is the breadth of this discretion as
evident as it is in setting of competency-based entry-to-practice standards. As the
jurisprudence demonstrates, under most circumstances courts will be loath to set aside
competency-based entry-to-practice qualifications on substantive grounds. Arguments
loosely structured around allegations that entry qualifications are ‘too stringent’ will
receive little, if any consideration.
Evidence of deleterious effects of entry-to-practice regulation, including effects
on public access to, and cost of professional services, will not in and of itself lead to a
conclusion that such standards are unreasonable. Regardless, evidence of deleterious
economic effects of regulation will no doubt be challenging to enter on the record. Given
that courts restrict the scope of affidavit evidence to material that was before the
decision-making body when enacting such standards, any additional material a
challenging party wishes to enter as evidence will in most circumstances be inadmissible.
In setting standards, if the self-regulatory body has considered the consequences of
regulation and some evidence exists to support their choice of competency-based
regulatory intervention, courts will likely uphold such decisions as being reasonable.
Furthermore, a lack of rational connection between competency standards and
public harm caused by practitioner incompetence- in psychometric terms often referred to
as content validation- or failure to select regulatory options that minimally impair
individuals’ liberty to practice a profession will not likely support a conclusion that the
competency-based standards are unreasonable. Courts have even gone so far as to state
that assessing the reasonableness of a self-regulatory body’s subordinate legislation “does
not extend to a weighing of its practical efficacy”. 555
Following Green, Sobeys West and Alberta College, self-regulatory bodies
defining the boundary between who may, and who may not practice a regulated
profession, and how they may or may not practice, need not do so based on evidence of
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actual public harm between regulated and non-regulated behaviour. As Canadian
jurisprudence has not yet recognized a Constitutional right to practice a profession, selfgoverning bodies are not required to meet the typical Charter obligations of rational
connection and minimal impairment when setting entry-to-practice standards.556
The broad discretion to set entry-to-practice boundaries pursuant to a public
interest mandate would permit most self-regulatory bodies to do so based upon some
evidence of potential harm. Although Green, Sobeys West and Alberta College pertain to
governance of the conduct of professionals already within a profession, there is a strong
argument to be made that the same reasoning in these cases would apply to entry-topractice standards effecting those outside of the profession seeking entry. If evidence of
potential harm to the public exists, thereby justifying the competency-based entry-topractice standards, and some evidence of reasoned decision-making is provided by the
self-regulatory body in setting entry standards, such standards will most likely be upheld
on judicial review.557
Of course, Sobeys West and Alberta College, decided in British Columbia and
Alberta respectively, would be persuasive but not binding within other provinces, so
Green’s effect within the rest of Canada remains to be seen. Furthermore, an argument
could be made that Green and its progeny are not analogous self-regulatory bylaws
governing entry-to-practice. The Court in Green drew a strong parallel to Catalyst
Paper, specifically analogizing the self-regulatory bylaws in question to municipal
bylaws. In both instances, those who are governed vote for those who directly govern
them, and those who govern are directly accountable to those who are governed. This
analogy does not ring entirely the same for entry-to-practice standards; those who are
The court in Togher refused to accept that protection of liberty under Section 7 of the Charter extended to the ‘right
to practice a profession. At paras 37-9, the court, citing Godbout c. Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 at para 66,
stated that the burden imposed upon the applicant by the licensing framework in question did not constitute matters that
are “fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core
of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence” thereby justifying application of Section 7 of the
Charter.
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subject to such regulations, namely prospective practitioners, do not vote directly for
those who govern and those who govern are not directly accountable to them. However,
other elements of statutory context and legislative intent likely justify broad discretion to
govern entry-standards. Most self-regulatory legislation provides self-regulatory bodies
authority to police against non-licensed practitioners (i.e. those who have not met
requisite competency-standards), which combined with public interest and competence
mandates would justify broad discretion in setting entry standards. 558
5.2(iii) Legislative Intent as a Limit on the Range of Acceptable Solutions
The foregoing being said, it is important to re-iterate the significance of statutory
intent. Sweeping generalizations regarding self-regulatory discretion are difficult in light
of differing legislative contexts. Judicial review is a search for legislative intent and the
limit of discretion is always a factor of statutory context. Laffin demonstrates that courts,
in the post-Dunsmuir era of the presumption of reasonableness, will invalidate
competency-based entry-to-practice standards as an unreasonable exercise of discretion
where justified by statutory context. Laffin is an excellent illustration of a court
respecting deference, while still exercising its judicial review function by carefully
analyzing statutory context to understand the limits of self-regulatory authority. In this
sense, the court in Laffin did not exercise ‘disguised correctness’ review, coming to its
own ‘correct’ conclusion and then judging whether the decision in issue aligned with that
of the court.559 Rather, the court engaged in a sophisticated statutory analysis,
considering the effect of s. 8(1)1(i) of the Professional Geoscientists Act, 2000 in limiting
the Council’s authority in setting education requirements. Thus, the court concluded that
the educational guidelines in issue were unreasonable given that that the Council failed to
consider s. 8(1)1(i) in its reasoning and that s. 8(1)1(i) limited the range of acceptable
solutions.560
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As legislative intent, political will and statutory context all play a pivotal role in
judicial review, one point of significance drawn from the jurisprudence is the level of
political oversight required within any given self-governing regime. The court in Laffin
distinguished the Basciano decision based on political oversight- the Association in
Basciano did not require Ministerial approval for setting educational standards whereas
the Association in Laffin did. The court in Laffin was critical of the fact that the
Association had apparently foregone the required political approval process when setting
its educational guidelines. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Sobeys West placed
considerable emphasis on the fact that the impugned bylaws passed through the required
approval process by the Minister of Health, who had authority to either approve, amend
or disapprove such by-laws.561
One cannot help but wonder whether the outcome in Alberta College may have
been different had the issue been framed as the reasonableness of the impugned incentive
prohibition by-laws in light of the statutory context rather than vires. As the Court of
Appeal highlighted, the issue of reasonableness of the incentive provisions was not
argued or thoroughly considered in the lower court, and as such the Court of Appeal
briefly dealt with the issue by simply citing Sobeys West and stating that it agreed with its
outcome.562 It appears that the issue should have been framed and argued as the
reasonableness of the incentive prohibition by-laws in light the statutory effect of section
3(2) of the Health Professions Act. This is not to say that the conclusion would have
been different, as the Court of Appeal clearly stated that the application judge did not
explicitly consider and find that breach of section 3(2) had occurred. 563 However, as in
Laffin, the more appropriate approach may have been to consider the meaning of section
3(2), and then, how section 3(2) may limit the range of acceptable solutions within the
context. If in passing the impugned provisions, the council had failed to adequately
Sobeys West, supra note 511 at para 61: “As mentioned earlier, bylaws passed by the Council do not become
effective until they have been considered by the Minister of Health and are thus subject to a degree of oversight by a
government official.”
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Alberta College, supra note 512 at paras 80-5. At para 84, the Court of Appeal states that “the reviewing judge in
this case did not ask if the Policy was one no reasonable body informed by these factors could have taken.” The Court
of Appeal then cites a paragraph from Sobeys West, following with a simple conclusion at para 85 that “for the same
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consider the effect of section 3(2) or acted outside of the range of discretion
circumscribed by it, the by-laws may have been found unreasonable.
5.2(iv) Unanswered Questions
Within the discussion of legislative intent, statutory context and substantive
review, several outstanding questions remains. Green, citing Edmonton East, places
emphasis on the concept of ‘institutional expertise’ as a justifying broad deference to
self-regulatory bodies’ by-law authority. What exactly does ‘institutional expertise’
mean?564 Here again, context is very important- is the standard of ‘institutional expertise’
the same in situations where a self-regulatory body is governing members of the
profession versus members of the public wishing to enter the profession?
As set out above, in cases involving university decision-making, courts have
regularly stated that university educational decisions are entitled to a high-level of
deference where such decisions fall within a university’s expertise. Subject matter
expertise weighs heavily in favour of deference to subject matter experts as opposed to
courts, and this would apply equally to self-regulated professions as it would university
faculty. But is psychometrics and licensing framework design within the ‘institutional
expertise’ of self-regulatory bodies (or universities for that matter)?
The foregoing also ties into the Dunsmuir question of transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process. What does transparent and intelligible
decision-making require in the context of professional licensing? Are validation studies
required, and if so, what extent of validation is necessary to support reasonable entry-topractice standards? In a situation like Brett, it is hard to argue that the validation efforts
used to support the competency-based practice restriction guidelines were anything but
flimsy at best. But this leaves open the question of what level of validation is actually
necessary.565 Brett presented a unique situation where validation studies were actually
presented and used as reasoning and rationale to support the impugned provisions. If
For a critique of ‘institutional expertise’, see the dissenting opinion of Côté and Brown JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and
Moldaver J. concurring in dissent) in Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC
47, [2016] 2 SCR 293 at paras 82-5.
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For an excellent discussion of the challenges associated with align psychometric standards of validity with legal
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reasoning so faulty as to borderline on irrationality is provided as support of selfregulatory decision making, courts can find the resulting decision unreasonable.566 But
how much reasoning must be presented? Can self-regulatory bodies insulate themselves
by presenting little validation evidence, in the hope that the presumption of deference will
allow them to avoid scrutiny?
While Canadian courts have correctly hesitated to engage in detailed
reasonableness review of substantive educational content, given that relative subjectmatter expertise clearly favours deference, in the U.S. context, courts engaging in
substantive judicial review have demonstrated a willingness to dig deeper into content
validity than have Canadian courts. For example, U.S. courts have been willing to review
actual licensing examination questions to ensure that exam setting is reasonable. It is
important to note that U.S. courts have recognized that this exercise is not intended to
substitute the courts judgement on the merit of formulation and grading of such
examinations for that of the statutory licensing body, nor is it an exercise to ensure
perfection from ambiguities. 567 However, courts have found that content that is
sufficiently ambiguous, such as examination questions containing insufficient
information to be answered correctly, constitute an unreasonable exercise of discretion. 568
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Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács, 2018 SCC 2. In Delta, the Court drew an important distinction between
supplementing the reasoning of an administrative body and supplanting faulty reasoning on judicial review, the latter
being unacceptable: “while a reviewing court may supplement the reasons given in support of an administrative
decision, it cannot ignore or replace the reasons actually provided. Additional reasons must supplement and not
supplant the analysis of the administrative body.”
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Kenny v. Snow, 28 C.I.T. 852 at 856–58 (2004), aff'd, 401 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See also Depersia v. United
States, 33 C.I.T. 1103, 1105–06 (2009): “In reviewing the Secretary's decision to deny Plaintiff's application for a
license, the Court ‘must necessarily conduct some inquiry into plaintiff's arguments and defendant's responses’
concerning the question at issue. DiIorio v. United States, 14 CIT 746, 747 (1990). Although the Court reviews the
exam question being challenged, the ‘[p]arties should not conclude from the court's detailed examination of the test
answers that the court is some kind of final reviewer of the [exam].’ Id. at 752.” Furthermore, at 1111-12: “While
Customs could perhaps have used more precise language in its drafting of question 9, susceptibility of different
meanings does not in and of itself render a term ambiguous. The overall meaning is unmistakable: the question seeks
to identify the course of action most appropriate for the hypothetical importer with regard to the current transactions
described therein.”
See for example O'Quinn v. United States, 24 CIT 324, 100 F.Supp.2d 1136 (2000) [O’Quinn]. O’Quinn involved a
customs broker licensing examination wherein one question utilized the ambiguous term ‘FOB’. The court found that
the term was sufficiently ambiguous and capable of at least two very different meanings such that the question could
not reasonably be expected to be answered correctly: “Therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that the
question does not contain sufficient information to choose an answer…. Therefore, “[b]ecause of faulty drafting,
[P]laintiff's answer must be considered correct or the question must be voided.” Carrier v. United States, 20 CIT 227,
232 (1996).”
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5.3 PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCY-BASED ENTRY-TO-PRACTICE
STANDARDS
5.3(i) Educational Institutions – Deference and Procedural Fairness
When discussing the interplay between substantive review, procedural fairness
and competency-based entry to practice standards, a logical starting point is cases
involving academic institutions such as universities. At least at first glance, this seems to
make sense- after all, substantive education is one of the foundational pillars of
universities. Furthermore, there is no shortage of case law involving disputes between
universities and students with respect to administration of education. From a judicial
review perspective, it has been stated that:
It is a consistent and well-recognized principle in Canadian
[a]dministrative law that judicial review boards do not interfere in the
academic activities and internal functioning of educational institutions,
relating to examinations and the application of evaluation standards,
unless in exceptional circumstances, for example, where the educational
institution has acted in bad faith or acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or
discriminated against. 569
Some courts have even gone so far as to state that substantive academic decisions
made by universities are entitled to such level of deference that applying a Dunsmuir
analysis regarding discretion is an “unnecessary and wasteful distraction”. 570
However, courts have been sensitive to the important distinction between universities
carrying out activities that are entirely within their sphere of domestic competence and
their broader ‘public interest’ mandate. This distinction carries important consequences
with respect to judicial review. This defining principle is summarized in the often-cited
Houston v. University of Saskatchewan:
… standards for a University degree and the assessment of a student's
work are so clearly vested in the university that the courts have no
power to intervene merely because it is thought that the standards are
too high, or that the student's work was inaccurately assessed. However,
the prerogative writs of certiorari and mandamus are available to a
student who has been denied natural justice in respect of his
569

Barreau du Québec v. Boyer, [1994] R.J.Q. 29 (C.A.) at para 19.
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Hamze v. McGill University, 2016 QCCS 630, 264 A.C.W.S. (3d) 659, 2016 CarswellQue 1172, at para 147.
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examinations. The university has been entrusted with the higher
education of a large number of the citizens of the province. This is a
public responsibility that should be subject to some measure of judicial
control.571 (emphasis added)
Furthermore, unlike substantive review, matters of procedural fairness are not
entitled to Dunsmuir’s presumption of deference. Rather, as stated in Chambers v.
Dalhousie University:
When breach of natural justice is alleged the applicable standard of
review is one of correctness. It is a question of law. When applying the
correctness standard in respect to jurisdictional and some other
questions of law, a reviewing court will not show deference to the
decision maker’s reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own
analysis of the question and decide whether it agrees with the
determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its
own view and provide the correct answer. 572 (emphasis added)
As discussed below, courts frequently cite university jurisprudence, and
propositions such as those referenced above, in professional licensing cases. As such, it
is clear that while substantive review of matters of an academic nature will be extremely
limited in scope, courts have an important role to play in safeguarding procedural
fairness.

5.3(ii) Procedural Fairness and Examination Administration
Beginning with examination standards, as with the discussion set out under
Chapter 5.1 regarding substantive review, procedural fairness has historically provided
little recourse for individuals taking issue with general examination standard setting
processes and value judgements regarding the stringency of such examinations.
There exists a paucity of Canadian case law surrounding procedural fairness and
competency-based entry-to-practice standards. Looking at examination administration
generally, case law from the public sector employment testing context provides some
guidance as to fairness obligations in general exam setting and marking. Regarding
571
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general examination administration, courts have stated that in public sector employment
advancement examinations, the duty of administrators is to ensure that candidates are
assessed against the same standards. Complainants alleging arbitrary treatment in an
examination process are entitled to assurances that their assessment has been considered
in light of the assessment of other candidates in order to guarantee consistency in
application of assessment standards. 573
For example, in Ahmad v. Canada Revenue Agency, the applicants alleged that the
examination process and format used for CRA employment advancement decisions were
‘flawed’, alleging impropriety in the tools used to assess competencies as well as
allegations that the examination trainers were not adequately qualified to apply training
standards consistently. 574 The federal court accepted that having two markers marking
against set criteria, calibrating their scores and then permitting a review of these marks
was sufficient to ensure consistency. 575 That is not to say that courts have been entirely
deferential to choice of examination setting and marking processes and unwilling to
undertake a critical look at the methods of exam setters. The federal court has taken a
critical view of incomplete or unclear exam instructions and the prejudice this caused to
candidates, along with a willingness to invalidate such examinations based on
unfairness.576
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P.I.P.S.C. v. Canada (Customs & Revenue Agency), 2004 FC 507, 2004 CF 507, 2004 CarswellNat 1010 at paras
161-3. Also, at paras 77-8, the court refused to take up judicial review on an application directed towards design of a
program for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency staffing decisions. In P.I.P.S.C., the court framed the application
as a non-adjudicative, “somewhat abstract debate without the benefit of a live dispute on a particular set of facts”. The
court indicated that declaratory relief in such circumstances, wherein a specific decision that is part of the testing and
promotion procedure is not being challenged, would be inappropriate given the hypothetical and speculative nature of
the allegations.
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See for example Ligondé v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1342, 2015 CarswellNat 7137 [Ligondé]. In
Ligondé, applicants for promotion to policy analyst positions were required to write an examination as part of a
competitive process. Exam instructions informed candidates that they were not communicate with one another but
were silent regarding use of internet resources or copy/pasting solutions therefrom. Several candidates copied and
pasted solutions from the internet, indicating that a number of candidates understood that there was no prohibition on
using internet resources. Several candidates were eliminated from competition on the basis that this conduct was
fraudulent. At paras 50-53, the Federal Court was critical of the candidates’ elimination on the basis of what was
genuine confusion regarding instructions, considering the fact that one the senior exam setters acknowledged the
imprecision of the instructions as well the fact that exam instructions were subsequently rewritten afterwards to resolve
this ambiguity.
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While cases involving public sector employment advancement testing are
persuasive and may provide insight into fairness in examination administration,
contextually, employment testing and professional licensing are very different. Public
sector employment testing is typically used for career advancement, and employment
tests implemented for government transparency and accountability by ensuring
advancement is based on a competitive process. However, professional licensing serves a
public interest mandate in ensuring that individuals entitled to practice meet a minimumstandard of competence. It is not a matter of career advancement, rather, it is a matter of
individual liberty.
In competency-based professional licensing contexts outside of the university
education setting, it appears that courts have, over time, placed increasing emphasis on
the importance of procedural fairness in licensing administration given the significant
individual liberty implications at stake. This is evidenced by the willingness of courts to
dig deep into the details of licensing examination processes, to ensure that licensing
candidates are treated fairly throughout the process.
In the interesting pre-Baker Boyer c. Barreau du Québec577 decision, the licensee
had completed four out of five of the necessary licensing examinations required by the
Quebec Bar, all with relatively high marks, but failed the largely essay-based legal
‘techniques’ examination by falling just short of the 60% passing threshold. The licensee
challenged the legality of the examination on the basis that his examination was returned
to him without marking or corrections, rather, he was only given a ‘bubble sheet’ with
score markings next to sample responses. “Correction by bubbles”, as the licensee
argued, provided him with insufficient indication as to his shortcomings in order to
understand and modify his understanding for the future.578 Furthermore, the licensee
argued that “it is impossible to identify any objective standard allowing a more or less
uniform correction of the ‘techniques’ section, so that the assessment and application of
each of the elements of the correction grid are left to the discretion of the correctors and
the two different correctors could not arrive at the same results, let alone for the same
577
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reasons.”579 This, applicant asserted, created standards and marking guidelines that were
arbitrary.
The Quebec Superior Court found that the marking guidelines for the ‘techniques’
examination “open[ed] wide the door to the arbitrariness of the correctors.”580 According
to the court:
No precise standards of correction, nothing to moderate the first
marking committee and the second marking committee and above all,
no way for the student to know his failings other than by consulting the
correction bubbles. This inaccuracy in standards, the absence of marks
of correction and the possibility of being corrected, revised and
recorrected by the first rather than the second committee, make these
standards and their application a perfect example of arbitrariness to
which a student only to bend if he wants to enter the compulsory stage.
It cannot even in such circumstances, make any grounds for revision
and recorrection. It must merely allege general reasons to the effect that
it believes it has responded accurately and concisely while using
appropriate legal language. 581

With respect to balancing of interests and the significance of the licensing process
both to the licensee and to the public, the court stated:
The arbitrary character of the norms and their application cause the
student serious injustice. On the eve of entering a profession he has
chosen, a young man with a strong legal background is forced to
resume an examination before starting his internship. He loses his
job and his income but, above all, he loses confidence in an
institution which, for the public, represents the first step towards
access to justice. This virtue allowing to attribute to each his fair
share of goods and services, honor and noble end that must translate
into the adoption and especially the application of fair standards for
all candidates for the internship required by the Law Society.
Regardless of the angle under which the matter is being considered,
the Bar's duty of fairness must be reflected in the accuracy of its
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standards, the objectivity of its examiners and the clear indication of
the student's shortcomings. That is not the case here. 582
Lastly, the court opined on the danger of over-encroaching onto the historically
broad discretion afforded to educational institutions, stating that:
[T]he court does not underestimate the risk inherent in any judicial
intervention in the fields of educational institutions. It must then act
with caution and measure each time the impact of its decision on
academic freedom. However, this reservation should not prevent it from
examining each case on its merits and, in the present case, convinced of
the serious injustice committed against Mr. Boyer, the court has no
hesitation in fulfilling its duty and justice by attributing to it its fair
share of property and honor. 583 (emphasis added)
On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the judgement of the superior
court.584 The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire examination process, which
examination process included several weeks of teaching by trained instructors in
accordance with detailed guides outlining readings, objectives and sample solution
texts.585 Students were trained by their instructors using template solutions and their
practice exercises were corrected in class according to solution grids similar to those used
on the actual examination. 586
The Quebec Court of Appeal also highlighted the effort the Barreau put into exam
validation. Exam questions were developed by instructors, which were reviewed by both
a sample population of practicing lawyers as well as an evaluation subcommittee prior to
being submitted for approval by the Barreau’s Professional Bar Council. 587 Furthermore,
following completion of the examination, a team of reviewers sampled fifty answer
papers in order to analyze, compare and where necessary, adjust the model correction
grid to accommodate for variations. 588 While the court appreciated the candidate’s
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frustration in not having received the standard answer key, the fact that he had received
his exam and correction grid, along with the fact that the validation procedures were
effective at ensuring that all candidates’ papers were corrected in the same fashion
according to the same rules, led the court to rule that the exam was not arbitrary and
unfair.589
Although the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the lower court decision, many
aspects of both courts’ decisions merit recognition. Primarily, the effort that both courts
put into reviewing the entire examination process in detail demonstrates the importance
placed on ensuring that licensees are treated fairly. Although decided pre-Baker, both
courts acknowledged the significance of the context, and the importance of the decision
to the individual. This line of reasoning, and recognition of the importance of setting the
standard high in professional licensing contexts, has continued, and arguably expanded,
post-Baker.
In the post-Baker Khan c. Barreau (Québec) 590 decision, a candidate of Quebec’s
lawyer licensing program had received less than the required overall 60% mark on a
series of three licensing examinations, administered by École du Barreau (the “School”)
on behalf of the Barreau, on account of a particularly poor mark on one of her
examinations. Upon request for revision (an administrative review), the mark on the
lowest exam was increased slightly, but the candidate still did not achieve the requisite
60% total. The candidate was informed that although she was entitled to review her
examination paper and correction grid, the mark was final and without appeal. 591 At the
review meeting, the candidate was not allowed to take a copy of her exam booklet and
correction grid, and was not allowed to take notes regarding the marking of her exam. 592

Ibid at para 16-7- “The proofreaders must apply the criteria adopted by the Bar School and known by the students.
The correction is additionally framed by a standard corrector, a detailed grid and precise correction instructions. The
form of the review and the use of several scrutiny teams inevitably involve a degree of subjectivity in the evaluation,
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The Quebec Court of Appeal found that:
[t]he evidence indicates that the student evaluation process and
examination correction method satisfy rigorous standards and respect
the recognized evaluation rules, with respect to both developing the
examination as well as passing and correcting same. In this context,
there can be no question as to the validity or legality of the École du
Barreau’s evaluation and examination correction process. 593
Despite this fact, the Court of Appeal characterized the issue not as
reasonableness of the Barreau’s standards, rather, as whether the mechanism chosen to
implement its licensing process satisfied the requirements of procedural fairness-“even a
well-thought-out and correctly implemented system may give rise to errors and require
occasional adjustments”.594 The Court of Appeal highlighted the significance of
transparency, given that the School and the Barreau carry out a public interest function, a
transparency which extends to licensing candidates and the examination process. 595
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal stated that “the [Barreau] would have been transparent
and would have completely satisfied its duty of procedural fairness if it had allowed the
respondent to take handwritten notes during the consultation” 596, thereby ruling that the
Barreau had breached its procedural fairness obligations. 597
The Court of Appeal considered the Barreau’s administrative efficiency rationale.
Exam material was withheld from candidates on review to permit the re-use of exam
questions in subsequent years, which, according to the Barreau, would lead to a
significant reduction of expenses associated with exam content development. However,
the Court of Appeal stated that the “economy sought would benefit the Barreau, not the
students.”598
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Applying the Baker factors, the Court of Appeal highlighted both the importance
and consequences of the process to candidates as well as candidates’ expectations in
being treated fairly, impartially and with transparency. 599 While recognizing that the
School and Barreau’s “choice of procedure must be considered and respected, when
related to its expertise”600 (emphasis added), the court stated:
There are heavy consequences for the student who fails the
examinations giving access to the practice of law. Aside from the
economic cost of reapplying for admission to the [Barreau], the
candidate, if readmitted, must register for preparatory courses prior to
recommencing the professional training… Practically speaking, the
candidate who fails the four month professional training in December
of one year, which began the previous September, may not reregister
until the following September. The candidate must take preparatory
courses for four months as a condition for admission to the professional
training session starting in January and ending in April. Ultimately, this
means an additional delay of almost one and a half years before
entering the profession, in some cases having to find another
professional training articling period, without taking into account the
psychological distress and impact of a major failure at the beginning of
one’s career.601
A similar set of facts were presented in the Goldwater c. École du barreau du
Québec602 decision. In Goldwater, much like Khan c. Barreau (Québec), the applicant
requested review of a failing grade on a midterm, rather than final, licensing examination.
At the meeting, the candidate was prohibited from taking any notes regarding his
examination and scoring grid. Distinguishing Boyer, the court found the case at hand
akin to the fact pattern in Khan c. Barreau (Québec), stating that the ruling in Khan c.
Barreau (Québec) should apply equally to the midterm evaluation. 603 As such, the court
ruled that the applicant had been denied procedural fairness. 604
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5.3(iii) The Right to Pursue a Chosen Profession
Standards of procedural fairness should be heightened in circumstances where an
individual’s right to continue towards their chosen profession or employment may be at
stake.605 In the often-cited Ontario Court of Appeal Khan v. University of Ottawa 606
decision, a law student having failed one of her law school exams alleged that she had
been marked on only three of the four of her exam booklets. The law student appealed
her grade to a faculty examinations committee followed by a University Senate
Committee. Without being provided the opportunity to appear to provide testimony
before either committee, her application for review was dismissed on the basis that she
had failed to prove any error in the grading of her examination.
Acknowledging that the student should have been granted the right to provide
testimony in the circumstances, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
In my view, a university student threatened with the loss of an
academic year by a failing grade is also entitled to a high standard of
justice. The effect of a failed year may be very serious for a university
student. It will certainly delay if not end the career for which the
student was studying. It may render valueless any previous academic
success. In some cases it may foreclose further university education
entirely.607
While Khan seems to set a very high procedural fairness standard, the cases that
have followed Khan have taken differing views of its applicability. Some courts have
limited the stringency of its application to circumstances where the right to a hearing is in
issue. In Green v. The University of Winnipeg 608, a student enrolled in the university’s
education program appealed a poor grade he had received on a final course assignment to
a departmental committee followed by a senate committee. The senate committee

with his own.’” In the circumstances of Boyer, this was found to satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness.
However, in Khan c. Barreau (Québec), the candidate was not permitted to take copies of any of these items, and was
not entitled to take notes during the meeting. Accordingly, it appears that Boyer and Khan c. Barreau (Québec) were
distinguishable on a factual basis, regardless of the effect of the Baker.
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acknowledged that the departmental review may have been incomplete, and in order to
undertake an appropriate review, requested a copy of the student’s assignment. The
student refused to provide a copy of his assignment unless he also be given the
opportunity to address the senate committee in person. When the student refused to
provide a copy, his appeal was dismissed without a hearing. The student’s allegation of
breach of procedural fairness was dismissed, with the court distinguishing the application
of Khan on the basis that the student’s credibility was not a critical issue as it had been in
Khan.609
In Daneshvar v. Canada (National Dental Examining Board)610, the applicant, an
English qualified dentist, sought to complete a series of three qualification examinations
to acquire a Canadian license to practice. The applicant failed one of the examinations,
and as all exams had to be successfully completed to pass, the applicant was given a
failure. The applicant requested an appeal in accordance with the Board’s appeal
process, which process involves a review of a candidate’s written submissions to
determine whether there was a mistake of fact of such significance that it could have
altered the decision or that the examiners failed to conduct the examination in accordance
with the procedures established. 611 Although oral submissions were possible in the event
that the Appeal Committee found a prima facie case of error, in Daneshvar, the Appeals
Committee dismissed the applicant’s appeal, providing a brief letter simply stating that
“The Committee determined that there was no mistake of fact of such significance that it
could have altered any decision made and that examiners conducted the examination in
accordance with the procedures established by the Board.” 612
The applicant sought judicial review on the basis that “she had made a series of
very specific complaints” and the letter she received from the Board did not sufficiently
disclose the basis of the denial, thereby denying her procedural fairness. 613 The court in
Daneshvar was clear that it “could not review the dental quality and competency
609
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decisions” and was limited to reviewing the appeal process, and specifically, whether the
applicant was denied procedural fairness due to a lack of sufficient reasons following her
appeal.614 However, in applying Baker’s ‘importance of the decision to the individual’
factor, acknowledged the significance of written decisions in promoting meaningful
decision making.615 While the respondent Board attempted to distinguish Baker’s
requirement for written reasons to ‘serious’ cases involving personal detention and
physical liberty, the court emphasized the importance of the decision at hand to the
applicant’s ability to practice her chosen profession:
The applicant is qualified to practice dentistry in England and her
entitlement to pursue her profession in this country, to which she has
immigrated, is at stake in these examinations. She has already passed
the first three stages at considerable investment of time and effort. The
respondent down-played the significance of the applicant’s failure at
this level because she could try the clinical examination one more time.
In our view that is not the point. If she was unfairly failed, it is a serious
wrong to require her to risk all on one final attempt. The added stress of
knowing it was her last chance would no doubt add to the difficulty of
the test. The ability to pursue the profession for which we have been
trained goes to the heart of who we are as persons, as well as having
huge economic consequences. In our view the consequences to the
applicant are of the magnitude contemplated in the Baker decision. We
conclude that, in simple justice, the Appeal Committee owed the
applicant some explanation for its decision. 616
The court concluded that what the Board had provided the applicant was not
reasons, rather, simply “conclusions that follow from whatever the reasons may be.” 617
Furthermore, the court took a critical view of administrative expediency as a justification
for its relatively brief reasons on appeal, stating that “[t]he governance of the entry of
persons with foreign qualifications into a profession is important work for the profession,
the applicants and the public and cannot be conducted unfairly for reasons of economy or
expediency.”618 (emphasis added) While recognizing that reasons as extensive as those
given by courts would not have been necessary, given the importance of the decision to
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the applicant, at least a brief answer to the complaints raised by the applicant would have
been necessary in the circumstances. 619
However, contrast Daneshvar with the facts, reasoning and outcome in Akhtar v.
Canadian Board for Certification of Prosthetists and Orthotists.620 Similar to
Daneshvar, the applicant in Akhtar was licensed and experienced orthotist in Pakistan,
and sought to acquire certification in Canada. Certification of orthotists in Canada is
governed by a private, non-profit corporation which administers the ‘certified orthotist’
credential.621 After completing the required residency program, the applicant failed one
of the three required examinations on three separate occasions, thereby being deemed to
be permanently ineligible to sit the examination again. 622 The failed ‘practical
examination’ involved two examiners independently assessing the practical performance
of the candidate against objective marking criteria. 623 The applicant appealed his third
failure to an examination appeal committee, which, upon review, notified the applicant
with a brief letter that his appeal had been denied. 624 The applicant then exercised his
right to a further appeal to the president of the respondent, and similarly, the applicant
was again denied his appeal. 625
The applicant applied for judicial review, alleging that he was denied procedural
fairness in that “he did not have a meaningful opportunity to fully and fairly present his
case to the respondent”. 626 However, unlike in Daneshvar where the applicant
challenged the adequacy of the written reasons provided on appeal, the applicant in
Akhtar stated that he should have been entitled to an in-person hearing to present his
evidence as it was his assertion that a central issue in the marking of his practical
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examination “was the credibility of his recollection of events versus that of the
examiners.”627
In its analysis, the court, applying Baker and citing Daneshvar, recognized that
the very significant economic impact failure of the examination would have on the
applicant warranted an increase in the requisite degree of procedural safeguards.628 Yet
the court was also sensitive to the balance between ensuring procedural fairness and
possibly encroaching on the expertise of the board, stating that:
the decisions were discretionary administrative decisions of the
examination appeal committee and the respondent board made within
their core competence and expertise, which, in my view, attracts
considerable deference. The decisions should only be set aside if the
appeal process was unreasonable and if the duty of procedural fairness
was breached.629
In reviewing the procedure chosen by the board, the court highlighted the fact that
the examination was conducted by two independent examiners who confer to compare
results, followed by independent review by a chief examiner who provides a breakdown
of marks and examiner comments.630 The examination appeal committee was composed
of certified orthotists from across Canada and appointed based on regional representation,
and the appeal committee provided a written response within 30 days of an appeal. 631
Furthermore, candidates were still entitled to a second appeal, which appeal reviewed all
information with respect to the examination prior to making its decision. 632
Accordingly, while the court acknowledged that procedural fairness required that
the respondent be provided with details of his performance and reasons for his failure, the
duty of fairness did not require that the applicant be afforded an oral hearing. 633
Regarding the appropriateness of the provided written decisions, the court stated that
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“comprehensive reasons for the decision would have been the preferred course for the
examination appeal committee and the respondent board to foster better decision-making
and to satisfy the applicant that the arguments he made were considered and properly
taken into account in the decision-making process”634. However, the court ruled that
“although it may have been preferable to provide more comprehensive reasons for its
decision, the respondent board was not required to give written reasons for its decision
more than what was provided in the circumstances.” 635
5.4 ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
5.4(i) The Elevated Standard of Procedural Fairness and Pursuit of a Chosen
Profession
The survey of Canadian jurisprudence set out under Chapter 5.1 demonstrates that
over time, substantive review of competency-based standards set by self-regulating
professions has moved from courts readily intervening in substantive decisions towards
showing substantial deference to the discretion of self-regulatory bodies. Similarly, the
opposite effect has taken place in the realm of procedural fairness- courts have moved
from being tentative with respect to intervening in matters of procedural fairness to
expressing the significance of fairness in the context of professional licensing and
engaging in comprehensive review of procedural matters.
Both cases of unsuccessful judicial review, such as Boyer c. Barreau du Quebec,
and successful judicial review, such as Khan c. Barreau (Quebec) and Goldwater,
demonstrate that when it comes to matters of procedural fairness and construct validity,
courts have not hesitated to comprehensively scrutinize all aspects of licensing
634
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examination administration. Examination construct validity, as opposed to substantive
content validity, can and should be reviewable as a matter of procedural fairness to
candidates. Courts have shown a willingness to review all matters of construct validation
including exam setting, instructions to candidates and marking procedures. It is
important to re-iterate here that a court would not be reviewing the substance of such
educational standards, such as educational requirements, curriculum and the number and
nature of examinations that must be completed. Rather, once substantive standards are
set, procedural fairness obligations set in. For example, while the setting of a curriculum
for a licensing examination is a substantive matter, once a curriculum is set, courts should
ensure that notice of such curriculum is adequately conveyed to examinees, that
examinees are provided access to preparatory material covering such curriculum and
adequate time to prepare for the examination following notice of curriculum, and that the
licensing examination does not test matters that are extraneous to the curriculum.
With respect to licensing examination, Danshevar sets a high threshold with
respect to the duty to provide reasons. While an oral hearing is not always required, there
must be clear evidence that an examinee’s feedback has been received, individually
considered and responded to in order to meet the requisite fairness obligations. As with
other matters of procedural fairness, while concerns for efficiency are an important and
pertinent consideration for administrators, efficiency alone cannot justify abdication of
the duty to provide reasons.
While the foregoing willingness to review examination construct issues is
certainly commendable, clear standards have yet to emerge. Matters involving
ambiguous examination instructions, for example, present a straightforward fact pattern
on which courts can receive evidence and formulate a clear decision. However, with
respect to examination setting, how much objective validation is required? What process
must be followed for setting examination questions, solutions and marking grids? How
are examination test-writers selected, and how many test writers are required? Are exam
timing and pass score matters of content (i.e. substantive) or construct (i.e. procedural)
validity? Even in the U.S., where a larger set of professional licensing case law exists,
questions surrounding validation standards have long remained unsettled. While U.S.
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courts have invalidated examinations set ‘by a small number of people in a dark, smokefilled room’,636 a clear standard of psychometric acceptability has yet to emerge. 637

If courts are willing to accept any evidence of validation as being sufficient for
procedural fairness purposes, this may give way to the triumph of form over substance.
In the U.S. context, courts and commentators have long-struggled to find that right touch
when it comes to review of licensing examination validation. 638
5.4(ii) Professional Licensing and Educational Institutions – An Appropriate
Analogy?
A consistent theme within the jurisprudence is that courts in professional
licensing cases often draw analogies to the university context pertaining to the balance
between substantive and procedural review. At first glance, this comparison seems
appropriate- both contexts involve subject matter specific expertise, educational testing
and entry-to-practice qualifications. Thus, the often-expressed apprehension to intervene
in matters of substantive education while setting a high standard for procedural fairness
seem equally applicable to both university and professional licensing circumstances.
Upon deeper analysis, important contextual differences between internal
university education, involving matters of developing and delivering university courses,
and matters of professional licensing examination emerge. Although university
educational programs are often a part of a professional licensing program, university
education and professional licensing examination play separate, but equally important
roles in both professional self-regulation and society generally. 639 Universities and
university professors are afforded certain safeguards to ensure adequate separation from
the politicization involved in professional licensing, including but not limited to tenure
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for university professors. University grading policies are afforded certain flexibilities,
such as grading curves, which promote passing as opposed to failing students.
Universities actively pursue recruitment of students for tuition purposes, and failing
students from any program is often seen as a last resort- there are strong moral and
financial incentives to assist students in succeeding. From a ‘political’ perspective,
student representatives are involved in various university governing and oversight bodies,
which is seldom the case for professional self-governing bodies. To put it simply,
universities have every incentive to recruit and keep students in a program, while in the
context of professional licensing examination, there is a strong implicit bias to keep
people out.
Contextually, courts reviewing matters involving procedural fairness issues in
professional licensing circumstances should exercise a level of apprehension in drawing
analogies to internal, university education scenarios. Accordingly, if courts reviewing
university decisions involving student education and pursuit of professional careers have
set a high procedural fairness standard, from a contextual perspective, the standard in
matters involving professional licensing examinations should be set even higher. PostBaker cases such as Danshevar and Khan c. Barreau (Quebec) have correctly
contextualized the nature of professional licensing regulation in terms of interests and
significance to licensing candidates, the profession and the public. These cases have set a
substantially high procedural fairness standard, and although decided in the context of the
duty to provide reasons, the reasoning and standard should apply with equal effect to all
aspects of the professional licensing processes.
5.4(iii) Procedural Fairness – A Tool For Political Reform?
While the foregoing procedural fairness approaches offer candidates for entry to a
profession, including the patent agent profession, mechanisms to challenge the
implementation of rules pertaining to competency-based entry-standards, they do not
provide much in the way of recourse to challenge the setting of standards for entry to
practice. These challenges might be viewed as an individual matter, a case of one or more
individuals challenging certain aspects of a licensing process that has left them unfairly
treated. In many circumstances, issues such as poor examination instructions or faulty
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marking processes would likely be viewed as an unfortunate administrative oversight
rather than a challenge to the foundational notions of competency and public interest
within the respective self-regulatory framework.
That is not to say that the value of such challenges should be dismissed outright.
Judicial threats of any form can lead to political change. 640 As public choice theory
dictates, some political actors may recognize that certain regulatory mechanisms may run
counter to the public interest, but may face strong political lobbying from well-organized
professional interest groups. In these circumstances, even the slightest legal threat may
provide the necessary impetus for political reform. 641
Legal threats of any kind further promote the values of judicial review, namely,
accountability and adherence to legislative intent. Forcing accountability through any
means of judicial review would force administrative bodies to remain true to statutory
intent and would create incentives to reduce conflicts within the governance
framework.642 By challenging self-regulatory bodies through any judicial review
mechanism, this furthers the purpose of political accountability by ensuring that any
governance conduct must either adhere to the provisions of the enabling statute or go
through appropriate political mechanisms in order to achieve the sought after objectives.
Even challenges to seemingly routine procedural matters, such as exam setting and
marking procedures, may force self-regulatory bodies to implement objective validation
mechanisms, and any level of objective third party validation minimizes potential biases.
Furthermore, procedural challenges leading to objective validation creates an objective
record, and as such, minimizes the possibility of self-regulatory bodies seeking to
immunize scrutiny by avoiding the creation of decision-making record. Over time, legal
challenges, both successful and unsuccessful, can create a transparent judicial record of

Supra note 2 at 849. At 874: “Given the public choice dynamics, the credible threat of legal action is essential to
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self-governance activity and may shift political norms.643 From this perspective, the
value of any legal challenge as a tool for political reform should not be discounted. 644
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CHAPTER 6
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – INSTITUTIONAL BIAS
6.1 INSTITUTIONAL BIAS AND REGULATORY CAPTURE
6.1(i) Public Choice, Regulatory Capture and the Limits of Judicial Review –
Grounding Institutional Bias
As with the analysis of substantive review under Chapter 5.2, it is important to
begin the discussion of institutional bias by first returning to the discussion surrounding
competency-based entry-to-practice standards and capture. As discussed under Chapter
5.2, if we distinguish public choice concerns from regulatory capture concerns, with
regulatory capture in the context of self-regulated professions manifesting itself within
the administration of the self-regulatory framework, then what legal mechanisms are
available to safeguard against the detrimental effects of such phenomenon? What,
precisely, is the concern surrounding regulatory capture? From an operational
perspective, the concern is best characterized as concern regarding biased decision
making. Self-regulatory bodies, either consciously or unconsciously, may make
decisions favouring professional interests over the public interest.
Substantive review, grounded in the principles of legislative intent, deference and
expertise, will in many circumstances struggle to provide an effective filter against biased
decision making within the self-regulatory context, and specifically, as set out in the
previous Chapters, in circumstances surrounding competency-based, entry-to-practice
standards. As Laverne Jacobs states, the “Dunsmuirian approach without more is not
enough to produce meaningful judicial review of the procedural fairness issues relating to
independence and accountability”, issues best characterized as matters of bias. 645 Recent
jurisprudence has demonstrated increasing willingness to exercise heightened scrutiny of
procedural fairness issues surrounding examination administration, issues which to date
have been largely framed as concerns surrounding adequate notice and provision of
reasons. However, as set out in detail under Chapters 5.3 and 5.4, even judges
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sympathetic to the plight of prospective professional licensees up against what appear to
be excessively onerous licensing standards have upheld the fairness of examination
procedures against such challenges. Most importantly, central to this thesis is the question
of what role can administrative law play in challenging competency-based regulatory
capture, and as set out under Chapter 5.4(iii), while challenging licensing examinations
based on questions of adequacy of notice and provisions of reasons might possibly lead to
heightened political scrutiny of licensing standards, such political scrutiny would be a byproduct of administrative challenge rather than a direct administrative challenge aimed at
disrupting capture.
Returning to matters of substance, as discussed under Chapter 5.2, many of the
cases cited therein can be distinguished on the basis of the fact that they deal with internal
matters, such as governance of professionals already within a profession, as opposed to
external matters, such as licensing of individuals wishing to enter a profession.
According to Jacobs, the Dunsmuirian reasonableness approach, and its respect for
deference, is grounded in internal expertise.646 Correctness, on the other hand, focuses
largely on external relationships.647 As such, in situations involving self-regulatory
conduct and action vis-à-vis external parties, such as entry-to-practice standards and
licensing, procedural fairness is the key to filtering out many of the deleterious biases
inherent to the self-regulatory governance model resulting from regulatory capture.
According to Jacobs, the question of reasonable apprehension of bias in the
administrative context often revolves around the question of “whether an administrative
actor’s structure or relationships appear sufficiently free from inappropriate
interference.”648 While this is a seemingly straightforward question, as we shall see
under Chapter 6.2, jurisprudence has, to date, provided little guidance regarding a
structured methodology for undertaking such an analysis. This is particularly challenging
Ibid: “Dunsmuir’s reasonableness is best suited for litigious matters involving parties before the administrative
actor. The concept of being respectful of agency procedural choices aligns most logically with choices
made internally by the agency alone, based on its expertise and within the context of a specialized process designed to
widely improve efficiency across the range of its cases. In such cases, there may be an expertise in process developed
by the tribunal that should be taken into account on judicial review.”
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in an administrative setting, as opposed to judicial decision-making, wherein courts have
recognized that review of administrative decision-making demands a flexible approach to
bias in appreciation for the particularities of any specific administrative context.
The challenge with self-regulatory bodies is that unlike many other administrative
bodies, matters which would normally be considered ‘biased’ often appear to be by selfregulatory legislation, thereby blurring the line between acceptable and unacceptable
bias. In the self-regulatory context, careful attention must be paid to the dichotomy
between biases authorized by statute and biases which manifest themselves within the
exercise of regulatory discretion. According to Jacobs:
…consider the administrative law doctrine that a reasonable
apprehension of bias is deemed not to arise as long as the conflicting
functions of an administrative body are prescribed by constitutionally
valid enabling legislation. Under the rule of law, democratically created
legislation may authorize a single administrative body to perform
functions such as prosecution and adjudication even though the
performance of both functions by the same entity would otherwise
contradict the principles of natural justice. The difficulty with the
doctrine is that it has been interpreted in some instances to permit
conflicting functions to survive without scrutiny even in cases where
the legislation has not expressly sanctioned the specific type of conflict
at issue. In other words, it fails to deal with the discretionary pockets
that may exist within the legislation where the conflicting actions are
not entirely covered by the legislation’s sanction. 649 (emphasis added)
To address inherent biases developing within a specific administrative system,
Jacobs suggests grounding procedural fairness analysis within the appropriate context and
‘on the ground’ understandings between regulator and regulated. The idealized, objective
hypothetical “reasonable and right-minded” person from whose perspective allegations of
bias have been traditionally assessed may lead to superficial analyses of bias focused
entirely on objective criteria such a statutory language. One of the key insights of a
grounded impartiality approach is that a reading of statutory text, alone, is often
insufficient to ground a legitimate determination of what can be considered ‘reasonable’
independence within any specific administrative context.650 A grounded impartiality
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analysis requires of courts the willingness to dig deeply into the operational workings of a
regulatory framework. From a contextual perspective, a deep dive into the workings of a
regulatory framework may uncover that jointly held beliefs between regulator and
regulated, while genuinely held, may also present evidence of unconsidered agency
capture.651
As discussed under Chapter 2.3, environments of tightly-knit, like-minded
individuals can quickly develop into epistemic capture and regulatory drift. Thus, as
Jacobs states, an understanding of institutional culture, while “not, in and of itself,
excus[ing] situations that would otherwise clearly lead to a reasonable apprehension of
bias… may offer avenues for additional exploration of the administrative body’s
understanding of procedural fairness.” 652 Such an approach “ground[s] the analysis of
reasonable apprehension of bias by focusing the inquiry on concrete areas where barriers
to independence may exist.”653 As such, if one accepts that the hyper-proximity between
the Patent Office and the profession has created a barrier against meaningful dialogue and
change within the institution, a grounded impartiality approach may be the key to reestablishing regulatory independence.
Jacobs proposes five contextual factors for grounding an analysis for
disqualifying bias: the provenance of the administrative actor; the shared understandings
and institutional culture (including institutional practices) within which the administrative
body is embedded; local understandings jointly held by the administrative actor and
regulated community; any connections between the administrative body and those
appearing before it that have been jurisprudentially flagged as potential impartiality
concerns; and the administrative discourse, and the extent to which this discourse either
promotes or hinders meaningful dialogue between all relevant parties. 654
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The provenance of the administrative actor examines the history, policy origins
and legislative framework of the specific administrative agency. 655 The shared
understandings and institutional culture requires consideration of “institutional norms,
which are often implicit rather than express, develop[ed] through the repeated
discretionary actions of an administrative agency or other administrative body and form
part of its ethos.”656 This consideration of institutional norms serves two significant
objectives. Analyzing institutional norms requires assessment of the operative
functioning of an administrative body, which in turn enables a deeper consideration of
biases that may or may not be legitimated by express legislative wording. 657
Furthermore, an understanding of institutional norms may lead to a more thorough
examination of barriers to fairness inherent within the administrative workings of an
agency.658
Local understandings build upon institutional norms, by considering the norms
and understandings between the institutional actor and the regulated community it is
tasked with overseeing. 659 An analysis of local understandings may discover that certain
practices that a hypothetical, ‘objective’ observer may consider illegitimate may in fact
be ‘reasonable’ within the specific administrative context. However, Jacobs is careful to
point out that a grounded impartiality analysis cuts both ways, and that “in considering
local understandings, a reviewing court should pay equal attention to the potentially
problematic issue of agency capture disguised as local understandings.” 660
While the third factor considers connections between administrative body and
those appearing before it relates to traditional jurisprudential understandings impartiality,
this analysis should carefully consider the nature of the relationships based for a
grounded consideration of legitimacy. Lastly, discourse considers the reality of exchange
between the parties, and whether this exchange allows for meaningful dialogue between
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the parties. Here, the central question is whether the institutional norms and narratives
within the specific context act as a conduit or barrier to meaningful dialogue between
regulator and regulated.661 The dominant discourse within a given administrative context
may lead to attitudinal biases, which, when implemented, may lead to incapability for
open exchange and testing of facts within the specific regulatory framework. 662
As mentioned above, these contextual factors cut both ways with respect to the
traditional notion of an objective, acontextual perception of what is a ‘reasonable’
apprehension of bias within a specific context. In some instances, a grounded
impartiality analysis will find that what a hypothetically objective, acontextual observer
might view as being biased decision-making may be legitimate within the specific
administrative context, while in some instances, what those whose rationality has been
tightly circumscribed by the boundaries of a specific contextual discourse may view as
legitimate may actually signal unintentional forms of bias. Essentially, a grounded
impartiality analysis seeks to define what a ‘reasonable’ apprehension of bias means
within a given administrative context by offering guideposts for analytic consideration as
opposed to an idealized, acontextual objective standard disengaged from the everyday
realities of a specific administrative environment. 663
6.1(ii) Patent Agent Regulation, Institutional Bias and Capture
Returning specifically to Canadian patent agent regulation, Part 1 argues that
epistemic and cultural capture have become deeply rooted into the Canadian patent
practice landscape through years of custom and tradition. The reality is that the
institutional actors and practitioners have all become accustomed to the current system
and the current narrative has become engrained within the current patent practice
landscape. The situation is not necessarily a matter of institutional actors placing their
individual material interests in conflict with the public interest. It may not even be a
matter of incumbent patent agents attempting to protect their market position. Rather, the
individuals involved have become so accustomed to the current framework that they are
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oblivious to the inherent biases within it. To put it simply, the institutional actors within
this system may hold a genuine belief in its legitimacy.
In challenging the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework, what is at
stake is far more profound than incumbent patent agents potentially losing market share
to new practitioners. Rather, challenging the predominant patent practice narrative poses
an existential threat to the current patent practice narrative. If the goal is to challenge the
current narrative in the hopes of reforming the system, it is essential to challenge the
institutional biases inherent within the current regulatory framework. Patent agent
‘competency’ acts as a lynchpin to the current dominant practice narrative. As this
dominant narrative may be deeply connected to limiting access-to-services for the most
vulnerable market segments, homogenizing professional identity and ethics, creating a
tightly-knit interest group predominantly serving foreign clientele (and interests) and
inhibiting the growth of new and innovative service modalities, challenging this narrative
may require challenging ‘competency’, which in turn requires challenging the biases
inherent within the current system.
Challenging the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework based on
institutional bias presents the most promising option for disrupting the current Canadian
patent practice narrative. Disrupting the current patent practice narrative requires outside
groups interjecting themselves between the long-standing patent office/patent agent
connection. To create the space for such a group to disrupt the current narrative, a crack
must form within the hyper-connectivity between the patent office and the patent agent
profession to allow new information, ideas and interests to manifest themselves. If the
objective is to use a judicial, rather than political, mechanism to achieve this objective,
then institutional bias may be the best possible tool for disentangling the patent office and
patent agent profession from one another.
6.2 INSTITUTIONAL BIAS JURISPRUDENCE
6.2(i) The Fundamentals of Institutional Bias
The following sets out the history of Canadian jurisprudence regarding
institutional bias. The roots of institutional bias were planted in the oft-cited Committee
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for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) decision.664 Although not
pertaining directly to institutional bias, Committee for Justice & Liberty set out the test
for reasonable apprehension of bias generally:
...[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by
reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the
question and obtaining thereon the required information... that test is
what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and
practically — and having thought the matter through — conclude.
Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision
maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide
fairly?665 [Emphasis added]
The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the obligation of impartiality is not
restricted to individual decision-makers, but also applies at an institutional level. In
Lippe c. Charest, the Court emphasized that the appearance of impartiality is important
for public confidence in the justice system, and it is important for the public to have
confidence not only in the impartiality of individual decision makers but in the system
itself.666 According to the Court, “whether or not any particular judge harboured preconceived ideas or biases” is not in and of itself determinative, and “if the system is
structured in such a way as to create a reasonable apprehension of bias on an institutional
level, the requirement of impartiality is not met.” 667
Thus, the Court in Lippe stated that the test set out in Committee for Justice
applied equally on an institutional as well as an individual level. 668 However, the Court
in Lippe set out a two-step test for cases involving allegations of bias at an institutional
level, has been subsequently followed and applied in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui
Indian Band:
Step One: Having regard for a number of factors including, but not
limited to, the potential for conflict between the interests of tribunal
members and those of the parties who appear before them, will there be
664
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a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a fully informed
person in a substantial number of cases?
Step Two: If the answer to that question is no, allegations of an
apprehension of bias cannot be brought on an institutional level, but
must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.669
In C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)670, a majority of the Court stated that
the test for institutional impartiality “is whether a well-informed person, viewing the
matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through, could form a
reasonable apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases.” 671 Although the
majority cited both Lippe and Matsqui for this proposition, it did not cite the two-step
test. However, the test set out in C.U.P.E. closely resembles the first step of the Lippe
test as well as the test set out in Committee for Justice & Liberty. In Bell Canada v.
Canadian Telephone Employees Association, the Court reiterated the test as “would a
well-informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, have a reasonable
apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases?”, and if this question is answered
in the negative, bias may only be alleged on an individual, case-by-case
basis.672 Accordingly, C.U.P.E., Lippe and Bell appear to provide a consistent doctrinal
test with respect to institutional bias.
Regarding the standard for proving institutional bias, in Committee for Justice &
Liberty, the Court endorsed a flexible application of the "reasonable apprehension of
bias" test to account various administrative contexts. The Court stated that:
The question of bias in a member of a court of justice cannot be
examined in the same light as that in a member of an administrative
tribunal entrusted by statute with an administrative discretion exercised
in the light of its experience and of that of its technical advisers. The
basic principle is of course the same, namely that natural justice be
rendered… In the case at bar, the test must take into consideration the
broad functions entrusted by law to the Board.673
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In Bell Canada, the Court stated that “[t]he requirements of procedural fairness —
which include requirements of independence and impartiality — vary for different
tribunals” and that “the procedural requirements that apply to a particular tribunal will
“depend upon the nature and the function of the particular tribunal.” 674 In Ocean Port
Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing
Branch), the Court stated that the degree of independence and impartiality required of an
administrative agency in any given circumstance is a matter of discerning Parliamentary
intent.675 Furthermore, according to Bell:
All aspects of the tribunal’s structure, as laid out in its enabling statute,
must be examined, and an attempt must be made to determine precisely
what combination of functions the legislature intended that tribunal to
serve, and what procedural protections are appropriate for a body that
has these particular functions. 676

Accordingly, Supreme Court jurisprudence appears to set a line of clear doctrine
regarding the appropriate approach to institutional bias analysis. However, as discussed
below, despite this apparent clarity, a paucity of case law and inconsistent application of
this jurisprudence have created a sphere of uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the
doctrine’s applicability.
6.2(ii) Institutional Bias and Professional Licensing
When considering administrative challenges to the legality of entry-to-practice
standards, institutional bias is possibly the most intriguing. This is due to the small but
increasing number of cases involving this issue, as well as courts’ comments and
perceptions regarding the nature and applicability of bias arguments. Courts have
increasingly drawn connections between bias, transparency and institutional design,
discarding conceptions of institutional bias as being only some form of nefarious
behaviour on the part of administrators in favour of a more pragmatic approach to the
issue.
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For example, in the above-referenced Goldwater decision, the midterm evaluation
process established by the Barreau was not mandated by the licensing ‘Rules and
Procedures’, rather, it was operated as an informal process.677 Contrary to the assertions
of the Barreau, the court found that rather than calling for a lower standard of procedural
fairness, the informal nature of the process demanded a heightened level of scrutiny“The danger of the informal review system called "rectification" is that it has no legal
existence and thus gives the appearance of a random and obscure system.” 678 On this
point, the court concluded that:
Procedural fairness requires that an organization such as the Law
Society act with the utmost transparency in order to avoid the possible
fear of institutional bias based on the absence of clear and precise rules.
To say that the rectification of an assignment is possible is, of course, to
deny its finiteness. Everything that is hidden gives rise to
apprehensions.679 (emphasis added)
In Togher, the applicant alleged that the NCA process created a reasonable
apprehension of institutional bias, given that “a significant portion of the NCA's
operating funds came from examination fees and a significant amount of the Executive
Director's compensation was derived from those fees.”680 The applicant argued that the
Executive Director had an economic interest in having students writing more exams,
thereby creating an apprehension of bias in the process for determining Canadian
equivalency for foreign trained students.
The court stated that “of all the matters raised by Ms. Togher before the Benchers
and on this judicial review, the most troubling, in my view, is the issue of reasonable
apprehension of bias.”681 The court was critical of the Benchers’ characterization of the
applicant’s argument as being ‘extreme’ and ‘way out of line’, clarifying that an
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allegation of institutional bias does not suggest ‘highly improper conduct’ or even require
evidence of actual improper conduct. 682 Rather, the court stated:
On its face, I agree with Ms. Togher that the financial structure of the
NCA raises questions. It is somewhat surprising that the Federation of
Law Societies could not devise a structure for the NCA that more
adequately separates the results of its decisions from its source of
financing.683
While somewhat sympathetic to the applicant, the court ultimately rejected the
institutional bias arguments. Although the NCA’s finances were drawn from
examination fees, the Executive Director’s compensation was directly linked to the
number of assessments performed rather than then number of examinations ordered. 684
Furthermore, as the NCA was structured to operate on a break-even basis, no direct
benefit accrued to the NCA or the Executive Director as a result of the number of exams
that needed to be written. 685 Thus, the court ruled that the examination process “does not
create an apprehension in a reasonably well-informed person that the NCA would not
decide fairly.”686
6.2(iii) The Possibility of a ‘Piercing’ Review – Does Current Canadian
Jurisprudence Allow for Grounding an Impartiality Analysis?
Cases such as Bell and Ocean Port Hotel call for the type of piercing review that a
grounded impartiality analysis demands, which requires a reviewing court to consider all
relevant contextual and statutory factors in determining legislative intent, statutory
authorization and standard of fairness. However, few cases have actually applied such
level of review and accordingly, there remains uncertainty as to how such an institutional
bias analysis should be applied.
One case which seems to apply such a piercing level of review is the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Kozak v. Canada. In Kozak, a group of Roma refugee status
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claimants had their claims denied by the Convention Refugee Determination Division (as
it then was) of the Immigration and Refugee Board. The Board had found that the
appellants had failed to prove that they had a well-founded fear of persecution in
Hungary and that state authorities would not, or could not, provide them adequate
protection.687
The claimants applied to the Federal Court for judicial review to set aside the
decisions, alleging a lack of procedural fairness in the decision-making process. The
claimants alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias and of a lack of independence in the
Board’s use of “lead cases”- the Board had developed its lead case by identifying a Roma
refugee claim with which to create a full evidentiary record for other panels could use for
making informed findings of fact. 688 The lead case would provide guidance to future
panels and would “promote consistent, informed, efficient, and expeditious decisionmaking.”689
The claimants based their allegations of bias not on a single instance of bias,
rather a factual matrix raising the specter of institutional bias. This factual matrix
included a series of emails between senior management at the Board and Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (“CIC”) discussing the increasing number of successful Roma
applications.690 Furthermore, included in the email exchanges and involved in the
planning process for lead case development was Board Member Vladimir Bubrin, , who
was also a member of the two-person panel which heard the claimants’ refugee claims. 691
Just prior to publication of the two lead cases, both of which denied the refugee
claimants, several leading Hungarian publications carried stories regarding the new
Board decisions, describing them as ‘precedent-setting’ and that they meant that
Hungarian Roma refugee claims would not be accepted in Canada. 692
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Applying the test in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National
Energy Board), the federal court concluded that the adoption of the ‘lead case’ by the
Board to promote consistent decision-making did not raise a reasonable apprehension of
bias, given that the independence of future panels was not compromised. 693 On appeal,
the Federal Court of Appeal overturned the federal court’s ruling regarding bias. Given
that Charter rights were at stake, the Court of Appeal stated that the reasonable
apprehension of bias standard should be “particularly demanding”. 694 The Court of
Appeal set out a broad definition of bias, relating both to impartiality and independence.
Based respectively on impartiality and independence, the legal notion of bias relates both
to “circumstances that give rise to a belief by a reasonable and informed observer that the
decision-maker has been influenced by some extraneous or improper consideration”, as
well as “the improper surrender of freedom as to how disputes should be decided.” 695
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeal stated that:
Contrary to the Judge’s conclusion, the appellants may establish a
reasonable apprehension of bias without proving the motivation of the
Board in orchestrating the lead cases. In my respectful view, it is
sufficient that a reasonable person could conclude from a review of the
evidence as a whole that the Board’s motive was such as to make it
more likely than not that the hearing panel was not impartial.696
(emphasis added)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal stated that the standard of impartiality in any
given circumstance depends on context and is to be measured by reference to the
Baker factors, thereby implicitly acknowledging the flexible standard approach set out in
Committee for Justice.697 In the circumstances at play in Kozak, including the fact that it
was an adjudicative procedure affecting the Charter rights of claimants, the standard fell
on the high end of the procedural fairness spectrum. 698 While the ‘reasonable person’ of
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the bias analysis should not be “unduly suspicious”, this hypothetical person’s
apprehension should be reflective of the standard of fairness owed in any given
context.699
The Court of Appeal was sympathetic to the Board’s administrative challengescontinuously increasing workload, public and political attention, decreasing resources,
maintaining consistent decision-making and the need for innovative methods to tackle
these issues.700 However, the Court stated that “procedures designed to increase quality
and consistency cannot be adopted at the expense of the duty of each panel to afford to
the claimant before it a high degree of impartiality and independence”. 701
Applying the law to the facts, the Court stated that it could not “point to a single
fact which, on its own, is sufficient to establish bias.”702 However, “despite the absence
of a ‘smoking gun’”, the Court concluded “on the basis of the entire factual matrix of this
case that a reasonable person who had considered every aspect of the matter and had
thought it through carefully, would think that the hearing panel was biased and was not
acting independently when it rejected the appellants’ claims for refugee status.” 703
Regarding the factual matrix, the Court stated that a “cloud of suspicion” was
created by a series of connected circumstances. 704 These circumstances included the fact
that Burbin participated in the hearing in addition to taking a lead role in planning an
organizing the lead cases and that the no external groups, such as the immigration Bar,
were involved in the planning process or even received any public explanation until after
the judicial review was initiated. 705 Furthermore, the series of email exchanges between
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senior management detailing the increasing number of Roma applicants, the high number
of positive Roma application and little evidence of inconsistency between cases,
combined with “the Board’s selection of both the lawyer and the specific cases to serve
as the ‘lead cases’, would also trouble the reasonable observer.”706
Reviewing the totality of the evidence, the Court concluded that:
…a person could reasonably conclude that the lead case strategy was
not only designed to bring consistency to future decisions and to
increase their accuracy, but also to reduce the number of positive
decisions that otherwise might be rendered in favour of the 15,000
Hungarian Roma claimants expected to arrive in 1998, and to reduce
the number of potential claimants. 707 (emphasis added)
The Kozak decision provides a number important take-away points. Primarily,
the Federal Court of Appeal states that for a finding of bias, it is sufficient that a
reasonable person could conclude, based on the evidence as a whole that it was more
likely than not that bias was present. Significantly, the court rejects the necessity of
proving any motivation for biased decision-making, a proposition which, as we shall in
our discussion of capture below, coincides with recent non-materialist theories of capture.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal accepted and considered a broad evidentiary record,
rejecting that a ‘smoking gun’ is necessary for a finding of bias and that a ‘cloud of
suspicion’ raised by the record as a whole can support a finding of bias.
6.2(iv) Applying a Grounded Impartiality Analysis to the Canadian Patent Agent
Regulatory Framework
Based on the details set out herein, and specifically, the summary set out under
Chapter 4.2(ii) which summarizes the history and potential biases within current patent
management’s response to the concerns of CIC about the Board’s previous positive decisions and its future handling of
a large number of Hungarian Roma claims.”
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agent regulation, the following is an application of Jacobs’ grounded impartiality
contextual factors to the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework.
Provenance of the Administrative Actor
The history of Canadian patent agent regulation as set out in detail under Chapter
3.3 demonstrates that Canadian patent agent regulation, much like historical, international
patent agent regulation, developed largely from concerns of ethical practice rather than a
specific, documented history of practitioner incompetence. However, much like patent
agent regulation in comparable jurisdictions, and similar to the general trend in Canadian
self-regulating professions, the Canadian regulatory framework has drifted towards
emphasis on competency as the predominant, if not the only, regulatory objective.
As with most administrative law matters, analyses relating to bias begin with the
context set by the legislative framework. Canadian patent agent regulation provides an
excellent example of the tension between statutory language, operational context and
potential bias. Referring to and re-iterating the statutory guidelines, Rule 13(1), which
establishes an Examining Board for preparing, administering and marking the qualifying
examination for patent agents, states that:
The members of the Examining Board shall be appointed by the
Commissioner, and the chairperson and at least three other members
shall be employees of the Patent Office and at least five members shall
be patent agents nominated by the Intellectual Property Institute of
Canada. (emphasis added)
The statute not only authorizes the participation of IPIC members, it mandates
that at least five members of the Patent Agent Examination Board are nominated by IPIC.
A cursory analysis of statutory language alone may lead to a conclusion that the statute
thereby authorizes the level of interaction and connection between CIPO and the IPIC
organization as detailed in Chapters 3.3 and 4.2(ii). However, a grounded analysis would
ask, what, within the context of this statute and operational workings of this body, does
this statute actually authorize and legitimatize?
Referring to Rule 13(1), what is the role of CIPO, the Commissioner and the
chairperson vis-à-vis the Examining Board, and in this licensing process generally? Does
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the statute authorize outsourcing practically the entirety of the examination setting,
training and development process to IPIC, along with unaccountable payments of public
funds? A similar issue was at play in Bell, namely, the scope of legitimacy in the Chair’s
discretion, pursuant to the enabling statute, to extend the terms Human Rights
Commission Tribunal Members’ Appointments during an ongoing inquiry. 708 As Jacobs
highlights, the statutory framework in Bell was ambiguous as to the precise standard of
required impartiality, and as such, reliance on statutory language alone, without a detailed
consideration of operational context, could not provide a complete picture. 709 As such,
Jacbos suggests that a grounded impartiality analysis would have been far more
appropriate in the circumstances at play in Bell.710
Turning to Canadian patent agent regulation, as a matter of legislative context,
one would expect that the profession’s full discretion and oversight over practically the
entirety of the licensing process would require explicit statutory language to give effect to
such authority. Although the above-referenced Laffin decision was decided in the context
of a substantive review of the reasonableness of the Council of the Association of
Professional Geoscientists’ exercise of discretion, the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the
scope of statutory self-regulatory authority is nonetheless pertinent to the case at hand. In
Laffin, the court recognized that self-regulation may include any number of statutory
grants of exclusive authority to a self-regulating, professional body, such as discretion
over entry-to-practice, accreditation and policing against unauthorized practice of the
708
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regulated field. Thus in Laffin, the court concluded that the Council’s actions amounted
to an exercise of educational accreditation, a power which, had the Ontario Legislature
seen fit to grant to the Council, would have done so explicitly within its enabling statute.
With respect to the Canadian patent agent licensing framework, Rule 13(2) states
that the Board, appointed by the Commissioner with the chairperson being an employee
of the Patent Office, shall be responsible for administering the qualifying examination.
Rule 12(b) indicates that candidates wishing to sit for the Patent Agent qualifying
examination must notify the Commissioner in writing of their intention to do so and
furnish evidence to the Commissioner establishing that they meet the necessary
professional experience requirements. Furthermore, Rule 14(2) and Rule 14(3) state that
the Commissioner shall designate the place of the examination and shall publish the
requisite public notifications. Rule 15 indicates that Commissioner shall, on written
request, enter onto the register of patent agents the name of any individual who has met
all requirements for qualifying as a Canadian registered patent agent. Finally, Section 16
of the Patent Act grants the Commissioner oversight authority over patent agent
misconduct.
While Rule 13(2) envisions the appointment of several members of the
profession, as nominated by IPIC, to the Patent Agent Examination Board, general
licensing best practices would expect that members of the profession would be involved
in setting a licensing examination to provide subject matter expertise. However, the
above-referenced statutory provisions, in combination with Rule 13(2), indicate a
statutory intent that it is the Commissioner who is responsible for exercising and
maintaining oversight of the qualification process. Within the context of both the
statutory scheme and professional licensing best practices generally, this language should
be taken to mean that the Commissioner, the chairperson and the Patent Office must
exercise responsibility for oversight of the patent agent qualification process.
Accordingly, Rule 13(2) should not be understood as permitting the Commissioner and
the chairperson to abdicate all oversight responsibility to the IPIC organization.
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As in Laffin, one would expect to see clear statutory authority allowing for the
level of professional self-regulation in setting exam templates, use of public funds and
psychometric validation, all without any input or knowledge from the chairperson,
Commissioner or anyone else at the Patent Office, as set out under Chapters 3.3 and
4.2(ii). Such statutory authority would no doubt include additional aspects of full selfregulatory authority aimed at ensuring appropriate transparency, accountability and
democratic processes.711 Furthermore, as discussed under Chapter 5.2(iii), political
accountability, as set out within any given statutory framework, is an important
consideration upon judicial review. The Patent Act grants the Governor in Council
authority to make Rules and Regulations, and as in Laffin, one could argue that the
current level of professional self-regulatory governance over the licensing process is an
attempt to capture greater professional power without going through the necessary
political approval process.712
Accordingly, from a statutory perspective, the legislative language and context
creates a strong perception that operatively, it is expected that CIPO and/or the
Chairperson of the Board should be exercising a far greater role in managing the
examination process and that the influence of the profession, largely through the IPIC
organization, may be inappropriate. Considering the matter from a grounded perspective,
the question becomes whether norms and practices developed through the historical
administration and operation of this regulatory framework may indicate operational
biases that may, or may not be, legitimated within this context.
Switching gears from the legislative context to the actual history and operation of
this regulatory framework, we see that the sparsely documented history demonstrates that
since as far back as the 1970s, CIPO has relied almost entirely on IPIC for direction on
licensing standards. This reliance has consistently increased over time, from

711

Supra note 311.

Section 12(1)(j) of the Patent Act states that “The Governor in Council may make rules or regulations: respecting
the entry on, the maintenance of and the removal from the register of patent agents of the names of persons and firms,
including the qualifications that must be met and the conditions that must be fulfilled by a person or firm before the
name of the person or firm is entered thereon and to maintain the name of the person or firm on the register.” Rule
13(2), which sets out the details of the Patent Agent Examining Board, was passed pursuant to the authority set out
under Section 12(1)(j) of the Act.
712

189

consultations during the 1970s, to twenty years of outsourcing of the entire examination
preparation and administration to the IPIC organization. CIPO and/or the Chairperson of
the Patent Agent Examination Board have exercised practically no oversight over any
aspect of patent agent licensing, and in the most recent 2016 High-Level Analysis, the
Chairperson of the Board (along with others at CIPO) exclusively sought IPIC’s feedback
and comments regarding agent candidate feedback pertaining to reform.
What does this history and customary practice tells us about the norms of this
professional regulatory framework? Specifically, does this proximity between the Patent
Agent Examination Board and the profession evidence a belief on the part of all relevant
parties that the current practices and norms are legitimate biases inherent within this
particular context? While it may be tempting to jump to the conclusion that so many
years of customary practice is evidence of legitimacy in the current framework’s
operation, the paucity of documented evidence cannot be disregarded. Given the lack of
empirical evidence, including qualitative evidence on the part of key participants within
this framework, one could just as soon posit that capture, bureaucratic drift and/or a
combination of both could be equally responsible for shifting the customary practices of
the regulatory framework from a position of legitimacy to one of illegitimacy.
What is important to note is that recent reviews of the current regulatory
framework have expressed concerns over the proximity between CIPO and IPIC, and the
influence of such a voluntary professional association within a professional licensing
process. The CBA and the Federation of Law Societies have both expressed concerns
about the propriety of such a voluntary professional association’s influence within a
regulatory system meant to serve the public, rather than private, interests. Furthermore,
the only documented qualitative feedback from patent agent candidates to date, the 2014
and 2016 High-Level Analyses, show an overwhelming sense of frustration on the part of
candidates, including a significant perception of bias.
Based on the foregoing, what the years of customary practice between the Patent
Agent Examination Board and the profession may demonstrate are not so much a set of
legitimate norms and practices within the particularized context of this regulatory
framework, rather, it may be an unintended drift towards greater proximity between the
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Patent Agent Examination Board and the profession caused by many years of lack of
public oversight and accountability. As discussed in detail herein, intellectual property
has not, until recently, been a Canadian economic priority, and as such, regulation of
patent agency has received little public attention. With little public attention or oversight,
a regulatory system can easily drift from its original objective and lose sight of its
purpose. As CIPO has always relied on the profession for feedback on many relevant
intellectual property matters, over time, it would only seem natural for CIPO to come to
rely on the profession for matters of agency regulation as well. Outsourcing agency
licensing to the IPIC organization may have been driven entirely by administrative
efficiency concerns- CIPO may have seen this as a more efficient way of acquiring
subject matter expertise without consideration for the possible bias it may introduce or
exacerbate. Similarly, candidates may have long ago perceived biases in the regulatory
framework but have only recently been provided the opportunity to provide their
feedback. Furthermore, a historical power imbalance between the profession and
candidates may have dissuaded candidates from openly airing any grievances they may
have had, for fear of damaging future career prospects.
Rather than demonstrating a set of contextually legitimate institutional norms and
customs, the history and customs of the Canadian patent agent regulatory framework
appear to demonstrate that what appears to be an explicit statutory intent is indeed a more
defensible theory of legitimacy and that the current customs evidence a drift, whether
intention or unintentional, towards illegitimate forms of institutional bias. While
additional empirical evidence is required to provide support for one position or the other,
the available evidence lends itself to a more persuasive interpretation that the current
customs may be unrecognized forms of capture rather than contextually legitimate norms.
Shared Understandings and Institutional Culture
Decades of hyper-proximity between the Canadian patent agent profession and
CIPO have created the current institutional culture, where CIPO views the agent
profession as its customer and relies almost entirely on the agent profession for
conceptualization of public interest in patent matters. Patent agent licensing is a glaring
example of this cultural capture. Historically, there has been little evidence of any effort
191

to validate competencies or engage in any form of robust exam setting process in line
with psychometric best practices. There is little, if any, documented consideration of
evidence of professional incompetence (or lack thereof) and the necessity for professional
licensing. Instead, CIPO has relied entirely on incumbent agents’ feedback on
appropriate standards of regulation, the basis for such feedback frequently lacking in
transparency.
Can the current patent agent licensing process be legitimated based on the
statutory framework which enables this regulatory intervention as well as institutional
culture and norms? As set out above, it is difficult to argue that the legislative framework
legitimizes what appear to be inherent biases within the current regulatory framework.
Furthermore, rather than serving to legitimize, the current institutional culture and norms
demonstrate that the current framework has lost sight of its purpose and grounding. To
paraphrase the above-referenced Khan c. Barreau (Québec) decision, any professional
licensing framework can easily drift, either intentionally or unintentionally, from its
original implementation and objectives and require judicial readjustment to give effect to
the required reorientation. The current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework may
be such a circumstance.
Local Understandings
What are the jointly held beliefs, between regulator and regulated, regarding
fairness and impartiality within the patent agent licensing framework? Here, it is
important to heed Jacobs’ warning that agency capture may disguise itself as local
understandings. Given the above discussion regarding institutional norms, and that the
current institutional culture has developed over many decades and has existed with little
public attention, one might conclude that this is evidence of a localized acceptance of the
legitimacy and fairness of the current system.
It is important to point out that in the circumstances of the current Canadian
patent agent licensing framework, the regulated are not current Canadian patent agents.
In fact, the current statutory framework grants CIPO only minimal regulatory oversight
over registered patent agents, which oversight is limited to de-registration in cases of
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gross misconduct.713 Rather, the regulated community is the public, and specifically,
those members of the public aspiring to qualify as registered patent agents.
Accepting the institutional culture that has developed between CIPO and the agent
profession as being indicative of local understandings between the regulator and
regulated would be to accept capture disguised as local understandings. The entire
regulatory framework has evolved through a one-way discussion between CIPO and the
profession, with practically no outside, objective input, let alone from would-be agents.
An accurate representation of local understandings would require interaction and
feedback from aspiring patent agents. CIPO’s 2014 and 2016 High-Level Analyses are
the only documented attempts to connect with candidates, and the results of these
analyses demonstrate a general sense of frustration on the part of aspiring patent
agents.714 Thus, the only available, documented local understandings demonstrate a
serious disconnect in perceptions of legitimacy between the regulator and regulated. The
challenge, of course, is that this interpretation is based on what little documented
evidence currently exists. The unfortunate reality is that within the patent agent licensing
context, little effort and attention has been given to qualitative feedback from all relevant
parties (apart from only the profession), and as such, it is difficult to paint a complete and
accurate picture of the state of the institutional culture.
Connections Between Administrative Agency and Litigants
As the Canadian Patent Agent Examination Board is not a quasi-judicial board,
this factor is not as relevant within this context as in agencies that carry out an
adjudicative function. However, as discussed under the ‘Discourse’ heading, the lack of
connection between the Board and prospective patent agents is a significant contributor to
the lack of meaningful interaction between the regulator and regulated.
Discourse
Patent Act, Sec. 16, which states that “for gross misconduct or any other cause that he may deem sufficient, the
Commissioner may refuse to recognize any person as a patent agent or attorney either generally or in any particular
case.” According to Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to
Information Request No. A-2017-01275 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development
Canada, 2017), there is no documented evidence that the Commissioner has ever exercised this authority.
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Of all the contextual factors, consideration of discourse, and the available
channels for meaningful dialogue between parties, may be the most relevant within the
context of Canadian patent agent regulation. As set out above, in the context of Canadian
patent agent regulation, the regulated are the public, or specifically, those members of the
public aspiring to become registered Canadian patent agents. The regulatory
intervention, in the form of licensing examination, applies to those outside of the
profession, who wish to enter the profession, rather than the profession itself.
Yet as set out in considerable detail in Chapters 3.3 and 4.2(ii), the entire history
of Canadian patent agent regulation is the story of a one-channel conversation between
the Patent Office and the profession. In many ways, this story is the narrative of
historical patent agency generally, but in the case of Canada, socioeconomic factors
unique to Canada have heightened the nature of this Patent Office/profession closedcircuit discourse.
The epitome of this discourse of hyper-proximity between the Patent Office and
the profession is illustrated by the barriers it creates to meaningful dialogue between
regulator and regulated. For example, the examination appeal process involves no
written feedback to candidates other than a brief statement on whether the appeal has
been successful or unsuccessful, thereby limiting meaningful interaction between
candidates and the Patent Agent Examination Board. The 2014 and 2016 High-Level
Analysis studies, which requested feedback from candidates, resulted in an overwhelming
response from candidates regarding perceptions of poor exam preparation material, poor
exam setting processes, procedural fairness issues and apprehensions of bias. Despite this
fact, CIPO sought only the guidance of IPIC on how to address these issues and did not
publish the results of these studies. The chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination
Board removed all references to such problematic issues, recommendations for
Examination improvement based on candidate feedback and plans to publish the results
of the analyses based solely on the recommendations of IPIC. 715
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See Appendix ‘G’.
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The current Canadian patent agent discourse is a case-study in a culture of
exclusion. Candidates are provided no meaningful opportunity to participate, in any
fashion, in the regulatory dialogue. Even when asked to participate, such as in the HighLevel Analyses or in the examination appeal process, the response they receive is akin to
a deafening silence. In the context of the numerous challenging issues surrounding the
current patent agent regulatory framework, the lack of meaningful dialogue between the
regulator and regulated is a deeply concerning factor that cannot, and should not, be
overlooked.
6.2(v) Application and Uncertainty
The previous Chapter 6.2(iv) sets out what a grounded impartiality analysis of the
current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework might look like. The question
remains- would such an analysis be possible under current Canadian administrative law
jurisprudence? Would current Canadian administrative law doctrine and evidentiary
rules permit a court to undertake such an analysis? Even if not explicitly, can current
Canadian administrative law allow for an implicit application of at least some part of the
analysis set out under Chapter 6.2(iv)?
One of the most important factors surrounding an analysis of bias is that it is a
matter of reasonable perception, and as research regarding epistemic capture, cultural
capture and bureaucratic drift teaches us, even the most well-intentioned of
administrators, without any motivation of personal gain or deceptive intentions, can
easily lose perception of bias when operating entirely within a closed culture endemic to
a specific regulatory context. Institutional bias analysis may provide the key to
combatting regulatory capture within the self-regulatory context, provided that courts are
willing to engage in the sort of piercing analysis that is necessary to uncover
operationalized implicit biases.716
From an evidentiary perspective, institutional bias is advantageous to substantive
review in that the standard of review is correctness and the scope of evidentiary record is
not subject to the same limitations as substantive review. Thus, building an evidentiary
716

Supra note 657 at 587.
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record for institutional bias can be used to demonstrate a valid ‘capture narrative’.
However, there are numerous challenges to applying a grounded impartiality analysis.
It is difficult to understand how analyzing whether a statute expressly authorizes
conduct that may potentially give rise to an apprehension of bias can be done without
engaging in some form of statutory analysis. Bell seems to explicitly require this level of
statutory analysis. However, here again the cases seem to point in various directions. In
a partially dissenting opinion in C.U.P.E., Bastarche J. rejects that statutory interpretation
is appropriate in an institutional bias analysis if the issue is framed as a question of
statutory discretion granted to a specific individual, which would be a matter of
substantive review.717 The issue in C.U.P.E. revolved around the Minister’s exercise of
discretion in forming ad hoc tribunals, an authority expressly granted pursuant to statute.
The Kozak decision, without citing C.U.P.E., distinguishes the issue of statutory
discretion from bias, and having decided the matter based on bias, the Federal Court of
Appeal did not address the issue of statutory discretion. 718 It would appear that C.U.P.E.
should be limited to circumstances properly characterized as a reasonableness exercise of
discretion, and neither Kozak or C.U.P.E. should be read as blanket prohibition against a
probing statutory analysis in light of the Court’s direction in Bell.
This issue of discretion and standard of review has also arisen in the context of
the discretionary choice of procedures set by an administrative body. Although
procedural fairness matters are reviewed on a standard of correctness, a line of
jurisprudence has established a principle that reviewing courts should respect the choice
of procedures established by an administrative body. 719 The court in Engfield did not
seem to place much effort into reviewing the Patent Agent Examination Board’s choice
of procedures other than to say that the Board is required to honour them. 720 In Maritime
Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, the Federal Court of Appeal
reviewed procedural matters of the Canada Industrial Relations Board on a standard of
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Supra note 665 at paras 44-5.

718

Supra note 682 at para 48.
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Maritime Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59 at para 55.
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Supra note 439 at para 14.
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reasonableness.721 However, it is important to note that Maritime Broadcasting System
Limited was contextually specific, involving a review of the Board’s reconsideration
hearing decision in which procedural matters were raised, rather than a direct review of a
procedural matter.722 The Federal Court of Appeal in Maritime Broadcasting System
Limited v. Canadian Media Guild was clear that the standard in the case at hand was
context specific723, and to date, there does not appear to be a case involving institutional
bias wherein a deferential, reasonableness standard has applied. As such, it would appear
that a deferential standard of review should not apply to issues of institutional bias, as a
matter of jurisprudence or principle. 724
With respect to evidence, both C.U.P.E. and Kozak allow for a broad and
comprehensive evidentiary record. The Federal Court of Appeal in Kozak took a holistic
view of the issue, framing it broadly as a question of whether “the circumstances
surrounding the origin, planning and execution of the lead cases gave rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias”. 725 (emphasis added) Furthermore, Bastarche J. states in C.U.P.E.
that “attacks on the independence or impartiality of a board are most convincingly made
with evidence of how that board operates in practice”, which should allow for
introduction of a broad scope of evidence regarding administrative agency practice. 726
The Court of Appeal in Kozak permitted and considered an expansive evidentiary record,
which included preparatory material, email communications and other documentary
evidence acquired through access to information requests.
721

Supra note 708 at para 48.

Ibid at para 64: “Maritime Broadcasting does not point to any particular misunderstanding of the Board as to the
relevant legal concepts. Rather, it invites us to stand in the shoes of the Board and apply the principles in this case. As I
have said, this is inapt.”
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Ibid: “The Board’s task in this case was to apply those standards in a discretionary way to the factually complex
matrix before it, a task informed by its appreciation of the dynamics of the case before it and its knowledge of how its
procedures should and must work, all in discharge of its responsibility to administer labour relations matters fairly,
justly and in an orderly and timely way. It did so under the umbrella of legislation empowering the Board to consider
its own procedures based on its appreciation of the particular circumstances of cases and to vary or depart from those
procedures when it considers it appropriate.”
723

For an excellent discussion, see supra note 654: “Edging towards reasonableness review in situations of institutional
bias could prove harmful to the development of good public administration. Transparency as a value needs to be
ascertained within the administrative state, including through judicial review. Collectively, we should work towards
this goal. Without more, a deferential approach could be detrimental to ensuring administrative justice.”
724
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Supra note 665 at para 44- this was addressed in dissent, but Bastarche J. states this proposition in agreement with
the majority.
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There are, however, several key features distinguishing Kozak from the
circumstances surrounding Canadian patent agent regulation. The Court of Appeal
placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the Charter issues at stake created a very
demanding standard on the respondent IRB. Furthermore, Kozak was decided in a quasijudicial, IRB hearing context. Both factors have historically been viewed as demanding
very high levels of procedural justice. Lastly, while Kozak briefly considered questions
of whether the biased conduct was authorized by statute, the issue of operationalized bias
versus expressed statutory bias was not considered.
It is also hard to reconcile the test set out in Kozak with both the C.U.PE. and
Matsqui decisions. Neither C.U.PE. nor Matsqui were cited in Kozak. Furthermore, it is
difficult to reconcile C.U.PE. and Matsqui; does the test set out in C.U.PE. require first
finding a ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’, according to the test set out in Matsqui?
Apart from any confusion regarding conflict with previous jurisprudence, the effect of the
Kozak decision itself remains uncertain. While Kozak has been cited in numerous
decisions, few cases have applied the same level of piercing analysis with respect to
institutional bias analysis. In Local 1518 v. BC Labour Relations Board & Wal-Mart
Canada727, J. Brine, citing Kozak, stated that “the facts of the case before me must be
considered globally rather than parsed individually” with respect to allegations of
apprehension of bias.728 However, the case pertained to allegation of bias with respect to
a single quasi-judicial adjudicator and it is not evident that any other aspect of Kozak was
applied.
Applying the foregoing to the circumstances surrounding Canadian patent agent
regulation, what would, or could, an institutional bias argument look like? Applying a
Kozak-type analysis, the question is could a reasonable person conclude from the
evidence as a whole that it was more likely than not that the Patent Agent Examination
Board has not been impartial in the development, administration and execution of the
patent agent examination?
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One could argue that the high standard of fairness, and corresponding depth of
review in Kozak was influenced by the Charter implications involved, and as such, an
equally high standard would not be warranted in the circumstances of patent agent
regulation. In response to these distinguishing points, there are reasons to believe that a
Kozak-level of comprehensive analysis can and should apply. As Canadian patent agent
regulatory matters fall under federal jurisdiction, the Kozak decision, handed down by the
Federal Court of Appeal, is highly relevant, binding precedent. Also, although patent
agent regulation does not implicate Charter issues in that there is no recognized Charter
right to practice a profession, as discussed under Chapter 5.3(iii), from a contextual
perspective, courts have held that the right to practice a profession justifiably warrants a
high degree of procedural fairness and have been sensitive to matters touching on
potential bias within the licensing process. As such, it is reasonable to expect that the
same level of scrutiny demonstrated in Kozak would also apply in matters involving
professional licensing.
The summary of relevant facts set out under Section 4.2(ii) must be viewed
alongside the relevant statutory language and context. It is important to again emphasize
the context, which helps to inform a grounded approach to impartiality. Here, there is no
single ‘smoking gun’. There is no clear indication that any individual has placed
themselves in a position of personal bias, in the narrow sense, wherein an individual has
allowed a personal conflict to improperly influence their individual consideration. There
is no evidence of ill-will or improper intent.
Yet many years of customary practice have created a culture between CIPO and
the profession wherein all relevant parties, despite acting based on what appears to be
good intentions, have had their perceptions of bias clouded by an inherent institutional
culture. Decades of proximity between CIPO and the profession has created a
comfortable atmosphere whereby information is communicated back-and-forth and
extreme insularity has bounded their respective rational views of the matter. The
profession’s effective self-governance, along with this level of comfort with CIPO and
lack of oversight, have allowed competency-based standards to drift towards a position
where objective validation is seriously in question. There is no evidence of intentional
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impropriety, and to the contrary, those involved believe that the current system is normal
and justified.
Despite the lack of any overt impropriety, the facts cannot be ignored. Public
money is transferred to a private, professional association with no oversight or
accountability regarding use of funds. Regardless of how one may interpret the statutory
responsibility of the Chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination Board regarding
oversight of Examination Board activities, the available evidence demonstrates that the
Chairperson has abdicated practically all responsibility for oversight to IPIC. The statute
states that the Board is appointed by the Commissioner of Patents and the Chairperson
must be a CIPO employee, implying a statutory intent that CIPO must exert some level of
oversight and management over professional governance. As stated in Kozak, bias is not
only a matter of improper influence, but also the improper surrender of freedom on how
certain matters should be decided. In light of the foregoing, it appears that CIPO has
improperly surrendered its oversight responsibility.
There is a strong argument that the administration of the patent agent examination
demonstrates a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias. While the statute envisions
participation of IPIC members on the Examination Board, it would be difficult to argue
that the statute also authorizes the current level of engagement between the IPIC
organization and CIPO. The lack of transparency and accountability, specifically in
relation to particularly sensitive examination issues, combined with poor examination
validation and dismal examination pass rates creates a strong perception of the possibility
of bias. Although Kozak does not require actual proof of apprehension of bias, the
evidence of actual apprehension of bias on the part of examinees and other organizations
would undoubtedly be viewed as persuasive.
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CHAPTER 7
FINAL CONCLUSIONS – (IL)LEGITIMACY, LEGALITY AND CANADIAN
PATENT AGENT REGULATION
The question this thesis set out to answer was whether current Canadian
administrative law principles provide an adequate mechanism to challenge professional
capture in the form of competency-based, entry-to-practice licensing standards. The
case-study of Canadian patent agent licensing was used to demonstrate if and how
administrative could possible provide a filter against competency-based, entry-to-practice
capture. In the context of Canadian patent agent regulation, the capture and competency
touch on a much deeper issue- as competency seals a barrier around a dominant patent
discourse, challenging this discourse in the hopes of reforming patent practice generally
may require challenging competency.
From the perspective of substantive review, Canadian administrative law may not
be an effective mechanism for challenging competency-based, entry-to-practice capture.
Most statutory grants of authority to regulate ‘competency’ in the ‘public interest’ grant
self-regulatory bodies tremendous discretion in setting licensing standards. The relative
subject matter expertise between courts and professional self-regulatory bodies weighs
heavily in favour of courts deferring to self-regulatory bodies’ discretion in substantive
matters of standard setting and examination. Furthermore, recent decisions such as
Green, Sobeys West, and Alberta College have both set a standard from tremendous
deference to self-regulatory bodies in passing by-laws while also limiting the evidentiary
record in challenges to discretionary by-law decision to matters that were before the
decision-maker when passing the by-law. Combined, this severely restricts the
applicants’ ability to construct an evidentiary capture narrative.
Although substantive review has been moving towards greater deference for selfregulatory discretion and limiting the scope of the evidentiary record, procedural fairness
has moved towards offering far greater protection through exercising heightened levels of
review. A body of recent jurisprudence demonstrates judicial recognition that
individuals’ right to practice their chosen profession is entitled to a very high level of
procedural fairness. Thus, with respect to professional examination matters, courts have
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demonstrated a willingness to review, in tremendous detail, all aspects of exam setting,
administration and provision of reasons to ensure that the requisite level of fairness is
being met. Furthermore, although there does not yet appear to be a decision within the
professional licensing context wherein a court has invalidated a professional licensing
decision on account of bias, courts have expressed concerns that transparency and
impartiality are essential within a professional licensing framework.
However, while procedural fairness issues surrounding adequacy of notice and
provision of reasons can be successfully used to challenge invalid professional licensing
examinations, this brings us back full circle to the question of capture. The central
question of this thesis was what role administrative law can play in challenging capture.
While any legal challenges may raise political awareness of potential capture, thereby
provoking positive change, this would be an indirect effect on capture rather than a direct
administrative law challenge to capture.
As set out under Chapter 6.1, theories of regulatory capture are best translated
into administrative law through the doctrine of institutional bias. Challenges based on
institutional bias cut directly to issues of capture. Primarily, institutional bias, reviewed
on a standard of correctness, is less deferential than substantive review and the
evidentiary record far less constrained. Thus, in theory, institutional bias can provide a
judicial mechanism for safeguarding against capture and the evidentiary rules could allow
for the creation of a capture narrative.
However, as discussed under Chapter 6.2, the current state of Canadian
institutional bias jurisprudence is far from settled, with a lack of clear consistency in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. From a conceptual perspective, one of the challenges
currently manifest in Canadian jurisprudence is the effect of statutory language in
assessing what forms of bias or authorized. This has tremendous relevance to the
question this thesis … biases manifest themselves at an operational level, and one of
main unsettled questions in the Canadian doctrine of institutional bias is how far courts
may go in analyzing operational context, as opposed to strictly statutory language, in
assessing whether institutional bias exists.
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This thesis discusses Jacobs’ contextual factors for grounding an analysis of
institutional bias. To briefly summarize, Jacobs’ suggests several contextual factors,
including: the provenance of the administrative actor; the shared understandings and
institutional culture (including institutional practices) within which the administrative
body is embedded; local understandings jointly held by the administrative actor and
regulated community; any connections between the administrative body and those
appearing before it that have been jurisprudentially flagged as potential impartiality
concerns; and the administrative discourse. Grounding an analysis of institutional bias
using Jacobs’ suggested factors places the question of what is a ‘reasonable’
apprehension of bias within the specific context of a regulatory framework, analyzing the
operation of a regulatory agency as opposed to simply looking to statutory language.
According to Jacobs, a grounded analysis may determine that certain regulatory customs
or norms, which viewed acontenxtually and objectively, may seem biased but are
accepted as legitimate within a given regulatory framework. Similarly, a grounded
analysis may uncover operative biases, which, viewed strictly from the perspective of
statutory language, may remain hidden.
Applying Jacobs’ factors under Chapter 6.2(iv), this piece argues that a strong
argument can be made that the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework
demonstrates institutional bias. Although the lack of empirical evidence is certainly
challenging, the existing evidence lends itself to a strong interpretation that the historical
over-proximity between CIPO and the patent agent profession, rather than evidencing
customs and norms that are legitimate within this specific regulatory framework,
demonstrate signs of impartiality within the regulatory process. The Patent Agent
Examination Board has abdicated practically all responsibility for the licensing process to
the IPIC organization, and private, voluntary association that represents the interests of
agents. The few examples of qualitative feedback from both patent agent candidates and
outside organizations express a sense of deep dissatisfaction with the current licensing
process, including perceptions of bias within the regulatory framework.
Despite the foregoing, Chapter 6.2(v) asks whether Jacobs’ factors, whether in
whole or in part, either explicitly or implicitly, can be applied under the current state of
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Canadian administrative law. Here again, the uncertainty manifests itself. Cases such as
the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Kozak seem to allow for a probing analysis into
the operative aspects of a regulatory agency. Kozak explicitly states that in some
instances, bias does not involve a search for a ‘smoking gun’, rather, the evidence must
be considered holistically. Furthermore, Kozak allowed for an expansive evidentiary
record, including evidence acquired through access to information requests. However,
few courts have followed and applied Kozak’s analysis, and the fact that it was decided in
an adjudicatory context involving Charter issues leaves open the question of whether
such a probing analysis would be implemented in a judicial review of a professional
licensing decision. A strong argument could be made that the judicial trend in recent
years to view professional licensing as attracting very high levels of procedural fairness
bolsters the argument that a Kozak-type analysis would be warranted in judicial review of
professional licensing decisions.
The legal analysis set out under Chapter 6.2 brings us back to the underlying
theme throughout this thesis, regarding the deeper fundamental issues at play in patent
agent governance and what this tells us about our patent system generally. Specifically,
this brings us back to the question of public interest, and beyond the narrow question of
patent agent regulation, who is responsible for protecting the public interest with respect
to governance of the patent system generally? Is CIPO the defender of the public
interest? If so, how does it view its role as protector and promoter of the public interest?
Patent offices were established to play a public interest role in the patent system.
Historically, patent offices have viewed this responsibility narrowly- patent examiners
examine patent applications in accordance with substantive law and publish patent
applications to disseminate invention information. As the technological landscape has
begun to change, disrupting our long-held notions of what innovation means, how
knowledge is disseminated and how professional services are delivered, patent offices are
left in a position of trying to figure out how they must evolve along with society.
As seen herein, CIPO now engages in new forms of service delivery, services
which less than a decade ago would have been completely foreign to patent offices. In
the U.S. context, the USPTO now undertakes a significant patent hearing process which
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has divided the perception of not only the proper role of the patent office within the
patent system, but also the very nature of patent rights within our society. 729
What this demonstrates is that CIPO, much like patent offices around the world, is
now struggling with an identity crisis brought on by changing social, economic and
technological trends. As with the discussion of self-governance and public interest under
the Chapter 2.2, our notions of public interest and the patent system are likely changing
along with these trends, and as well as struggle to define what the public interest is, or
should be, in relation to the patent system, CIPO struggles to define itself vis-à-vis what
it believes is the public interest.
Similarly, the future of the patent agent profession is threatened by technological
disruption, a challenge facing all professions going forward. In the case of patent agency,
the technological advances and the unbundling of professional patent agent services
threatens to bring to the forefront the shaky foundation upon which patent agent
regulation rests. Patent agent regulation demonstrates a deeply entrenched form of
epistemic and cultural capture between CIPO and the Canadian patent agent profession.
To put it simply, CIPO has adopted the profession’s conception of public interest and
competency as its own.
While it is easy to view this discussion as a simple analysis of a poorly
administered licensing examination, this would be missing the forest for the trees. As
discussed herein, patent agency competency in many ways represents the lynchpin of a
patent discourse, of the foundation of an ideology upon which much of the patent system
rests and ironically, an ideology which we have come to believe is set stone. Patent
offices and patent agents historically have mutually reinforced one another, and the
historical hyper-proximity between the two has substantially contributed to the perception
of permanence in our patent institutions. But the reality is that this discourse was
authored by interest groups with a deep interest in influencing its development.
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At the time of writing this thesis, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Oil States Energy Services,
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC (584 U.S. ___ (2018)). The issue in Oil States was the narrow question of legality
of certain patent office hearings pertaining to patent validity. However, in its decision, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the granting of a patent is a public right, and specifically, a public franchise. While the implications of
this ruling are yet to develop, this has opened a debate as to whether patents can even be considered ‘property’ rights
and whether the entire patent system should be properly viewed entirely as an administrative framework.
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Challenging the notion of competency in many ways challenges the foundation of this
discourse.
The regulation of Canadian patent agents teaches us far more about our patent
system than would appear at first glance. It demonstrates that our patent discourse has in
many ways been authored by those exclusively entitled to participate in the dialogue.
The fact that those within this this discourse have not appreciated this reality is not a
matter of intentional impropriety, rather, it demonstrates how deeply entrenched this
discourse has become. As social, economic and technological factors are beginning to
disrupt this discourse, it is inevitable that both CIPO and the profession must eventually
confront this reality.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX ‘A’ – 2014 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL
ANALYSIS (EXAM VALIDATION COMMENTS)
The following is a collection of comments from 2014 Canadian Patent Agent
Examinees regarding the exam. The sample comments set out below are several example
responses taken from the set of provided feedback:
The Exam should be shortened, or time to write lengthened. There is no
value to adding time-pressure into the Exam. Time pressure merely
results in answers that are less well thought out. Answers year-to-year
are inconsistent (e.g. what is expected in the Background section of
Paper A varies from strict descriptions of the prior art, to discussions
of the failings of those prior art over the present invention).The
material to memorize should be provided, like it is in the Bar exam.
There are a plethora of cases, and it is impossible to determine which
of these cases is considered relevant to the Examining board, or what
meaning the Examining board derives from these cases.

Historically, the short answer questions tend to focus too heavily on
'trick' questions and even where the question is straightforward, the
model answers tend to assign marks for responding to issues that were
not raised in the original question (and ignoring other issues that
would be at least as relevant). Many of the long answer questions are
designed to elicit a single 'correct' answer but inevitably leave areas
open for multiple interpretations. This causes problems when the exam
is marked against a rigid and detailed marking guide. Excessive length
has also been a problem, particularly where the question book exceeds
50 pages (often due to prior art documents containing extraneous
information). This leaves little time for answering the questions within
the 4 hour time slot, particularly since 'skimming' the art is not a viable
strategy in view of how these exams are now structured. The weighting
of marks on the exam also adds to the difficulty, as the mark
distribution in both the long and short answer sections often doesn't
reflect the level of effort required to answer the question.

You require processes to ensure exam consistency between years. The
exams seems to change entirely when a new examination board is
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selected. Perhaps only 1 person should change on the board every year
rather than the entire board. I practiced using the last 4 years of exams
but this year, the exam seemed totally different.

Preparation material for writing the exams is lacking. The only
preparation material that I have found useful is the 2010 to 2013
marking guides. The IPIC Tutorials and Clinics are disappointingly not
in tune with the actual exams, most Patent Agents that prepare those
sessions have not studied the latest marking guides and rely on their
personal experiences back when they were preparing for the exams.

There were multiple errors on the admission letter received from
CIPO.We are close to last in G8 and G20 for innovation and we
seriously lack patent professionals in Canada. Why having pass rate of
7% or 10%? Why Canada is so different than the rest of the world?
Suggestions: The Exam Papers should be shorter and predictable. I do
not suggest that the Examination should be easy. Anyone should be able
to sit for the exam more than once a year. There should be mock up
Exam Papers provided every year as provided in Europe. All we have
are past Exam Papers for which the format has changed over the years.

Provide ability to type exam on computer. Answers provided for
previous exams are not consistent. Took IPIC training course (2010),
but advice on how to write exam did not align with marking scheme.
Accordingly more coordination between IPIC instructors and grading
committee would be beneficial. Grading of paper A seems too
subjective - only seem to get marks if claims exactly match the model
claim despite providing an equally broad/Effective claim. Maybe
provide more flexibility with awarding marks for paper A. Bottom line exams (paper B & D in particular) now feels like a test of writing speed
and time management, rather than professional skill.

The exam format and mark allocation appears to change year to year
making it difficult to determine what sort of answer will be awarded the
optimum number of marks. This year's Paper D is a good example
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wherein the format and mark allocation was quite different from the
previous couple of years. Candidates are left to determine at the time of
writing the exam what amount of time and analysis is required to obtain
the marks allocated for a particular question/analysis. An attempt to
clarify the type of answer expected was made on Paper D - but the
directions were still somewhat vague. This makes the exam results
arbitrary. Perhaps the best evidence of this is in the IPIC training
courses which frequently advocate candidates to adopt a particular
approach which may have worked a couple of years ago, but which
would now result in suboptimal performance.

This is my third year taking the exams. I passed paper C my first year.
During my second year, even though I was 7 marks (out of 240) short of
passing all papers combined, I did not receive enough marks on any
one paper to keep any of my scores. I appealed, and the result was that
my marks were LOWERED. I understood that this was a risk of
appealing, but, in my case, I truly did not understand the motivation.
The lowering of my mark had absolutely no effect on my standing (I still
had to take all three exams again BEFORE the appeal). Also, without
receiving any kind of feedback from the appeals process, I was not able
to learn from my mistakes. I wasn't even informed which question
resulted in the reduced mark (how is this helpful?). Instead, the result
of my appeal was that it effectively discouraged me for continuing in
this field. Without any transparency in the appeals process (and without
more transparency in the exam marking process), I'm beginning to
wonder if there is any way for me to improve my chances of passing
(other than just hoping for "better luck" next year). I have taken almost
all of the courses offered, and have consistently received positive
feedback from the instructors. So, I'm really not sure what else I can do.

While I understand that general knowledge of varying fields is an asset
to IP practitioners, the subject-matter at issue in Papers B and C of this
year was very different from the subject-matter of previous years, and
especially in the case of Paper C, somewhat esoteric…. if the subjectmatter for the exams is decided sufficiently ahead of time, people sitting
for the exams be informed prior to the exam of the subject-matter to
which the exam will relate, allowing them to do some preparatory
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reading, so that the subject-matter be at least somewhat more familiar
when the time comes to sit for the examination.

The marks allocated per question are not consistent from year to year.
Also, the marking guides are inconsistent in terms of acceptable
answers from year to year.

To whom it may concern, Thank you for offering this opportunity to
submit feedback. As an electrical engineer and patent attorney, these
are by far the most unfairly difficult examinations I have ever written in
my life. I appreciate the effort that you have taken to try and improve
the marking guides; however, they are still very unhelpful. Not only are
mistakes routinely made in the marking guides (in terms of page
numbers, incorrect figure references, etc) but more egregious ones such
as a complete failure to explain the reasoning behind the answer are
discouraging, to say the least. Even the examinations contain blatant
errors (this year, there was a clear mistake in the date format on Paper
B). Nowhere in the world are such draconian examinations
administered, and rightfully so. A brief review of CIPO's 2012 Report
serves as a very sad indicator of the utter difficulty of passing, and one
will clearly notice that in instances of 4% pass rates where the highest
mark is 66.5/100 (Paper D), there is obviously a clear problem with
both the administration and content of the exams. Also, when the
average mark in ALL exams is below a pass rate (as was the case in
2012 and surely again in 2013 if not every single year), it is a strong
indicator that something is wrong. Bearing this in mind, CIPO needs to
find a way to assist candidates to understand the answers in the answer
guide. The goal of the examinations should be to test candidates on
their knowledge and application of the relevant law and principles.
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APPENDIX ‘B’ - 2016 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL
ANALYSIS (EXAM VALIDATION COMMENTS)
The following is a collection of comments from 2016 Canadian Patent Agent
Examinees regarding the exam. The sample comments set out below are several example
responses taken from the set of provided feedback:
“Paper D was a bloodbath. The pass rate is horrendous during the
years that this "marking style" of Paper D has been instituted.”
“More consistent marking from year to year. Sample marking guide
answers from one year are not helpful for following years.”

“don't even know where to start; but for somebody involved so many
times in litigation and licensing discussions, this exam is a joke and
lacks fairness. actually the only thing you seem to evaluate is the
understanding of the invention and use of keywords in the analysis, I do
not believe the reasoning is considered at all. for anybody involved in
litigation, he would understand that different lines of arguments can be
taken and rightly so as long as we can sustain the
validity/invalidity/infringement from that point of view. now for the
exam board to limit the analysis to few points or keywords shows a lack
of understanding of real life patent trials or licensing.”

“The answers given to the previous years' examination are arbitrary,
no clear standards, especially in Part B and Part D. There is no way to
know how to write a right answer. One particular case is the claim
construction, how does the meaning 'purposive' apply? no criterion can
be found.”

“Paper D was very different than previous years. The difficulty of the
exams is acceptable. However, changing the format and style of the
exams in a drastic way feels unfair.”
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“I can't believe my experience so far with the exams. I don't what you
are trying to test as it is not clear. It is almost like you are purposely
trying to have people fail.”

“Paper D should be less lengthy and complicated… The guide keeps
changing constantly. For claim construction, the guide required the
candidate to identify the following: mapping, purpose, inventor's intent
from claim language and specification, material effect.”

“Marking guides for one year give little to no guidance as to what is
expected in subsequent years, which makes the correct answers seem
like moving targets.”
“Paper D was very unfair this year and has been unfair for the last 2
years as well. Significant changes need to be made to Paper D so that
candidates that have studied and have experience can actually pass
Paper D. Claim construction on Paper D is significantly different than
on Paper B, yet there should only be one construction according to
Free World Trust (SCC). The "essential feature" analysis in the claim
construction question in Paper D should be removed from the exam.”

“The training material and courses provided do not really provide a
clear guidance how to tackle the exam... The quality of the exam's
guides of last years is very different and sometimes not at all helpful.”

“No clear guide as to what material should be studied, or how response
should be structured. Marking guides from recent years indicate a
model answer structure that fluctuates significantly in form and scope.”
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APPENDIX ‘C’ – CIPO/IPIC COMMENTS REGARDING PATENT AGENT
EXAMINATION PSYCHOMETRIC VALIDATION
Each year CIPO releases annual statistics and data regarding the Patent Agent
Qualifying Examination, including candidate numbers and pass rates. Until 2014,
CIPO’s annual report stated that “the Examining Board participates in a coaching session
provided by a consultant versed in best practices for the setting of professional
accreditation exams”(emphasis added). A request to CIPO for information and details
surrounding the work of this consultant and the nature of these sessions prompted a
response that further details would be provided in the upcoming 2015 annual report.
When released, the 2015 Annual Report had been changed from previous years’ reports
to state the following:
Prior to preparing the examination, the Examining Board meets with
the IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee to discuss
best practices for the setting of professional accreditation exams. The
IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee reviews the
development and administration of the qualifying examination for
patent agents in order to assist the Examining Board in maintaining
recognized standards for certification, including the security,
practicality, fairness, scoring, reporting, technical analysis and
documentation of the exam. The Committee is assisted by an expert in
measurement and evaluation of competence, Dr. Gary Cole, who
coaches members of the Examining Board in setting and marking
examination papers that meet recognized standards in measurement of
competencies. (emphasis added)
This revised statement creates considerable confusion as to whether it is the
Examining Board, the statutorily mandated body responsible for development and
administration of the patent agent exam, or the IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards
Committee, that is ‘assisted’ by Dr. Gary Cole. This statement is unclear as to the
respective roles of each of the Examining Board and the IPIC Standards Committee in
Exam development.
Furthermore, CIPO again changed information regarding Dr. Cole’s involvement
in its 2016 Annual Report, which reads:
Prior to the preparation of the examination, a Joint Meeting was held
in November 2015 between the Examining Board and the IPIC Patent
Agent Examination Standards Committee (“Committee”) to discuss the
administration of the 2015 Exam and discuss best practices for the
administration of the 2016 Exam. The Committee reviews the
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development and administration of the Patent Agent Examination in
order to assist the Examining Board in maintaining recognized
standards for certification, including the security, practicality, fairness,
scoring, reporting, technical analysis and documentation of the Exam.
The Committee is assisted by an expert in measurement and evaluation
of competence, Dr. Gary Cole. As in previous years, the Committee
invited Dr. Cole to share his expertise in setting and marking
examination papers at the Joint Meeting. (emphasis added)
This only exacerbates the confusion regarding the respective role of the
Examining Board and the IPIC Standards Committee in development and administration
of the Patent Agent Exam.
A further Access to Information request sought clarification regarding the role of
Dr. Gary Cole. The response stated that “Dr. Cole is retained directly by IPIC, and as
such, CIPO is not in a position to provide information regarding the matter.” (emphasis
added) Furthermore, CIPO advised that such inquiries should be sent directly to IPIC.
Requests for further information from IPIC resulted in being told by IPIC that the
requested information is confidential and would not be disclosed. 730 Two further Access
to Information requests were filed, the first of which stating:
I am currently conducting regarding the Canadian Intellectual
Property Office’s (CIPO) development and administration of the
Canadian Patent Agent qualifying examination, CIPO’s website states
that: Prior to preparing the examination, the Examining Board meets
with the IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee to
discuss best practices for the setting of professional accreditation
exams. The IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee
reviews the development and administration of the qualifying
In an attempt to clarify the matter and receive further information, I contacted IPIC on
October 25, 2016 and spoke with Anne-Josee Delacorde. I informed her about the previous
Access to Information requests (which I understood from her that she was already aware of)
made to CIPO for information regarding the consultant’s role in the patent agent examination
process and other IPIC material relating to development and administration of the Patent Agent
Exam. During our telephone call, I requested any available information regarding the
consultant’s role in the patent agent exam development and administration process, as well as
any other information available regarding exam development and validation, information I was
easily able to receive from patent offices in several other jurisdictions. I was told by Ms.
Delacorde that the information I was requesting was confidential and that my requests must be
directed to CIPO. To date, I have not been provided with any of this information.
730
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examination for patent agents in order to assist the Examining Board in
maintaining recognized standards for certification, including the
security, practicality, fairness, scoring, reporting, technical analysis
and documentation of the exam. The Committee is assisted by an expert
in measurement and evaluation of competence, Dr. Gary Cole, who
coaches members of the Examining Board in setting and marking
examination papers that meet recognized standards in measurement of
competencies. I would like to request all documentation, including
contracts, but excluding emails, detailing Dr. Gary Cole’s role in the
development and administration of the Canadian Patent Agent
Examination, including details regarding the coaching sessions
conducted by Dr. Gary Cole.
A second Access to Information request stated:
I am currently researching the regulation and governance of patent
agents in Canada, with a particular emphasis on the Canadian Patent
Agent Exam. In previous Access to Information requests (requests no.
A-2015-00626 and A-2016-00068), I requested information and
documents pertaining to the development of the Canadian Patent Agent
Exam. I have attached to this request copies of this information I had
received pursuant to that request. In the attached documents, reference
is made on a number of occasions to the role of the Intellectual
Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) Standards Committee and the IPIC
Exam Revision Committee in the development process for the patent
agent examination, including (but not limited to) development of
‘Templates for Exam Setting and Marking’ for the exam. I would like
to request all documents (excluding emails) pertaining to the IPIC
Standards Committee and the IPIC Exam Revision Committee in the
development process for the patent agent examination, including (but
not limited to) the involvement in the reformation of the exam taking
place in 2009 as well as copies of the ‘Templates for Exam Setting and
Marking’ for the exam. As the Canadian Intellectual Property Office
(CIPO) is statutorily responsible for the development of the patent
agent exam, through the Patent Agent Examination Board, these
documents should be considered to be under the custody and control of
CIPO and therefore acquirable if CIPO does not already have
possession.
This request received the following response:
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We regret to inform you that we were unable to locate any records
responsive to your request. Program officials with the Canadian
Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) completed a thorough search and
have confirmed that no relevant records were located. The work of Dr.
Cole is in relation to a contract between himself and the Intellectual
Property Institute of Canada (IPIC). The coaching was provided to
IPIC members. No CIPO board members received coaching from Dr.
Cole. (emphasis added).
This information apparently conflicts with the information CIPO has published in
its Annual Reports. The provided information states that no CIPO Board members have
met with Dr. Cole, while the Annual Reports set out above state that it is ‘the Examining
Board’ with the IPIC Standards Committee that meets with Dr. Cole at the “Joint
Meeting”. It appears that contrary to CIPO’s assertion, it is only IPIC committees and
IPIC Board Members, rather than the Examination Board itself, that historically has had
any ‘coaching’ with Dr. Cole, the details of which are confidential to both the public,
CIPO and the Examination Board itself despite being publicly funded by CIPO.
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APPENDIX ‘D’ – CONFIDENTIAL PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION MARKING
TEMPLATES
Below are copies of the confidential templates provided to Canadian Patent Agent
Examination markers, received as part of an Access to Information Request. As seen
below, practically the entirety of the templates have been redacted.
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APPENDIX ‘E’ - 2014 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL
ANALYSIS (PERCEPTION OF BIAS COMMENTS)
The following is a collection of comments from 2014 Canadian Patent Agent
Examinees regarding the exam, which comments highlight examinees perception of bias
in the examination development and administration process. The sample comments set
out below are several example responses taken from the set of provided feedback:
As I'm sure you know, in 2012, exactly one candidate out of 231 writing
the exam passed on his or her first attempt. Ten years ago, nearly 10%
of candidates passed on their first attempt. Over the same period, the
overall pass rate dropped from 32% to 7%. These numbers are in
keeping with overall trends in the administration of this examination.
The number of new members admitted to the patent bar in recent years
is a small fraction of what it was before the format and marking
practices for the exam were drastically changed in 2009. This shift took
place without any notable change in the number of candidates writing
the exam. There is also nothing to suggest that there has been any
change in the composition of the candidate pool: most candidates have
worked in the field for three or more years and have advanced
technical degrees as well as law degrees. Allowing current patent
agents -- who have a financial interest in restricting the number of new
entrants -- to determine the rate of new admissions to the profession is
a clear conflict of interest, and in most fields it would be considered an
illegal restraint of trade. Any government body enabling this kind of
anti-competitive behaviour would generally be regarded as fully
captured by the industry it is charged with regulating. Industry Canada
and CIPO should seriously consider the damage they are doing to their
reputations by allowing this kind of anti-competitive "self-regulation"
of patent agents to continue unchecked. The examinations should be
designed and marked by patent agents or examiners who do not have a
conflict of interest, and pass rates should be normalized year-by-year to
prevent prejudice to candidates stemming from deficiencies in the
design of the examination questions or the marking guidelines.

The appeals process is not fair and useless. Many successful patent
lawyers do not pass the exams, many write many times. Many patent
lawyers rely on passing the exams for their livelihood - many years of
writing can push people out of patent agency. The average pass times
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(4 years) is too long. The overall pass rates seem biased against
candidates and suspiciously anti-competitive.

this exam is a joke. which criteria are used to mark? it always state
there is no right answer but at the same time you consider specific
keywords in your marking guidelines to give points. anybody that has
been involved in patent and particularly litigation knows that so many
things can be used to show difference that are not spotted by the other
side. this exam need reform badly what is the passing rate? are all
candidates that clueless about patent? 4 hours to go over 1 patent and
3-4 references for validity analysis and handwrite the analysis? what
efforts are being made to read candidates writing ? so many things to
talk about this exam...bottom line it is a joke and a walled-garden that
somebody is doing everything to guard or limit the access.

Given what I have seen of CIPO and IPIC and the complete lack of any
true desire to change this process in a positive way, I don't expect that
proper changes will be made ... however, I always remain hopeful

The exams do not reflect patent agent practice in real life. Paper B of
2014 was in the format of a scientific paper submitted as a patent
application. It was designed to confuse and disorient the candidates. I
accept that this situation occurs in real life but in real life, I am not
limited to 4 hours to provide the validity opinion. I have not met any
patent agent who provides an opinion in less than a day let alone, 4
hours. I do not see how paper B of 2014 can reasonably be justified as
an evaluation of a candidate's ability to solve problems and provide
validity opinions. Paper D of 2014 was designed to bogged a candidate
down by requiring the candidate to understand meticulous details of the
invention and requiring the candidate to answer ridiculous number of
questions that clearly no patent agent can possibly answer within 4
hours. I accept that the patent agent field is complex and require
special skills but I failed to see how paper B and paper D of 2014
evaluate the necessary skills to be a patent agent. These papers were
testing patience more than ability to solve problems. I believe that
future exams should be first tested on a random number of patent
agents that are NOT members of the examination board. The
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candidates' marks should be adjusted according to the performance of
the test group.

Correctors must work honestly toward the candidates to obtain
recognition. Correctors must not be rewarded with a free lunch paid by
tax payer money. I should file a complaint with the Auditor general of
Canada and with I. C. Minister. You would stop this practice right now
and apologize for it .

I feel that the exams are written so as to keep people out of the
profession.

It would be good for IPIC to provide receipt of the exam.

Finally, something I would also like to understand is why the pass rate
over the past ten years has gotten progressively worse. According to the
information available online, as of 2012, it takes most candidates
FOUR years to pass all of the exams. However, a few years ago, it took
most candidates only TWO years. Does the administration truly believe
that the quality of the candidates is decreasing? Or is this an attempt to
reduce the number of patent agents in Canada? I really do enjoy
working as a patent agent, and I very much hope that I am able to pass
the exams so that I can continue working in this field. However, I feel
that the current administration of the patent agent exams has some
significant flaws that are preventing (and discouraging) high quality
candidates from entering this field.

it appears, from my perspective, that the short answer questions for
Paper D were unnecessarily, and perhaps unreasonably difficult as to
provide support for the notion that the patent-agent exams are designed
to prevent entrance to the profession by all but a few lucky contestants
each year. Regardless of the true intent of these question, the
appearance is easily colourable as being suspect. This reflects poorly
on the profession as a whole.
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Unfortunately, we are not prepared at all for these exams because they
do not reflect the practice of a patent agent. Moreover, there is no book
that can be used to write and SUCCEED exams. The exams are way too
long and it's a shot of if they are successful and it does not reflect our
patenting skills. It is a great frustration for many of us and many of us
leave the profession by discouragement in view of the many failures
suffered during these examinations…. We do not understand very well
for whom these examinations are made. Very depressing ... (machine
translated from French)

Dear CIPO, You have asked for feedback on this issue so I feel that I
need to be honest with you. I think that there are many feelings,
including by myself and nearly every person I talk to about this who
have gone or are going through this process, that arise with respect to
the patent exams. This includes ambivalence, frustration, and a general
"protectionist" attitude by those administering / writing / marking this
exam. This "protectionist" attitude has little to do with the knowledge of
the individual examinees on the most part, who most are of M.Sc.,
Ph.D., LLB or JD level. With respect to CIPO, I feel it is a simply
method to control the level of individuals in the marketplace, and for no
other reason. Many candidates, including myself, feel that they have no
hope of completing these exams, ever. Many become dejected and just
move on, which I think is "criminal". It is such a waste of Canadian
talent. I have spoken to many individuals who tried for 3 and 4 years
and sometimes longer, and simply give up. Never if my life have I faced
such a weighted examination against an examinee I am a Ph.D, post
doctoral and J.D level educated individual. … How come no-one can
seem to pass these examinations, even the individuals who work for
CIPO as patent examiners. You may retort, well people do. I say that
the figure you show in your reports indicate that the pass rate is
abysmal and has been in decline for the past ten years. The overall first
try pass rates are 1-2 percent, the overall pass rate has fallen from 30%
to less than 10% in a decade and the years taken to pass the
examination has ballooned at the same time. An average of 4-5 years to
pass is totally ridiculous. That is longer than my Ph.D. and J.D
combined took to complete. That alone does not make sense to any right
minded individual…. I want to practice in this country. I am passionate
about law, and especially patent law. I have never felt passion such as
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this in anything but this field in my many and varied careers. To turn
my back on a career in this field after the work and sacrifice pains me.
As many before and after me, there will be a time when turning my back
on this will be necessary. And it will not be from lack of trying, it will
be the barrier that s been deliberately placed in front of all candidates
for the benefits of the current membership. I hope that this feedback
will be read in a constructive light and do no mean to demean the
valued service that CIPO does provide to practitioners in this field.
However, I firmly believe that our uniquely skilled individuals in this
field need to be nurtured, not excluded by such artificial barriers.
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APPENDIX ‘F’ - 2016 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL
ANALYSIS (PERCEPTION OF BIAS COMMENTS)
The following is a collection of comments from 2014 Canadian Patent Agent
Examinees regarding the exam, which comments highlight examinees perception of bias
in the examination development and administration process. The sample comments set
out below are several example responses taken from the set of provided feedback:
Provide IPIC with consistent information on what is expected/required
for passing each exam, for use during their annual exam prep courses.
… While I'm sure the process is meant to keep the number of people
passing low (something I'm sure the industry would want‐ supply &
demand), it is not particularly fair or provide the best outcome.

Stop having IPIC draft Papers A, B and D (they have a conflict of
interest and use fail rates as a barrier to entry). CIPO should draft all
exam questions.

The extremely low pass rate for Paper A relative to the pass rate 10
years ago is a consequence of the subjective nature of the marking
guide and the long list of divergences from the model answer that can
result in points being deducted. The exam administrators are long
overdue to correct the longstanding trend toward lower pass rates on
all four papers. The appearance of a conflict of interest should be
addressed ASAP.
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APPENDIX ‘G’ - EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CIPO AND IPIC
REGARDING CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Despite the serious perception of bias expressed in both the 2014 and 2016 High
Level Analysis reports, in both instances, CIPO sent both draft High-Level Analysis
reports to IPIC for review and comment prior to completion. CIPO sent a draft of the
2014 High Level Analysis to IPIC’s Director of Professional Development, who returned
a heavily revised version to CIPO, the revised version becoming the final 2014 High
Level Analysis.
For the 2016 High Level Analysis, the Chair of the Patent Agent Examination
Board sent a draft of the Analysis to IPIC, requesting that CIPO and IPIC create a “joint
statement of summary observations and conclusions” to “summariz[e] our observations,
and what we commit CIPO and IPIC Standards Committee to exploring in the next 12
months.” The Chair of the Patent Agent Examination Board requested that IPIC “attempt
a draft of that [joint] statement” in addition to requesting comments on the draft Analysis.
The draft 2016 Analysis that was sent to IPIC contained the following recommendations:
- Publishing the survey results and offering to assist candidates with
preparation- this section stated that “in the interests of transparency,
results of the 2016 survey should be made publicly available. The
candidates are clearly engaged and would be interested in the findings.
CIPO should demonstrate that the opinions of its clients are being heard
and attempts are being made to improve services.”
- Review Paper D- This section stated that “there were a number of
complaints regarding Paper D. There should be a review of the relevant
comments from the survey and a comparison of the 2016 Paper D with
previous years in terms of paper length, question clarity, and test
results”
- Publish answers from top papers – this section stated that CIPO
should “seek permission from candidates to publish examples of
answers which received top marks as a means to inform candidates on
what types of answers are expected of them”
- Review exam writing guides – this section had a number of revisions,
edits and strikethroughs, and stated that candidates identified the ‘CIPO
and IPIC’ exam writing guides as being “poorly received”, and that
they “should be reviewed to provide candidates more of the information
they are seeking” to “gain a better understanding of what information
candidates need”
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- Compile a syllabus – this section stated that “a comprehensive
syllabus should be developed for each paper. It has been identified as
something the candidates would like and may help with declining pass
rates. A syllabus could help maintain consistency with setting exams
from one-year to the next. Syllabi are common in other jurisdictions
for similar tests. (emphasis added)
In the revised version sent back to CIPO from IPIC, each of the above referenced
sections were struck out, which deletions were accepted by the Chair of the Patent Agent
Examination Board and were not included in the Final Analysis. Furthermore, in
accordance with IPIC’s recommendation, the 2016 High Level Analysis was not
published, and was accessible only through Access to Information request. Despite all of
the foregoing, CIPO’s major conclusion in the 2016 High Level Analysis regarding
reform of the patent agent licensing process was that “further input from the IPIC
Standards Committee should be sought.” (emphasis added)
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APPENDIX ‘H’ - 2016 PAPER A (SHOWING -10 MARK DEDUCTION)

For example, in the 2014 Paper A, the marking guide provided a breakdown of scores for
the independent apparatus claim as follows:

Similarly, for the 2015 Paper A Exam, referred to in the 2015 Paper A Marking Guide,
the marking breakdown was as follows:
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However, the 2016 Exam mark breakdown is as follows:

Both the 2014 and 2015 Exams (as well as several years before that) followed
roughly the same format in that marks were awarded for inclusion of certain elements,
with approximately 15 marks awarded for highlighting the element considered to be at
the point of novelty. Approximately 3-5 marks are deducted for superfluous claim
elements, 5 marks are deducted for elements found in a dependent claim, and 5 marks are
deducted for unclear language or inconsistencies.
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However, reviewing the 2016 Exam mark breakdown, it is apparent that the 2016
marking breakdown deviates from the last several years’ approach to marking. Rather
than following the same format as previous years, the 2016 Patent Agent Paper A
Examination Marking Guide also includes a ‘-10 marks for including the ‘attachment
member’’ in addition to the standard ‘-5 mark deduction’ for ‘superfluous element’,
‘element found in dependent claim’, and ‘unclear language and inconsistencies’. It is
impossible to know how or why the exact amount of ‘10 mark’ point deduction was
selected. This marking approach had never been included in any of previous ten years’
Paper A Marking Guides that are made available to candidates, i.e. for the 2005-2015.
Given that candidates only have previous years’ sample exams to use as study guides,
this unprecedented shift in marking causes significant prejudice to candidates.
Furthermore, given the presumption created by the redacted marking templates set out
under Appendix ‘D’, this creates the perception that the marking grid is being adjusted to
create an ideal pass rate.
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